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## The Sovereignty Contested about some countires, practical solution

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### Abstract

This paper, which focuses on the concept of language edutainment, introduces segments from several variety television programs that have been successful in comedic terms in Japan. Using a discourse analytic approach, the paper discusses the way in which three common and interdependent discourses on culture, language, and language learning are promulgated through popular media. We show that rather than opening up broader linguistic and cultural horizons for potential learners, these discourses function to narrow them down. The three discourses identified are: 1) an essentialised conflation of language and ethnic identity; 2) a reification of the native speaker; and 3) a defeatist discourse regarding language learning. These programs offer Japanese learners of English little to aspire to in terms of cultural and linguistic opportunities, and have, unfortunately, set the agenda for newer forms of language edutainment.

**Keywords:** English learning, Japan, language edutainment, native speakerism, stereotyping.

\* Professor Diana Patterson from Mount Royal University Calgary, AB Canada.

English has a high level of exposure on Japanese television. Learners of English can tune into teacher-centered lessons on English grammar as well as on conversational and business English. In addition to this formal education, a range of programs broadcast in English are subtitled in Japanese and learners can also select simultaneous interpretation options for news and other programs. Furthermore, within the highly popular variety and quiz show genres, there are featured segments in which Japanese speakers' use of English is tested and challenged, and these programs have enjoyed considerable longevity. In the first part of this paper we broaden and problematise the conventional definition of language edutainment and then overview English edutainment in Japan. We then introduce three examples of English quiz segments from variety television programs in Japan.

In the second part of the paper, we argue that, despite the entertaining nature of this type of English segment featured in variety programs, the genre frequently perpetuates three common and inter-dependent discourses that function to narrow down potential learners' linguistic and cultural horizons rather than to open them up. These interconnected discourses are those that are concerned with

1. the conflation of language and ethnic identity,
2. the reification of the native speaker, and
3. a defeatist discourse about language learning.

### **Problematising Language Edutainment**

The portmanteau *edutainment* – derived from the words *education* and *entertainment* – is a term that has most typically been employed to describe the hybridisation of ‘traditional sources of entertainment with educational tools’ (Bird 2005, p. 311). *Language edutainment*, therefore, refers to the utilisation of various forms of media (such as television, radio, computer software, personal game consoles, and the internet) in the teaching and learning of languages. Many previous studies from the field of second language pedagogy have advocated the integration of multimedia into traditional language learning contexts (e.g. Bird 2005; Iwasaki 2009; Matsuda 2008). In a complementary way, this paper looks at language edutainment beyond the control of educational authorities. In other words, while much other previous work has been focused on the ‘edu’, this paper problematises the ‘tainment’ side of English edutainment. Edutainment is underpinned by the assumption that for learning to be effective (i.e. *educational*), it should also be stimulating, engaging, and enjoyable (i.e. *entertaining*). For a text (such as a television programme) to qualify

as *edutainment* in the conventional sense of the term, it has generally been accepted that it ‘must have been produced for educational purposes’ (Walldén and Soronen 2004, p. 7). Nevertheless, there are a number of programmes that have been produced primarily to entertain, that also include educational elements. Therefore, the distinguishing feature of our modified conceptualisation of language edutainment includes, in addition to programmes that possess intrinsic educational value, programmes with a semblance of instructional content. Seargent (2009 p. 146) has noted that some scenarios in language edutainment segments merely borrow ‘the clothing’ of language education. Accordingly, we employ the umbrella term *language edutainment* to denote commercial representations of language learning which, while often presented as informative and educational, are designed primarily to entertain rather than educate. Here, we adopt a more critical approach to the content of language edutainment than has typically been offered, because, such material often perpetuates discourses about L1 speakers and second language learning that are problematic but too frequently escape the critical examination they deserve.

Moody (2006) has offered a useful categorisation of English language programming on Japanese television. He makes the overarching distinction between programs produced for children and programs produced for adults. Moody argues that although the primary objective of English programs produced for children (such as NHK's *Eigo de Asobo!* (Lets play in English)) is clearly language instruction, a distinction can be made between, on one hand, adult programs produced to *instruct* (such as *Jissen Bijinesu Eigo* (Practical Business English)), and on the other, those produced to *entertain* (e.g. *Eigo Shabera Naito* (Speak English Night / We Must Speak English)). Moody (2006 p. 216) points out that, unlike the instructional genre of English programming, a common characteristic of the latter category is that ‘all the English information appears in subtitled simultaneous translation’ and therefore, enjoyment of such programs does ‘not require that viewers understand the English’ contained within them.

In addition to full length programs utilising English for either instructional or entertainment purposes, Moody and Matsumoto (2011) have argued that shorter featured segments contained within so-called *baraeti bangumi* (variety shows) are also worthy of scholarly attention.

The programme containing these segments cannot be considered part of the language entertainment genre, but

the *featured segments* have the same generic features as other language entertainment programmes...These segments are designed to portray, usually with comic effect, many of the typical problems that Japanese speakers of English face when communicating in English.

(Moody and Matsumoto 2011, p. 167)

Importantly, such featured segments have relied strongly ‘on the exploration of foreign cultures and customs, and discussion of *differences* [our emphasis] between languages and expression’ (Moody 2006, p. 212). In addition to drawing on widespread perceptions of cultural and linguistic difference, these segments play up an additional nuance: that the compulsory study of English at junior and senior high school was, for the vast majority of Japanese, an onerous and largely unsuccessful experience (Matsuda 2011). Stated simply, it is the self-deprecating ridicule of a supposed universal failure among Japanese to speak English proficiently that makes these segments humorous.

In the following we introduce readers to three sample segments of English edutainment from Japanese television. We later draw on these in discussing the three interrelated discourses mentioned above that undermine the learning of English in Japan. The authors believe them to be typical examples of the formulas upon which this type of segment is based.

### **Examples of English Edutainment on Japanese Television**

#### **Example One: Karakuri Funniest English Segment**

The first example of a featured segment of English edutainment is *Karakuri Funniest English* from the programme *Sanma no Suupaa Karakuri Terebi* (Sanma’s Super Karakuri TV) (Tokyo Broadcasting System), a longstanding prime-time comic variety show hosted by the immensely popular comic veteran Sanma Akashiya. Typical segments on this program include a ‘Funniest Home Videos’ segment, street interviews with intoxicated businessmen, and trivia quizzes between slightly senile elderly citizens. In the *Karakuri Funniest English* segment, Thane Camus, a bilingual American, appears to stop people in the street and asks them to tell a personal anecdote relating to a specific theme (e.g. ‘Yourbikkuri [surprising] story’, ‘Your hazukashii [embarrassing] story’ etc.). The themed titles of these segments are in themselves interesting examples of intra-sentential code-switching which is a feature of the bilingual word-

play used in this genre of edutainment, and in the Japanese media more generally. After offering their personal anecdotes in Japanese, the participants are then asked to attempt to retell their stories in English. As Philip Sargeant (2009, pp. 146-147), who has offered an interesting analysis of *Karakuri Funniest English* has pointed out, these ‘anecdotes are always themed around an idiom or set phrase, and the whole theme is framed as a “lesson” in English usage’. In the segment that we describe below, for example, participants are asked to describe their ‘*akappaji* story’ (embarrassing story).

In one particular segment (able to be viewed on YouTube, see Murasaki 2011) which we analyse, a Japanese interviewee tells the story of his being alerted by children playing in the street to the fact that his Pikachu-patterned underpants were showing through the zip of his trousers. After describing the incident in Japanese, the interviewer asks him to relate it in English. The dialogue between the interviewer Camus (C) and the storyteller (S) is transcribed in Table 1 along with the simultaneous on-screen text subtitling. Hambleton (2011, p. 35) has pointed out that Japanese television customarily uses ‘the screen drop (teroppu), to subtitle speech or to add graphics to emphasise what is being said’. Sargeant (2009) analysed an anecdote on the theme of personal tragedy from the same program in which the screen drop was noted to be part of a ‘complex multimodal representation’. Different colours, font sizes, as well as the periodic insertion of katakana script are operationalised to emphasise the linguistic errors of the participants and underscore the overarching discourse that Japanese people are very poor English speakers.

*Source:* <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOoYDc4SnaY&feature=related>

This segment seems to be quite contrived. It is likely that it was planned in Japanese and back translated into English because, for example, a phrase such as ‘English please’ is not particularly natural English. As a translation of ‘英語お願いします!’ (Table 1, C1) one would rather expect either ‘Speak English please!’ or ‘In English please!’ There are also distinct differences between the English and the Japanese speaker’s initial story in Japanese. In fact, it is the interplay between the Japanese subtitling and the spoken English that triggers the laughter from the audience and this supports our earlier assertion that these segments are more about entertainment than language education.

### **Example Two: Karakuri Funniest Japanese**

Our next example of edutainment in a featured segment (view on YouTube, see urbanjapan 2010), *Karakuri Funniest Japanese*, is the converse of the segment *Karakuri Funniest English* outlined above in that it features an anecdote told in Japanese, the second language of the African-American interviewee. The interviewee, describing his ‘Shinjirarenai [unbelievable] Story’ recounts an incident in which he comments on the height of the heels being worn by a young woman in the street and how she slapped him following his erroneous use of the phrase *ookii ketsu* [big backside] rather than *ookii kutsu* [big shoes].

Although this appears as being spontaneous, there are signs to the contrary. Other studies that have examined the representation of foreign residents in Japanese television programs (e.g.: Hambleton 2011; Iwabuchi 2007) have shown that variety programs, rather than being spontaneous and unscripted, are highly orchestrated and edited to portray foreign participants in a certain light. A simple internet search reveals that the ‘randomly’ stopped foreigner appearing in this segment is, in fact, the bilingual American actor, Craig Nine, with over 150 credits on Japanese television to his name. In this example too, as with the previous clip, the Japanese error of the storyteller seems somewhat farfetched, because the word *kutsu* [shoes] is such a high frequency lexical item invariably introduced to beginner learners. It is also worth noting that the performative, scripted nature of this popular segment has been widely commented on in an online forum in which several former participants allege having been told what to say by producers of the program they were appearing in. For example, someone using the name Gaijin Gal and claiming to have been a former participant on the show made the following accusation in an online blog:

*i [sic] was in the segment 'karakuri's funniest japanese' [sic] & i [sic] was surprised that it's all scripted! they[sic] told us what to say! i [sic] can speak Japanese [sic] fairly well, but they told me some stupid mistakes to make, i [sic] was so embarrassed!*

*so, from now on when u [sic] watch that show – [sic] remember that the people appearing usually*

*know better. well [sic], at least they pay us well for it! :)*


‘Gaijin Gal’, 2001

The final example of language edutainment in this paper is from the segment *Geinoujin [Celebrity] Private Photo Summit* which appears periodically on Nihon Terebi’s popular variety show *Gurunai*. The setting is a mock summit between celebrity contestants dressed up as well-known political figures (interestingly though, not always of the same era) such as General Douglas Macarthur, Barak Obama, Mikhail Gorbachev, Hillary Clinton, and Junichi Koizumi. In this segment, the celebrity contestants are shown a photo of a contemporary Japanese celebrity. Contestants are asked, in turn, to choose an item in the photo (e.g. a hat, a glass, a flower etc.), circle it, and state the English word for that item. The contestant’s pronunciation of each word is heavily scrutinised by the gatekeeper of authentic English pronunciation, a white English speaker. If the contestant’s pronunciation is deemed to be authentic enough, s/he is rewarded with a point. If not, the contestant is forced to restate the word, numerous times in some cases, until s/he is deemed to have pronounced it correctly, s/he elects to pass, or time elapses. The contestant’s struggle to clear this challenge provides the humour in this. The contestant found to have the worst English at the summit is rounded up by two supposedly scary black men dressed in dark suits and wearing sunglasses. One of the men holds the contestant in a fireman’s lift while the other spansks him on the bottom much to the delight of the other contestants and the studio audience.

### **Discussion**

This discussion critiques the genre of variety television that we have exemplified above via three interdependent discourses that have been identified in a range of academic works. They are: 1) a conflation of language and ethnic identity; 2) the reification of the native speaker; and 3) the discourse of failure in foreign language learning. It is not possible to completely separate these because each of the three discourses is both reliant on, and operationalised, by the other two. While acknowledging the significant overlapping in these discourses, we will discuss each in turn.

**Figure 1. The interdependency of language edutainment discourses**



### **The Nihonjinron conflation of language and national/racial/ethnic identity**

*The Nihonjinron* (日本人論 – literally, theories of ‘Japaneseness’) is a body of literature – and the discourse that literature sustains – that espouses an essentialist ‘uniquely unique’ (Sugimoto 1997, p. 2) characterisation of Japan’s sociological and psychological essence. These works depict Japanese society as racially and culturally homogeneous, and, in relation to language, the archetypical *Nihonjinron* formulations, according to Maher and Yashiro (1995, p. 10), erroneously presume national monolingualism and the uniqueness of the Japanese language itself.

Although in academic discourses the *Nihonjinron* ideology has been largely discredited for two decades (e.g.: Befu 1993; Denoon et al. 2001; Noguchi 2001) we argue that its popularist manifestations – such as discourses that can be found in language edutainment programming – remain prevalent in contemporary Japanese society. In particular, we believe that the *Nihonjinron* ideology that shapes discourses about foreign language learning in Japan is predicated on three fundamental assumptions that are prevalent in such programs.

First, there exists a widespread assumption that the nature of the Japanese language is somehow distinctly different from all other languages. In *Nihonjinron* discourse, Japanese is frequently juxtaposed against other languages (usually English) which, in relation to Japanese, are presumed to be less nuanced and vague, as well as more rhetorical and easier to master (Kubota 1998). Indeed, the view that a mystical linguistic spirit (*kotodama* 言靈, see Miller’s famous 1982 work) renders Japanese, in comparison to other languages, virtually impossible for non-Japanese to acquire, remains pervasive (Gottlieb 2005 pp. 4-5; 2012, p.

13). The assumption here that, given the presumed distance between English and Japanese, L2 learners from each language background will have great difficulty learning the other language, is unsustainable.

The featured segments in the *Karakuri* programs mentioned above persistently show L2 learners of English and Japanese respectively to be inept at using the second language. Furthermore, in our third example, *Geinoujin* [Celebrity] Private Photo Summit from the programme *Gurunai*, the highly racialised nature of the cultural and linguistic divide is exaggerated. The humour in this segment is created through the knowledge that the Japanese celebrities dressing up as foreign political figures are totally hopeless in their attempts to successfully deploy alternative linguistic identities to that of Japanese-speaking monolingual. With the Japanese language so profoundly connected to cultural nationalism and identity in Japan (Yoshino 1992 pp. 12-17; Gottlieb 2012 p. 13), it is not surprising that English is sometimes referred to as the ‘alien language’ (Dougill 2008).

The second *Nihonjinron* premise concerning foreign language learning is that using a foreign language requires Japanese to somehow enact personality traits presumed to be non-Japanese. Evidence of this is that one of the goals of the JET (Japan English Teacher) Program through which thousands of English native speakers are deployed to Japanese schools as assistant English teachers is to help students become accustomed to foreigners (McConnell 2000) and their assumed difference. Moody and Matsumoto (2011), for example, argue that the ideal Japanese speaker of English is someone who is able to overcome their (presumably, as a

Japanese, innate) fear and shyness in speaking a foreign language, and is able to display courage (*yuuki*), self-effacement (*jigyaku*), and enthusiasm (*genki*). ‘Being shy (*hazukashii*)’ writes McVeigh (2002, p. 108), ‘is often used as an excuse as to why students cannot or will not express themselves, and this description seems to make sense in a society where modesty and self-restraint are strong cultural desirables.’ This commonly heard remark, McVeigh argues ‘is similar to other culturalist yarns: for example that ‘Japan is culturally homogeneous’; ‘Japan is a small country’; ‘Japanese is a unique language like no other’ and so on (2002, p. 108). Thus, the *Nihonjinron* ideology seems to erroneously conflate a presumed and particularly unique difficulty in learning foreign languages with issues of race, nationality, and ethnicity.

Institutional embodiment of the theory of Japanese uniqueness has been discussed separately by Hashimoto (2000) and Liddicoat (2007a; 2007b) who’s textual analyses of government policy documents show English education to be an exercise in Japanisation. In other words, English is frequently positioned in opposition to Japanese, and in the clips we have discussed, the non-Japanese characters are repeatedly positioned in contrast to Japanese people. Taken singularly, this contrastive positioning that is ripe for comedic exploitation may seem innocuous. But as a consistently repeated theme in this genre and elsewhere, a negative understanding of human’s potential to learn and expand their linguistic and cultural repertoires outside their first language and cultural environment is created.

### **The Reification of the Native Speaker**

‘One consequence of relating the concept of Japanese ethnocentrism to foreign language learning’ writes Sargeant (2009, p. 56), ‘is that it prioritises the role of culture in ELT practice’. He goes on to argue that in Japan, native-speaker teachers are seen as representing, first and foremost, the target foreign culture to the extent that their role and appointment as instructors of specialized knowledge is overshadowed by their status as authentic living cultural artifacts. This reliance on an ‘essentialised notion of national and ethnic identities of both home and foreign language culture’ (Breckenridge and Erling 2011, p. 98) has had a profound impact on the way foreign languages are taught and studied in Japan. For example, that the hiring practices of English language schools – particularly those in the commercial *eikaiwa* (English conversation school) sector – have been, for many years, racially based is well-documented (Bailey 2006; Breckenridge and Erling, 2011, p.85; Hall, 1998; McVeigh, 2002, p. 167; Sargeant, 2009), and the dominant underlying assumption in Japan

seems to be that to teach ‘authentic’ English, you have to conform to a narrow set of physical and personal characteristics.

Rivers (2011, p. 3) offers a prototypical exemplar of the ideal native speaker teacher in Japan. Linguistically, he argues, in order to maintain perceptions of purity and authenticity, the native speaker teacher must be perceived to be utterly monolingual. Demonstration of proficiency – or even interest – in Japanese is firmly discouraged. Racially, the ideal native speaker should come from an ‘inner-circle’ (Kachru, 1992) country, and of course, be tall and good looking. Behaviorally, the ideal native speaking teacher should be charismatic, optimistic, and extroverted. S/he should be unconditionally willing to speak to anyone in the foreign language about all subjects, except, of course, problems regarding EFL education in Japan. And culturally, the ideal native speaker teacher should embrace all cultural events (e.g.: Christmas, Halloween) consistent with stereotypical images of the native speaker’s home country, regardless of their actual personal or religious beliefs.

The reification of the native speaker rests on several questionable assumptions. In their review of the existing literature, Breckenridge and Erling (2011, p. 82) cite numerous studies that indicate students often *perceive* native speaker teachers to be more linguistically competent, outgoing, talkative, flexible, and innovative than their non-native speaker counterparts. It has also been shown that students often rely heavily on native speakers, who, as authentic linguistic resources, are expected to legitimise students’ use of the target language (Silver 2011). Kirkpatrick’s (2007, p. 8) summation of this issue is precise: ‘...many people believe that native speakers are necessarily better at speaking English than non-native speakers.’ In the case of Japan, Yano writes,

The majority of Japanese think that only native speaker English is real, natural, and authentic, and thus worthy of learning. They pursue the impossible dream of obtaining ‘native’ or ‘near-native’ proficiency in English. It is not uncommon to encounter newspaper and magazine articles saying that since an overwhelming majority of teachers of English are Japanese Japan needs to hire more native speaker English teachers so that the learners can have access to genuine English.

Yano (2011, p. 131)

However, despite the mantle upon which native speakers are often positioned, the constructs of native and non-native speaker have, due in large part to the growth of Critical Applied Linguistics (see Pennycook 2001), increasingly been problematised. Tsuda (1997, p. 25) writes that ‘the Japanese...glorify English, its culture and speakers’

to the extent that they are suffering from '*Eigo Byo*' (English Disease) or 'Anglomania'. In her paper entitled 'Who, if anyone, is a native speaker?' Piller (2001) argues that the very notion of a native speaker is conceptually flawed and removed from reality. 'Linguistically, the native speaker concept is useless...' she argues, 'As discourse analysts, however, we should carefully examine discourses about native speakers and the mother tongue as instances of the discursive construction of difference, deficit, and domination' (Piller 2001, p. 14). Piller fittingly asserts that 'native-speakerism' – a term later used by Holliday (2005) – requires critical examination. Native speaking teachers, it should be noted, have also been subjected to back-handed, disparaging labels including that of 'professional egoist' (Barratt and Kontra 2000, p. 21) and the 'native non-teacher' (de Almeida Mattos 1997, p. 38) (both of these references cited in Breckenridge and Erling 2011, p. 84).

The genre of variety programs that we have described above consistently employs Caucasian native speakers of English from 'inner circle countries' (Kachru 1992) to judge the English of Japanese participants. Nothing escapes their attention, however, even when what the L2 speakers say is quite comprehensible. The subtext for learners is that good is not good enough for the authentic target interlocutor, the native speaker. The 'them' and 'us' approach to native speakers and Japanese speakers of English, is further emphasised in these programs by the application of different colours, fonts, and scripts in subtitles. In all our examples of language edutainment, the English and Japanese proficiency of second language speakers is subjected to the judgments of native speakers. For example, in the *Geinoujin* Private Photo Summit featured segment, it is a white English native speaker who brings down the judgment regarding the accuracy of the contestants' pronunciation, and it is the black native speakers who meter out the punishment to those deemed to have failed.

The racial embodiment of English speakers creates an impossible hurdle for Japanese learners and the unrealistic linguistic goal of L1 competence also sets the bar unnecessarily high for them. Rather than setting competence goals akin to that of native speakers, a discourse of acceptable imperfection in communicative competence would be helpful to English learners. Likewise, the faces and voices of some of the many successful Japanese speakers of English would neutralise the negative messages being sent to potential learners.

In both examples from the *Karakuri* segments, Thane Camus, the interviewer, continually laughs at, corrects, mocks, and ridicules the participants for their poor linguistic ability. Although we have

argued earlier that a large portion of language learners appearing on Japanese television are portrayed as linguistically incompetent, Mr. Camus, who was raised and educated in Japan, is an exception. Camus appears anomalous in this regard. While he embodies most of Rivers' prototypical native speaker characteristics, such as being tall, good-looking, enthusiastic, and extroverted, his point of departure is his high level of Japanese proficiency. We argue that Mr. Camus belongs to a rarified class of foreign celebrities who are celebrities for the very reason that they defy expectations regarding bilingualism. He is the bilingual explainer that is needed to bridge the linguistic and cultural gulf.

### ***Discourses of Failure regarding Foreign Language Learning***

We have so far discussed the negative inference that Japanese are culturally unsuited to speaking/learning English and that native speakers are the only authentic speakers of both Japanese and English. The third discourse we believe to be perpetuated in our examples of language edutainment programming is a discourse of failure in foreign language learning in Japan. The humor underpinning all of the segments we have introduced rests on the belief that, despite six years of compulsory English education in the junior/senior high school system, Japanese people, invariably, cannot speak English. English education, this discourse implies, is a complete failure, and any effort to become proficient in the language will prove futile. Stated simply, it is a perceived shared experience of failed foreign language study that is being lampooned in these programs.

According to Sargeant (2009, p. 3), 'one of the most frequently voiced opinions about English in Japan is that the high profile of, and indeed, immense interest in, the language is not matched by an equally high level of communicative proficiency among the population'. That Japan, by TOEFL scores, is frequently outperformed by other Asian countries is a fact that has been cited virtually *de rigueur* in all discussions about the apparent poor state of English learning in the country (e.g.: Honna 1995, p. 57; McKenzie 2010, p. 10, McVeigh 2002; Sargeant 2009, p. 47; Sargeant 2011, p. 188). Sargeant (2009, p. 47) has labeled the pessimism with which English education is often discussed as the 'problem frame' around which debate and discussion is often conducted.

The discourse of failure relating to foreign language learning is widespread, not only within the language edutainment genre, but throughout the mass media. 'Japanese media of all types', posits one online contributor to the website Everything<sup>2</sup> (quoted in Sargeant, 2009, p. 150), 'strongly sup-

port the image that Japanese, no matter how much they study, simply cannot speak English'. This, coupled with the justification that English is too difficult and that Japanese people do not have the cultural make up for speaking it, are powerful demotivators for English learning, especially when there are men in black coming to get you when you fail.

In the three examples discussed in this paper, the acceptance of failure in second language learning is pervasive and celebrated in the comedy. The Japanese storytellers in the *Karakuri Funniest English* program seem happy to contribute to the normalisation of failure in English, and their counterparts in the *Karakuri Funniest* Japanese segment appear to be cooperative in furthering the myth that non-Japanese cannot acquire Japanese either. Earlier in this paper we have pointed to the strong beliefs regarding the Japanese language and culture that provide justification of this failure. The defeatist discourse negatively influences potential learners of English.

### Conclusion

This paper has sought to problematise the content of edutainment in second language learning by identifying three interdependent discourses that are perpetuated by a particular genre of Japanese television programming. The discourses concern: 1) a conflation of language and ethnic identity; 2) a reification of the native speaker; and 3) a defeatist discourse about language learning. We have argued that this genre of television emerges from and contributes to the three discourses. Our concern is that they impact on language learners in negative ways predisposing them to believe success in foreign languages and language learning to be unachievable.

This mindset undermines English education in Japan.

Seargent and others (Seargent 2011b, p. 3, see also Higgins 2009; Pennycook 2010) have advocated the viewing of language as a 'situated social practice' and Seargent has also maintained that scholars need to consider the ways in which English 'is displayed as part of a far wider semiotic practice' (Seargent 2009, p. 1) rather than merely paying attention to learner language or the linguistic organisation of the variety that has come to be called 'Japanese English'. We believe that in the case of the television segments that we have presented, there appears to be a lighthearted engagement with English learning. However, we have revealed that even in this material there are negative messages to learners that have pedagogical implications. Where teachers more fully understand the ways in which second language learners are socio-culturally preconditioned to relate to foreign language(s), their teaching practice becomes more informed and effective. Finally, newer forms of language edutainment – such as the i-Phone application 'What if your boyfriend was a foreigner?', (Jackson 2011; Jackson & Kennett 2012) – also display elements that we have critiqued from the example segments. This demonstrates the level of entrenchment and uncritical acceptance of these beliefs. While we do not wish to wreck anyone's fun, continued scholarly attention to these forms of edutainment is warranted. Further, teachers and learners need to learn to view this material critically so that they can challenge the negative discourses about language learning and ethnic identity that narrow their potential as learners and their interaction as human beings.

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#### Notes

[1] Although the verb form ‘asobou’ (let’s play) has a final long vowel and is thus conventionally Romanized with a final ‘u’, the Japanese title of this programme appears in the hiragana script as ‘asobo’ – a softer, child-like usage of the expression (see also Moody, 2006: 213).

[2] The title *Eigo de Shabera Naito* is a word play. It can be interpreted as meaning something approximating both ‘We must speak English’ and ‘English Speaking Night (see also Moody, 2006, p. 213).

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## From Sovereignty to Imperium: The West Borders and the Specter of Neo-Imperialism

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### Abstract:

Interest in Japanese popular culture, particularly young people's engagement with manga and animation, is widely acknowledged to be a driving factor in recruitment to undergraduate Japanese language and studies courses at universities around the world. Contemporary students live in a convergent media culture where they often occupy multiple roles as fans, students and 'produsers' of Japanese cultural content. Students' easy access to and manipulation of Japanese cultural content through sites that offer 'scanlation' and 'fansubbing' services as well as sites that enable the production and dissemination of dojin works raise a number of ethical and legal issues, not least infringement of copyright. However equally important are issues to do with the transnational consumption and production of Japanese cultural materials that are subject to different ratings systems and censorship. The sexualised content of some Japanese media, particularly in regard to representations of characters who may 'appear to be' minors, has become the site of increased concern in some countries, notably Canada and Australia where fictional depictions of child characters have been included in the definition of 'child-abuse publications'. The ever expanding scope of this legislation has led to the recent arrest and prosecution of manga and anime fans in both these countries and in the US.

This paper asks what role, if any, do educators have in alerting students to the problematic nature of studying, consuming, producing and disseminating contentious media content? How do we support students, balancing the need for academic freedom against requirements to live by the ethical and legal frameworks set by local authorities?

**Keywords:** Japanese popular culture, internet, copyright, manga, pornography.

## Introduction

This paper began its life as a presentation at the conference ‘Teaching Japanese Popular Culture’, convened at the University of Singapore in November 2012, where I was asked to reflect on my experience teaching about Japan to undergraduates in Australia. The issues discussed below therefore focus mainly on the Australian context and are necessarily anecdotal—based on my own experience and that shared with me by colleagues. However I have attempted to broaden the argument and show that the ethical and legal issues I confront in the classroom each semester as a result of overbroad or misguided legislation are of concern elsewhere and are worthy of sustained consideration by all those with an investment in Japanese popular culture whether as teachers, researchers, students or fans.

In the late 1980s when I first began to study Japanese at university, enrolments were largely prompted by students attracted by Japan’s economic success and international business profile. More recently, however, interest in ‘cool Japan’, particularly young people’s engagement with animation, comics and gaming, is widely acknowledged to be a driving factor in recruitment to undergraduate Japanese language and studies courses at universities around the world (Armour 2011; Tsutsui 2010; McGraw 2002). Unlike the 1980s when obtaining original Japanese-language materials outside Japan was time consuming and expensive, contemporary students now live in a convergent media environment where they occupy multiple roles as fans, students and ‘produsers’ (producers + users; Bruns 2008; Flew 2012: 7) of Japanese cultural content that is available via the Internet. The field of Japanese Studies has seen not only a transformation in the kinds of students attracted to the discipline, but also in the modes of engagement that these students have with Japanese popular culture more generally.

Although niche interest in aspects of Japanese popular culture had existed among some people since the original export of Japanese animations to Western countries in the 1960s, from the 1980s onward Japanese anime, in particular, has gained a mainstream audience. Anime and associated merchandise (games, manga, figurines, cards, cosplay) associated with globally successful franchises such as *Naruto*, *Power Rangers* and *Pokemon* (Napier 2010; Tobin 2004) have become part of the childhood experience of many children in Australia, the US and elsewhere and the animated feature films of Studio Ghibli have also attracted a widespread adult audience. However, in comparison with the large number of manga and anime produced and

made available in Japan, only a very small proportion of titles are ever commercially released in English. Furthermore there can be a long time lag between the original Japanese release date and the licensing of an English translation which makes fans impatient. Also important is the fact that many Japanese anime are altered in the localisation process—most often sexual references are edited out and any violence is toned down so as to fit with Western notions of what is acceptable for a young audience (see for example, Parini 2012). This frustrates many die-hard fans who are eager to view the original unadulterated series (Daniels 2008: 710).

Hence, as well as these mainstream products which have been officially licensed to overseas companies, translated into English, given appropriate viewer ratings and conventionally distributed, an enormous amount of unofficially translated and transmitted material also exists on the internet driven by fan demands. Original Japanese anime titles are dubbed or subtitled (so-called ‘fandubs’ and ‘fansubs’) and manga scanned and translated (so-called ‘scanlations’) into English and other languages by circles of fans and distributed via fan sites and peer-to-peer networks (Lee 2012; Condry 2010; Hatcher 2005). New technologies not only enable the spread of these unofficial versions of Japanese media products to a wider audience but they break ‘the link between media content and delivery platforms’ (Flew 2012: 7). Hence fans themselves have taken on ‘active roles as mediators and distributors’ and facilitated the ‘bottom-up spread of culture across geographical and linguistic borders’ (Lee 2011: 113) in a manner that evades industry and government regulation. The ease of manipulating digital content in today’s ‘remix culture’ (Lessig 2008) has also resulted in an equally voluminous amount of fan-generated content based on Japanese originals. Known in Japanese as *dōjin*(coterie) products, these ‘transformative works’ are also widely available online and popular among fans (Lam 2010; Hatcher 2005).

New circuits of distribution enabled by social media including sites like Tumblr, Facebook and Reddit as well as video sharing sites such as YouTube and the Japanese site Nico nico douga have made this remixed material widely available. Despite the fact that fansubbers evince a “strong desire to support the local animation industry by promoting anime culture and widening anime’s accessibility” (Lee 2011: 1138; see also Hatcher 2005) their activities do impact negatively on sales. Also, given that these circuits of production and redistribution are illegal in terms of international copyright law, they have at times resulted in the

Japanese manga, anime, and gaming industries taking legal action (Lee 2012; Anime News Network 2010). Hence, students' easy access to and manipulation of Japanese cultural content through sites that offer scanlation and fansubbing hosting services, as well as sites that enable the production and dissemination of derivative *dōjin* works, raises a number of ethical and legal issues, not least infringement of copyright.

In addition to concerns over copyright there are problems to do with the increased flow of Japanese cultural materials that are treated differently by various viewer-ratings systems. A clear example of these inconsistencies is the treatment of the parody anime *Puni Puni Poemy* (2001), directed by Watanabe Shinichi (who also made the popular *Excel Saga*). This title has received an MA15 rating in Australia, an R18+ rating in the UK, but was banned in New Zealand

in 2004 over concerns about the apparent age of its main character, who is subject to exaggerated comical violence and sexual acts. Indeed the trailer for the anime on Australia's Madman distribution network plays with the controversy over the title, asking that viewers 'don't sue us' because they have removed all "nudity, groping and inappropriate use of fish."

This example illustrates Eiland's point that "obscenity is based upon cultural norms" (2009: 406) which can differ even among societies as closely related as the UK, New Zealand and Australia.

In fact, in recent years, the violent and sexualised content of some Japanese media, particularly in regard to representations of characters who may 'appear to be' minors, has caused considerable concern in some countries, notably the US, the UK, Canada, Sweden, New Zealand and Australia, where fictional depictions of child characters have been included in the definition of "child-abuse publications" (McLelland 2012; Eiland 2009; Zanghellini 2008). The ever-expanding scope of this legislation has led to serious charges being laid against some manga and anime collectors in these jurisdictions. In one recent Swedish case, a professional manga translator was convicted over cartoon images stored on his computer that appeared to depict minors in sexual contexts (Orange 2012). Although this conviction was later overturned in the Supreme Court, it demonstrates how fans, academics and students alike should exercise extreme caution over which manga images they choose to archive. As Eiland notes, "No one with comic images in their possession—which can include viewing them on a computer—can afford not to know the law" (2009: 396).

Furthermore, while anime such as *Poemy* that have been licensed and distributed through official

channels at least have ratings attached, *dōjin* works, which might have received a PG rating for their official versions, are often 'sexed up' in fan creations to an extent that they would receive adult-only ratings or be banned altogether in some jurisdictions. Take for example the *Harry Potter* franchise, the movie versions of which are rated M in Australia. M for 'mature' is the highest unrestricted rating, meaning that it does not specify a minimum viewing age but advises that the film "contains material that may require a mature perspective but is not deemed too strong for younger viewers." Young people, who may initially consume the 'official' *Harry Potter* texts in books purchased from the store or by viewing the movies on DVD, if they were to follow their interest online, would encounter thousands of fan creations specialising in *Harry Potter* slash (sexualised fan-authored stories and artwork). Indeed highly sexualised *Harry Potter* manga are a major *dōjin* genre in Japan and internationally (Orbaugh 2010). Concerns about children accessing this material while searching for official *Harry Potter*ties on the internet have prompted the author J.K. Rowling to send a cease and desist letter via her publisher to at least one *Harry Potter* fan site hosting such "sexually explicit content."

Hence, although official ratings systems may be useful for gauging what material is suitable to use in class or as the basis for student research projects, students do not only access officially distributed merchandise but download other material directly from the internet. The irony of the New Zealand ban on *Puni Puni Poemy*, for instance, is that episodes from the series can be downloaded for free from YouTube and the ban is only likely to increase people's interest in the title.

Concerns about copyright, ratings and exposure to potentially illegal content are serious issues for those of us teaching Japanese popular culture in the classroom, although to date the literature discussing these last two issues is scant (McLelland 2012; Noppe 2010; Zanghellini 2009; McLelland and Yoo 2007). In this paper I will first discuss the context in which I teach about Japan and then outline the legal and ethical issues I have encountered both in the classroom and in my own research.

### **Where and how I teach about Japan**

Although my PhD training is in Japanese Studies, I am a sociologist working in a school comprising social sciences and media and communication studies. I do not teach courses that are specifically about Japan, although I do use many examples from Japan in my teaching, and my students (some of whom are taking Japanese language classes) like to use Japanese examples in their project work. One course where topics deriving from Japanese popular

culture occur with some frequency is my third-year level ‘Globalisation and Social Transformation’, which enrols around 100 students annually. The subject outline promises that classes will attempt to de-centre ‘the West’ by focussing on Japan’s role as an important node in the creation and recycling of popular culture. The main intellectual paradigm deployed in this enterprise is that of Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) five ‘scapes’, the ethnoscapes, financescape, and in particular technoscapes, mediascapes and ideoescapes that define and condition global flows of culture in a digital age. One key question that I pose to students is “What happens when content from specific locales moves around increasingly de-territorialised mediascapes via the internet?” The case studies we look at in class include the movement from ‘hard’ (militarist, corporate) to ‘soft’ (J-pop and manga) power in Japan. This involves discussing comparative masculinities and looking at the regional popularity of Japanese boy bands and the manner in which they have inspired a “pan-East-Asian soft masculinity” (Jung 2009) quite distinct from the male pop idols in some Western countries.

Another topic involves the indigenisation of manga/anime for Western audiences and the recycling of content in *dōjin* work. The main point of comparison here is the different ways in which complex gender and sexual issues are incorporated into media for children and young people in Japan, and the main example explored is Japanese Boys Love (BL) comics popular with women and girls. From an intellectual standpoint, given the focus of the class, it would be remiss not to address the radical implications of the global flows of fans’ own ‘transformative works’ in this new media environment. Indeed, as Axel Bruns argues, there is a need for educators to teach “new literacies to enable users to work effectively and assuredly with the artefacts of produsage” (2008: 339). Hence, the class also considers these global flows alongside the legal and ethical issues concerned with the production, distribution and consumption of these materials.

### **What are the legal issues?**

As Nele Noppe points out in relation to teaching Japanese popular culture through one of its most prominent forms, manga:

Manga studies focus on a medium with a large proportion of young and tech-savvy readers, a considerable number of whom are involved in some form of online fannish interaction and directly experience the disconnect between legal restrictions and technological realities (2010).

Many of my students take my course because they are interested in Asia (and are studying Japanese or Chinese language). Some of these students

are of Asian-Australian backgrounds or are exchange students from Asian countries and already have a strong interest in and long experience of engagement with manga and anime due to the prominence of these media in their families’ cultures of origin, including Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China. However, all students in their early 20s in Australia have had some exposure to Japanese popular culture having grown up during the 1990s *Pokemon* boom. Many of my students have a far more detailed understanding of specific manga and anime titles than I do and some regularly visit Japanese pop culture events such as *animania*. I have also encountered students who cosplay and produce their own *dōjin* works.

In a convergent media environment, students are used to a cut-and-paste culture which makes the development of assessment items, whether they are essays, reports or larger scale presentation-projects, an exercise in bricolage—browsing the web and then cutting, pasting and reworking material. Of course lecturers do this to a certain extent but given that much of our teaching material needs to be delivered online or placed in an online repository such as Moodle, university staff have to take copyright concerns very seriously, especially in the face of random audits of our teaching sites. One problem that has arisen recently in my institution is that in two auditoriums the software used automatically to record lectures for placement in Moodle for student access has been programmed not to record any copyrighted material played in a lecture. The playing of a YouTube clip live in a lecture, for instance, is apparently within the copyright guidelines but the recording of that clip as part of the lecture for redistribution to students is an infringement. Hence students in the lecture itself will see the video clip whereas students accessing the lecture from remote campuses will see only a blank screen. Incidents such as this further compound the difficulty of teaching ‘digital literacies’ that involve the viewing and critique of artefacts from ‘remix culture’.

So far, most scrutiny of student work (at my university at least) is centred on plagiarism (making sure that students’ sources are properly attributed). However as students are increasingly encouraged to submit their work online (and it therefore comes to reside on a university-maintained server), it is likely that this work will also begin to be audited for copyright compliance. This is a growing concern given that students are now encouraged to take advantage of the convergent multi-media environment and include images and even sound clips and videos as part of their project work. It is unclear how copyright restrictions would apply to students’ own *dōjin* work produced as part of an assignment.

As Matthew Rimmer (2012) points out, despite the fact that a number of “creative artists, fans and amateurs, citizen journalists, scholars and researchers, and others... rely upon copyright exceptions,” there is no government department or citizen’s agency that champions fair use in Australia that could advise on these issues. Given that university lawyers tend to be risk averse, it is likely that the administration would take a dim view of such student activities.

Another aspect of contemporary convergence culture concerning copyright is that students and academics alike travel with all their ‘stuff’, including image and music files and work and study related materials, on devices such as laptops and iPads. People are increasingly reliant on an internet environment that enables “multi-tasking and mobility” (Han 2011: 73) and yet the archiving of all users’ stuff on convergent devices exposes them to increased surveillance by the state. Carolyn Guertin has noted how since 2008 in the US, border guards have been given increased oversight of copyright infringement and “have the right to seize any digital devices or files without suspicion of wrongdoing” (2012:13). Guertin queries whether these ‘copyright cops’ are able to distinguish between academic fair use and piracy. Inconsistencies in the ratings of Japanese pop culture content across jurisdictions, as mentioned above, is another problem that can arise as students and academics move across borders. The Canadian Customs and Border Control, in particular, have demonstrated an enhanced scrutiny of manga and anime in recent years, as will be detailed later.

One more contentious issue regarding the kinds of material that students use in their assignments and show in class concerns sexual explicitness. As has been widely noted in alarmist articles in the Anglophone press (McLelland 2003), Japanese popular culture does not segregate material of a sexual nature to the same extent as some countries in the West. Although the manufacture and dissemination of child pornography was made illegal in Japan in 1999, ‘simple possession’ of these materials is still not an offense (McLelland 2011: 359). Furthermore, despite recent attempts by conservative politicians, in particular the previous Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō, to reign in sexualised depictions in media available to young people (McLelland 2011), as Tobin points out “there is much less concern in Japan than in the West about the presence of sexual themes in media texts enjoyed by children” (2004: 284; see also Daniels 2008: 721-22). One clip I have used in another class (a second-year course entitled ‘Genders and Sexualities’) to demonstrate different cultural sensibilities around what is considered appropriate

content for children is from popular anime *Crayon Shin-chan*. The character Shin-chan (the chan suffix is a diminutive title), a precocious and troublesome four year old, was first introduced as a character in an adult manga, but became very popular with children after a toned-down anime version was screened on TV Asahi at 7.00 pm (Grigsby 1999: 186).

The scene is of Shin-chan’s bath time—already a touchy scenario for Australian viewers because he appears naked—even touchier is that his mother joins him in the tub (a common bathing habit in Japan), where they begin a conversation about why he doesn’t have breasts. Anyone familiar with the series would know that one persistent strand of humour is Shin-chan’s sexual precociousness, a topic that would not be alluded to in an Australian children’s show or a Disney animation. Indeed references to sexual precocity are widespread across Japanese children’s media as further evidenced by *Doraemon* character Nobi Nobita’s interest in lifting girls skirts and as discussed in sex-education books for prepubescent children such as Makayuri Fumiko and Tanaka Shinsuke’s (2003) *Ke ke ke* (Hair, hair, hair) which has the text “Hey, why does my dad’s dick have hair on it?” and other questions I want to ask mum’ emblazoned on the book’s *obi* (promotional wrap-around sash).

Of particular concern, however, is the manner in which there are genres within Japanese manga and anime, specifically *rori* (Lolita), *hentai* (perverse sex) and *yaoi* or ‘Boys Love’, that represent actual sexual acts among characters who are or may ‘appear to be’ minors (under the age of 16 or 18, depending on local legislation). The only genre that I introduce for pedagogic purposes is ‘Boys Love’ (also referred to as BL). Although to those outside the fandom, ‘boys love’ in the Western context may conjure up images of adult male pederasty, Japanese researchers into BL manga point out that “The BL phenomenon is... a female gendered space, since its participants—writers, artists, readers, and the majority of editors—are female” (Mizoguchi 2003: 53). Given BL’s ‘overwhelmingly female’ readership (Nagaike 2003: 77), the pornographic nature of these stories and illustrations may come as a surprise to those not familiar with Japanese culture—and that is precisely why I use this genre to generate classroom discussion. Despite the fact that much of the debate about pornography in a Western context assumes a generalised male consumer, in Japan there are numerous pornographic print media created and consumed by women. Although the ratings category ‘adult’ (*seinen*) is applied to manga containing explicit sex or fetishes, and these products are shrink wrapped and sold

only in specialty stores, the ‘aesthetic’ nature of BL means it is not considered adult-rated and is freely available in bookshops and libraries. This may seem odd in the Western context since BL stories and illustrations do not shy away from depiction of sexual acts; as Nagaike notes, BL is “an example of narrative pornography directed at female readers” and “BL narratives include all kinds of sexual acts, such as hand jobs, fellatio, digital penetration of the anus and S/M” (2003: 80). BL thus has much in common with the largely female Western ‘slash’ fandom genre that also features explicit fictional descriptions of male homosexuality and it is no surprise that the two fandoms interconnect around certain key texts such as *Harry Potter* (Orbaugh 2010).

Students who investigate the BL genre via their own web searches often find it exciting and amusing and because the illustrations are cartoon-like, they do not attribute any moral seriousness to them. Students feel that since they do not depict *real* people, they are not *really* pornographic and not that shocking. Hence, each year, when this issue is raised in class, my students are disturbed to discover that these depictions can be covered by child pornography legislation, not just in Australia, but increasingly in other jurisdictions across the world. Students simply are not used to thinking of young fans like themselves as paedophiles.

Since I do not teach Japanese popular culture as a topic in itself but take examples from Japan to illustrate wider points about the nature of globalisation in a convergent media environment, it is not necessary for me to teach BL texts in detail (and this would be impossible to do in an Australian context anyway, given the current legislation). Indeed, a new offence that was added to child protection legislation in 2010 was to ‘make available’ objectionable content. The legislation defines this as, “describing how to obtain access, or describing methods that are likely to facilitate access, to material (for example: by setting out the name of a website, an IP address, a URL, a password, or the name of a newsgroup)” (Crimes Legislation Amendment [Sexual Offences against Children Bill] 2010: 60). Hence, given the problematic nature of BL and other sexualised Japanese manga and anime genres, it is important to be extremely circumspect when discussing them in class. My teaching instead focuses on Appadurai’s (1996) notion of ‘ideoscapes’. In particular I address how the now global circulation of BL and similar Japanese genres is an interesting point of reference for related issues such as how the social construction of childhood in manga and anime can be contrasted with Disney products, or how different disciplinary re-

gimes apply to the representation of different kinds of images across cultures.

Students find the development and spread of the relevant legislation covering manga and anime depictions of minors to be of interest. While early child pornography legislation dating from the 70s aimed to stop the production and circulation of images of harm and abuse of *actual* children, since the digital revolution of the 1990s, this definition has been expanded to include ‘virtual’ (that is, unreal, fictitious, manufactured) images including manga and anime representations (McLelland 2012; Johnson 2010). Legislation that covers these purely fictitious representations includes:

- Canada: in *R. v. Sharpe* (2001) the legislation states that “‘person’ includes both actual and imaginary human beings.”
- USA: the PROTECT Act Section 1466A (2003) criminalises possession of “a visual depiction of any kind including... a cartoon” that depicts “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”
- Australia: in the case *McEwan vs Simmonds & Anor* (2008) it states that “the word ‘person’ includes fictional or imaginary characters.”
- UK: the Coroners and Justice Act Chapter 2 (2009) “requires that a person in an image is to be treated as a child... despite the fact that some of the physical characteristics shown are not of a child;” subsection (8) “makes it clear that references to an image of a child include references to an imaginary child.”

As noted above there has been a legal ruling that cartoon images do contravene local (in this case the Australian state of New South Wales) regulations covering child pornography. That cartoon representations fall within the definition of a ‘person’ in the relevant legislation was clarified by Justice Michael Adams in his ruling in the case *McEWAN v SIMMONS & ANOR* [2008] NSWSC 1292. This case was heard as an appeal against an earlier conviction. The plaintiff had originally been convicted of the offences of possessing child pornography contrary to s 91H(3) of the *Crimes Act* 1900 and using his computer to access child pornography material contrary to 474.19(1)(a)(I) of the *Criminal Code Act* 1995. The appeal was launched on the basis that the images in question—user-generated cartoons modelled on child characters of the animated television series *The Simpsons*—could not reasonably be defined as ‘persons’ as specified in the legislation. Justice Adams, however, upheld the original conviction, stating:

In my view, the Magistrate was correct in determining that, in respect of both the Commonwealth and the New South Wales offences, the word ‘person’ included fictional or imaginary char-

acters and the mere fact that the figure depicted departed from a realistic representation in some respects of a human being did not mean that such a figure was not a ‘person’ (McEWEN v SIMMONS & ANOR [2008] NSWSC 1292, para 41).

In 2009, based on Justice Adam’s ruling, another Australian man was prosecuted for possessing six doctored images of *Simpsons* and *Pokemon* child characters in sexual scenarios. However, unlike the McEWAN case, this individual had no previous history of child-abuse offenses and there was no suggestion that he was also a collector of pornographic pictures involving actually existing minors. The presiding magistrate apparently commented that “even though the images did not depict actual children being exploited, the need remained to deter members of the community from viewing or disseminating such images” (*Newcastle Herald* 2009), thus sending a clear message that the kinds of sexualised *dōjin* products popular among young manga and anime fans are illegal to create, possess or distribute in Australia.

A recent conviction was also obtained in the US, this time specifically in relation to the import of manga from Japan. In February 2010, Christopher Handley, an avid manga collector living in Iowa, was sentenced to six months in prison, after pleading guilty to possessing manga supposedly featuring “obscene visual representations of minors engaged in sexual conduct.” I insert ‘supposedly’ here since Handley accepted a plea bargain and the case was never tried in court, so the ‘obscenity’ of the material in question was based on a presupposition of the arresting officers, not a finding by a jury or magistrate.

Handley was prosecuted under provisions of the PROTECT Act, which widened the list of crimes related to the sexual exploitation of minors to include possession and distribution of ‘obscene’ fictional images. Handley’s prosecution was the first time in the US that a comic book collector was sent to prison for owning comic books when there was no other evidence that he also collected or accessed real child pornography. As the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund (CBLDF) pointed out, the problem with provisions that ban sexualised depictions of minors in cartoons, paintings, sculpture and other art forms is that they do not protect victims of actual crimes, but instead criminalise speech.

Given the sheer scale of potential infringements of the ever-expanding scope of ‘child abuse publications’ legislation, these prosecutions are somewhat arbitrary and cruel (see also, Johnson and Rogers 2009). Indeed, as Eiland points out, “There are many collectors of Japanese manga who may unwittingly have material that would be considered illegal” (2009: 406).

This legislation has also hit closer to home. One of my PhD students had art books relevant to his thesis that he had ordered online from a supplier in Japan refused entry by Australian Customs. The legal procedure he then had to go through to gain access to the material can only be described as fraught (as well as expensive and time consuming). The contentious images in question involved the ‘baby art’ of a British artist resident in Japan, Trevor Brown. Again it is ironic that the material deemed too dangerous to enter Australia in printed book form by Customs can be viewed on the artist’s website or on the sites of galleries that exhibit his work in Japan. My student later published a book chapter reflecting on the case (Stapleton 2016).

The cases discussed above have serious implications for students, researchers and fans of Japanese popular culture. As one colleague pointed out to me when discussing the Handley case:

We have items on the open/public shelves here like the ones that were described in the Handley case. I have a lot of Japanese students going abroad, and tell them to not take anything explicit, and to make sure they have none on their computers either (personal communication from academic teaching Japanese popular culture in English for overseas students and Japanese students at a Japanese university).

My colleague is right to recommend caution as the US-based CBLDF website lists a number of cases where US-citizens crossing the border into Canada with print copies of Japanese pop culture content or digital copies on their electronic devices have been detained and questioned on child-pornography charges relating to purely fictional materials. Details of the arrest of one target, Ryan Mattheson, including reproductions of the contentious material, are available on the CBLDF website which contains a link to an audio account by Mattheson recounting his ordeal for a New York comic convention.

Indeed confiscation of comics at the Canadian border is becoming so common that there are online articles advising travellers on the kinds of material most likely to be targeted (Hudson 2011; see also Gomez 2012).

Despite the severity with which Customs, law enforcement officers and the courts treat these kinds of fictional cartoon images, in Australia I have never encountered an undergraduate student who was perturbed by the BL case study, although colleagues teaching about Japan at institutions in the American mid-West have pointed out how they are cautious about topics touching on unconventional sexual relations due to the religious sensibilities of a small but vocal number of students. In

Missouri for example, State legislation allows students to opt out of assignments that they feel violates their religious beliefs (Huffington Post 2012).

Of interest is that there is no evidence that such images and narratives are necessarily harmful or dangerous. In fact, prior to the tabling in 2009 of the Coroners and Justice Act which broadened UK child-pornography legislation to cover purely fictional images, the UK Home Office released a Consultation Paper where it was stated that “We are unaware of any specific research into whether there is a link between accessing these fantasy images of child sexual abuse and the commission of offences against children” (cited in Ost 2009: 238). Yet, despite the lack of evidence that the new provisions addressed an actual harm, the legislation passed into law in 2010 anyway.

Likewise in Australia, legislators do not seem beholden to evidence when arguing for increased restrictions. In a review of Justice Adam’s ruling by the New South Wales Child Pornography Working Party in January 2010, no evidence supporting the supposition that cartoon-sex depictions of minors are dangerous was tabled. Instead, the authors cited extensively from a submission by the Public Defender who argued that if the sexual manipulation of fictional child characters were not illegal, then “[exploitive] behaviour *may be* normalised and cognitive distortions reinforced” (my emphasis). The working party went on to conclude that it did “not believe the decision has any unintended policy consequences and does not over reach the purpose of the legislation” (Report, 2010: 42). However as has been argued elsewhere (McLelland 2012), the implications of this ruling are in fact very serious for teachers, researchers, students and fans of Japanese popular culture.

The lack of any compelling evidence driving the legislation has led some legal scholars to argue that the banning of these ‘virtual images’ surpasses the harm principle—as the supposed ‘crimes’ depicted are entirely fictitious, the legislation is not harm based but morality based. As legal scholar Bruce Ryde points out in relation to the Canadian legislation:

Expressive material that does not involve harm in its production... should be no concern of the criminal law. Moral corruption arguments do not provide a compelling basis for the imposition of sanctions on the creation, dissemination and use of expressive material (2003: 135).

However such sweeping legislation has serious implications for a large number of people, not simply those with an avid interest in popular culture in Japan where there is no such legislation that actually bans the depiction of imaginary characters in sexual scenarios, irrespective of their age. As

legal studies scholar Maureen Johnson points out regarding the situation in the UK, “[cartoon] images widely available on the internet and often passed between friends, particularly young men as ‘a bit of a laugh’ are now capable of giving those individuals a criminal record for possession of child pornography” (2009: 15). The number of people who would have come across such images or even have them (inadvertently) stored somewhere on their computer is certain to be large.

### Conclusion

Taiwanese academic Josephine Ho, who was herself taken to court by Christian right-wingers over links she had included on a sex-education website based at her university, has noted that “‘Children’s welfare’ has now become an aggressive concept that proactively purifies social space for the sake of children” (2007: 134). Nowhere is this proactive purification better illustrated than in the escalating concern over Japanese manga, games and anime. Even Japan, the source of much of the material considered problematic, is being pulled into this now global debate. In February 2010 conservative Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō introduced a local ordinance that placed further restrictions on the display and sale of manga, anime and games that might be considered ‘harmful to youth’. The ordinance was ridiculed in the press as the ‘Non-Existent Youth (*hijitsuzai seishōnen*) Bill’ because of its policing of the activities of purely fictional young people, but despite strong industry and academic opposition, was passed into law in December 2010 (McLelland 2011). In addition, in 2016 the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s policy research council made the recommendation that existing child pornography legislation be expanded to capture even purely fictional images that “violate the rights of children,” leading to an outcry from the manga and anime industries who argued that their products would be unfairly targeted (*Nihon manga gakkai* 2016).

Given that Japan has now been pulled into this global debate about the limits of acceptable representations of children and young people, it is likely that the scrutiny and regulation of Japanese popular cultural materials depicting characters that may only ‘appear to be’ minors will accelerate. These concerns over potential illegalities in *representation* in the media need to be added to existing concerns over copyright violations in the *reproduction* of media. These are, of course, complex legal issues that are dealt with rather differently in different jurisdictions and it is difficult for students and educators to grapple with their implications individually. Hence given the increased flow of culture and people across borders, particularly among academics and students in-

volved with Japan, these issues are something that the relevant professional organisations in each country need to take on board and advise on. After all, it is not just in the classroom that these issues arise but also on the international conference circuit.

It is not every day that classroom teaching invites the possibility of police investigation and

arrest. But given that in the Japanese popular culture classroom potentially infringing material is only ever a click away, it behoves us as educators and researchers to take these restrictions very seriously indeed and to lobby our professional bodies to establish guidelines for teachers and speakers, and to inform our students of the risks inherent in pursuing their interests in Japanese popular culture.

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## The competing Para – Sovereignties in the ancient history

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### Abstract:

This exploratory study seeks to address this gap in the extant literature and to obtain insights regarding the subject of direct sourcing by relying on primary data and the relevant literature to ensure the accuracy and applicability of future primary research. Section 2 introduces the framework that guides our exploratory effort. Our starting point to explore the issue of retailer-initiated direct trading relationships is the retailer's sourcing strategy. In case that a switch from sourcing through wholesalers to direct sourcing at manufacturers is a strategy priority, the next questions are whether (a) the retailer has the power to shift the distributive functions performed by wholesalers to manufacturers, or (b) whether the retailer has the resources to integrate the distributive functions. In sections 3 and 4, we present a synthesis of the existing data and research that address the research questions derived from the framework introduced in section 2, namely (1) Was establishing direct trading relationships with manufacturers a priority for large Japanese retailers? (2) Did large retailers have the necessary power to shift the distributive functions that were performed by wholesalers to manufacturers? (3) Did large retailers have the necessary power to circumvent the wholesale sector? And (4) Did large retailers have the necessary resources to integrate the distributive functions? Section 5 provides an overview of the main findings of the study. Despite the importance for foreign firms trying to tap the Japanese consumer market, the question whether large retailers in Japan have started to source a greater share of their products directly at manufacturers has been largely ignored by studies on the Japanese distribution system. This exploratory study contributes to fill this gap. Contrary to the widespread belief, the findings of this study suggest that retailer-initiated direct trading relationships with manufacturers in Japan did not significantly increase between 1990 and 2005.

**Keywords:** Japan, distribution system, large retailers, direct trading relationships, direct sourcing.

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## Introduction

The question of whether the burst of the Japanese economic bubble and the subsequent years of slow economic growth triggered changes in the sourcing strategies of large Japanese retailers is highly relevant to foreign firms that are attempting to tap the Japanese consumer market because these types of changes would significantly enhance the ability of foreign firms to access Japanese retailers directly. However, although the structure of Japan's distribution system has been an extensively discussed topic (for an overview, see Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998, among others), the issue of direct trading relationships between large Japanese retailers (department stores and supermarkets) and manufacturers after 1990 has been largely neglected by both the business and scientific community. There are two possible explanations for this paucity of studies. First, official statistics from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) do not include data regarding direct transactions between manufacturers and retailers (with no explanation provided). However, these official statistics do include data on the sales of consumer goods through wholesale markets. Efforts to gather similar large-scale primary data regarding direct trading relationships between retailers and manufacturers would be resource-intensive and would require access to a large number of organisations in the distribution sector. These efforts would be further complicated by the difficulty of collecting primary data in Japan (Bestor *et al.*, 2003). Second, an increase in direct trading relationships between Japanese retailers and Japanese manufacturers is assumed to be a given, and therefore the situation with respect to this topic has not been further investigated due to the widespread belief that the Japanese wholesale sector is moribund (Larke and Davies, 2007).

## Framework


The Japanese distribution system has been a source of dispute between Japan and its trade partners, above all the United States (WTO, 1998). According to United States representatives, the Japanese distribution system inhibits competition, denies Japanese consumers the full benefits of a free and strong economy, and limits product availability as well as the opportunity of American businesses to sell competitive products (Verity, 1988). However, the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law, enacted in 1974 with the objective of protecting small- and medium-sized retailers against large retailers, in favour of large stores at the beginning of the 1990s was expected to lead to a substantial increase in the number of large retail

stores on the expense of small traditional retailers. Once the number of large retailers and retail concentration increased, trading routes would shorten and facilitate market entry of new competitors (Stern and Weitz, 1997).

The data of the Japanese Statistics Bureau confirm indeed a continuous increase in the number of large stores during the time frame studied. The term "large store" refers to department stores and supermarkets with 50 employees or more. Between 1990 and 2005, the number of large stores increased by 82%, from 2,358 stores in 1990 to 4,285 stores in 2005. The largest increases occurred between 1993 and 1994 (9%) and between 1997 and 1998 (8%). With regards to wholesale circuitry, referring to the number of separate title-holding intermediaries between a manufacturer and a retailer or individual demander, the commonly used measures, the W/R (wholesale sales/retail sales) ratio and w/W (sales from wholesalers to other wholesalers/total wholesale sales) ratio, indicate that distribution routes shortened. The W/R ratio declined from 4.1 in 1991 to 3.0 in 2004, and the w/W ratio for wholesalers dealing with consumer goods declined from 1.71 in 1991 to 1.65 in 2002 (Statistics Bureau, Historical Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13; METI 2004; METI 2005). Consistent with this trend, the number of wholesale establishments declined by 21% from 476,000 in 1991 to 375,378 in 2004 (Statistics Bureau, Historical Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13). Total wholesale sales declined by 27%. Sales per wholesale establishment were only down 10% between 1991 and 2004, indicating a concentration process within the wholesale industry (Statistics Bureau, Historical Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13). The data don't indicate, however, whether direct trading relationships between retailers and manufacturers in Japan increased. Thus, the question that arises is whether alongside the shortening of distribution routes and concentration within the wholesale sector, direct trading relationships between retailers and manufacturers in Japan also increased during the time frame studied.

Our starting point to explore this question is the retailer's sourcing strategy. In case that a switch from sourcing through wholesalers to direct sourcing at manufacturers is a strategy priority, the next questions are whether (a) the retailer has the power to shift the distributive functions performed by wholesalers to manufacturers, or (b) whether the retailer has the resources to integrate the distributive functions (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1. Framework**



*Source: Authors*

We start with an explanation of the terms used in our framework.

### Direct sourcing

For manufactured goods to pass from manufacturers to retailers, a number of distributive functions have to be performed, such as shipping, inventory holding, or bulk breaking. Depending on how the distributive functions are distributed among manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, various distribution system structures can be distinguished. Manufacturers, for example, can ship their goods directly to consumers (direct channel), retailers (retailer channel), or use wholesalers (intermediaries) to cater the retail market (wholesaler channel). Similarly, retailers can procure goods directly from manufacturers (referred to as direct sourcing, factory-direct model, or direct trading relationship) or through one or several layers of wholesalers.

Retailers include wholesalers in their distribution arrangement if the wholesalers perform certain functions at higher levels of efficiency and/or effectiveness. Otherwise, retailers will eliminate wholesalers from their sourcing arrangement. The functions performed by wholesalers, however, cannot be eliminated. They must either be assumed by the retailers themselves, or the retailers must make the manufacturers assume the functions. To do so, retailers must have the power to shift the functions from wholesalers to manufacturers and make them bear the additional costs or, alternatively, to integrate the functions, retailers must possess the necessary resources to do so.

### Power

Power in a distribution channel refers to the extent of one channel member's ability to influence decision variables of another channel member at a different level of distribution (Coughlan *et al.*, 2006). Retailer size is regarded as an important factor that affects the power of retailers within a distribution channel. A key determinant of retailer size is the number of goods that an outlet stocks (Inderst and Mazzarotto, 2008). Size increases a retailer's power in a number of ways. Large retailers can act as "gatekeepers" and threaten to deny manufacturers access to retailers' markets (Galbraith, 1952; Etgar, 1976). If they are large enough, retailers can threaten to incur substantial costs and

integrate backward, rendering the manufacturer redundant (Katz, 1987; Sheffman and Spiller, 1992). Retailers might also threaten to switch to other manufacturers or increase the threat of entry by "sponsoring" a new manufacturer. Large retailers can also put pressure on the manufacturer's price. Several studies have found a negative relationship between retail concentration (the market share of the largest retailers in a retail market, usually the top four or five retailers) and manufacturers' profit margins (Inderst and Mazzarotto, 2008). In addition, large retailers can reduce the value of the manufacturers' alternatives. When a manufacturer loses a large contract, the search for alternative distribution channels may reduce the price, thereby reducing the profit the seller can realise (Inderst and Mazzarotto, 2008). Market share is a necessary condition and proxy market for retailer power. It is, however, only a starting point for analysis because other factors, such as a favourable image among consumers, influence retailer power as well (Amato and Amato, 2009).

Because a market has both a demand and a supply side, the power of both the retailer and the manufacturer over supply contracts depends largely on the availability and value of outside options (Inderst and Mazzarotto, 2008). Therefore, as Biggar (1999) writes, not much can be deducted in terms of retail power from high retail concentration ratios, unless the ratios are interpreted, at a minimum, through comparison with concentration levels prevailing in manufacturing markets. A large retailer has only relative power over a manufacturer if competing supply options are available (Amato and Amato, 2009). Thus, the negotiations between a retailer and a manufacturer will depend, in part, on the following (Biggar, 1999):

- From the point of view of the retailer, how quickly and easily the retailer can find a substitute for the product in question, and how the retailer's customer will react to not being able to buy a certain product.
- From the point of view of the manufacturer, how quickly and easily the manufacturer can

find alternative outlets for its present line of goods and on what terms or, alternatively, how quickly and easily the manufacturer can produce a different line of goods.

An important factor that shapes retailer size and retail market concentration is legislation. The impact of legislation on retailer size is well documented (Leunis and Francois, 1988; Hollander and Ohmura, 1989; Davies and Harris, 1990; Treadgold and Sanghavi, 1990; Davies and Itoh, 2001). Such legislation is usually intended to restrict large-scale retailing businesses. Planning legislation restricts the ability of retailers to build larger outlets, whereas pricing legislation affects the ability of large retailers to use their purchasing power to gain a competitive advantage by offering lower prices. Both planning and pricing legislation restrict the power of large-scale retailers to use any economies of scale or scope that can be derived from the nature of their operations (Davies and Itoh, 2001). In a market either limited or unrestricted by regulations, the number of small-scale retail businesses is expected to decline over time because larger retail stores are more economical and cost efficient to operate as a result of economies of scale. Furthermore, because small-scale retailers tend to purchase through wholesalers more often than their larger rivals, which, in an unconstrained market, can result in preferential discounts in direct negotiation with manufacturers, legislation directed toward the retail sector can have an indirect, unintentional impact on the wholesale sector as well (Davies and Itoh, 2001).

The second factor affecting retailer power is private labels. Private labels are products owned and exclusively distributed by one or more retailers. The significant increase in the share of retail sales accounted for by private labels and a general growth in retail concentration in national markets are the two most important changes in retailing in recent years (Biggar, 1999). The retailers' greater ability and willingness to produce and sell private brands is viewed as an important driver of retail market concentration (Dobson, 1998). The rationales for retailers selling private labels can be categorised as efficiency-related and power-related. Efficiency gains can be realised by avoiding efficiency losses through double marginalisation and, in the case of a bilateral monopoly, reducing transaction costs. In addition, the retailer may be able to provide some branding services more economically than the manufacturer by creating a synergy between a store's reputation and that of the goods it carries (Biggar, 1999). The introduction of private labels by retailers leads to more competitive manufacturing markets (Dobson, 1998). Private labels enhance retailer power by augmenting the costs of

switching stores and reducing the costs to consumers of switching brands. After all, it is regarded as a powerful means of retailer differentiation (Biggar, 1999).

### **Resources**

In the case where retailers cannot or do not want to shift wholesaler functions to manufacturers, they can choose to integrate such functions if viewed as efficient and/or effective for their operation. In recent years, large retailers have increasingly become more vertically integrated (Nordås, 2008). They have taken over wholesale, and to some extent, logistics functions and source merchandise directly from suppliers. Drivers behind this development are the need for inventory control, and potential sources of economies of scale that can be derived from trading off inventory and transport costs on a broader product range by coordinating delivery from many suppliers. This requires retailers to have large enough financial resources covering the necessary investments as well as the ongoing distribution costs. Furthermore, retailers need also to have the necessary merchandising know-how to make the right sourcing decisions.

Summarising the above discussion, our research focuses on the following four issues. Given the exploratory nature of this study, we chose the below research questions in lieu of formal hypotheses.

1. Was establishing direct trading relationships with manufacturers a priority for large Japanese retailers?
2. Did large retailers have the necessary power to shift the distributive functions that were performed by wholesalers to manufacturers?
3. Did large retailers have the necessary power to circumvent the wholesale sector?
4. Did large retailers have the necessary resources to integrate the distributive functions?

We limit our analysis to the years 1990 to 2005 for the following reasons:

- Revised retail market regulation: In 1990/1991 and 2001, retail market regulation in Japan was revised twice. In 1990/1991, the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law was revised in favour of large retailers as a result of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks between Japan and the United States, that were initiated in 1989 and addressed a number of anticompetitive practices and structural factors inhibiting manufactured imports into Japan. The revised statute was enacted in 1992 (Kusano, 1994). In 2001, the revised statute was replaced with a new statute, the Law Concerning Measures by Large-Scale Retail Stores for Preservation of the Living Environment, which further deregulated large store establishments (Japan Credit Rating Agency, 2011).

- Stagnating or decreasing retail sales: The sluggish economic environment along with stagnant or falling retail sales after the burst of the Japanese asset price bubble should have provided an incentive for retailers to streamline their supply chain and cut distribution costs by eliminating wholesalers from their distribution arrangements as a means to adapt to intensified competition in the post-bubble era. After 1991, retail sales stagnated, and after 1998, they decreased. Only in 2005 did retail sales increase for the first time in nine years to 130 trillion yen (JETRO, 2007).

### Retailer resources and sourcing strategy

We start with the questions of retailer sourcing strategy and retailer resources.

The 1990s were characterised by stagnating or even decreasing sales at Japanese retailers, a low operating profit margin and high levels of interest bearing debt (Dawson and Larke, 2004). The situation somewhat improved after 2000. As of 2003, outstanding debt in the retail industry had returned to the levels of the beginning of the 1990s, and the return on assets (ROA) had modestly increased, reflecting a reduction of debt and a withdrawal of companies with low productivity (Cabinet Office, 2004). Both department stores and supermarkets tried to cope with the troubling (financial) situation the retail industry was in by expanding sales space and reorganising their supply chain.

- Sales space expansion: Both department stores and supermarkets invested in the expansion of sales space during the time frame studied, i.e., the opening of new stores and the enlargement of existing stores (JETRO, 2004; 2007). According to data provided by the Statistics Bureau Japan, sales space of department stores increased by 10%, while that of supermarkets increased by 112% (Statistics Bureau of Japan, Historical Statistics, Chapter 13 Domestic Trade, Table 13.11). The number of department stores decreased from 378 in 1990 to 345 in 2005 (-9%), while that of supermarkets increased from 1,980 in 1990 to 3,940 in 2005 (+99%). Such sales space expansion was a continuation of a trend that had started in the latter half of the 1980s when retailers were eager to capitalise on the increasing consumer demand during the bubble economy. The favourable business environment induced retailers to expand their businesses to meet increased consumer demand. Between 1982 and 1985, the number of stores with sales floor space of 500 m<sup>2</sup> or more grew by only 1%, while between 1985 and 1988 the corresponding number was 10%, and between 1988 and 1991, it was 6% (METI, 1999). According to Dawson and Larke (2004), large retailers expanded sales space because they had no

other choice for serving their large bank loans, a relict of the bubble economy when the favourable business environment in the second half of the 1980s had induced retailers to expand their businesses to meet increased consumer demand. Banks were the main providers of these funds. Eventually, the bubble burst at the beginning of the 1990s, and retailers were trapped because servicing bank loans was tied to increasing sales. Retailers tried to increase sales by increasing sales space, which increased the loan burden even more, by expanding product selection and by frequently introducing new products, with the hope that consumer confidence would eventually return. Consumer confidence, however, weakened further throughout the 1990s, and retail spending per household fell as did floor space productivity and sales (JETRO, 2004). Nevertheless, large retailers continued to invest in their store network even after debt levels were back to 1990 levels (JETRO, 2007).

- Supply chain reorganisation: At the same time, large retailers cut costs by reducing the number of wholesalers they contracted with, but, according to Maruyama (2004) and *The Economist* (2004), they did not increase direct sourcing. This led to a series of mergers and acquisitions in the wholesale industry. Given the retailers' strategy of concentrating the financial resources on maximising sales space and competing on product selection, reducing the number of wholesalers they contracted with is plausible for a number of efficiency-related reasons.

- Ordering function: Ordering through wholesalers allowed retailers to access a large number of manufacturers and, simultaneously, to keep the number of manufacturers they dealt with and the related costs at a comparatively low level.

- Storage and delivery function: The expanding of sales space and the number of product items required that storage space be minimised. Retailers relied on wholesalers for storing goods and the frequent and reliable supply of merchandise in accurate, small quantities because of the limited availability of retail store space due to a general scarcity of habitable land and high population density in Japan, especially in metropolitan areas (Izuhara, 2000). As a result of these smaller orders, delivery frequency increased from once per week to twice per week or more; sometimes deliveries were made daily (Maruyama, 2004). Thus, relying on wholesalers for the delivery and storage of goods allowed retailers to maximise sales space.

- Lower risk and personnel costs: Furthermore, including wholesalers in their supply chain allowed retailers to lower the risk associated with the frequent introduction of new products and, at

the same time, lower personnel costs by means of consignment purchases. Under consignment purchase arrangements, products that do not sell can be returned to the manufacturer through wholesalers at no cost. Under such an arrangement, the risk of new product introductions is borne by manufacturers. Manufacturers reduce this risk by dispatching their own sales personnel (i.e. sales clerks dispatched to retailers, employed and paid by manufacturers) and acquiring expertise in closely following and anticipating consumer trends. This eventually results in manufacturers controlling sales floor operations (Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998) and retailers depending on manufacturers' market expertise and dispatched employees for both know-how and cost-related reasons. Even as late as the 1990s, some department stores had failed to introduce the buyer function responsible for selecting merchandise and tracking the saleability of the merchandise. Department stores also failed to implement an effective tenant mix management as they were not able to evaluate each manufacturer's and wholesaler's product mix to create an attractive portfolio of products to consumers (McKinsey Global Institute, 2000). According to *The Economist* (2000), this is due to Japanese department stores having few retailing and merchandising skills and acting more like property developers, earning most of their revenue by renting out space. The use of consignment sales and supplier-employed sales staff in department stores increased since 1990 as retailers sought support from their suppliers and tried to reduce costs associated with directly paid employees (Dawson and Larke, 2004). According to a survey of selected department stores by The Japan Institute of Labour (JIL), the use of dispatched sales personnel was still on the rise after 2005 (Ono, 2005). The retailers' dependence on consignment sales and dispatched sales personnel not only significantly undermined the retailers' bargaining position toward manufacturers, it also meant that retailers wishing to integrate wholesalers' functions must incur substantial investment both with regards to their payroll and their own merchandising know-how. Collected data suggest that during the time frame studied and from a resources point of view, retailers refrained from doing so.

### Retailer power

In this section we focus on the question whether supermarkets and department stores had the necessary power to shift the distributive functions performed by wholesalers to manufacturers.

### Market concentration levels

We start with analysing market concentration ratios (CR) and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of the retail market, supermarket and de-

partment store industries, as well as selected product markets. The CR is the sum of the market shares of the largest retailers in the market in question, while the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms in the market. The most commonly used concentration ratio is the four firm concentration ratio (CR4). We use the following structural descriptions of CR4 levels:

- CR4 below 40%: effective competition
- CR4 between 40% and 60%: loose oligopoly
- CR4 over 60%: tight oligopoly

We also use the standards adopted by Japan's Fair Trade Commission (JFTC). According to those standards, a monopolistic situation prevails in markets with a concentration rate in which one player has more than 50% of the market share ( $CR1 > 50\%$ ) or two players have more than 75% of the market share ( $CR2 > 75\%$ ), annual output is  $> 100$  billion yen and entry into the market is "difficult" (no further explanation provided). An oligopolistic situation prevails in markets with  $CR3 > 70\%$  and an annual output  $> 60$  billion yen (Kobayashi, 2003). Measuring market concentration levels, however, provides only limited information about the actual market structure. Therefore, we also consider the HHI of the markets in question. The HHI is influenced by both the number of firms in the market and the differences in their relative size. The value of the HHI decreases as the number of firms in a market increases. Similarly, the value of the HHI will be greater as the degree of inequality in firm size increases. According to the U.S. Department of Justice 1982 Merger Guidelines, an industry is regarded as unconcentrated if HHI is  $< 1,000$ , moderately concentrated if HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, and concentrated if HHI is  $> 1,800$ .


### Data sources

The JFTC provides data on 988 product and service markets in Japan. The data include CR3, CR4, CR5, CR8 and CR10 levels and HHI figures for the years 1975 to 2008. We limit our data analysis to the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. The data include market concentration figures and HHI for the supermarket and department store industries, defined as industries with large stores. Data for total retail market industry are not provided. We compute total retail market concentration by relying on data provided by JETRO (2007), Dawson and Larke (2004), and Nikkei Marketing Journal (1992; 1996; 2005).

Of the data mentioned above on 988 product and service markets, we selected 40 food products and 37 non-food products that are likely to be

found in either department stores or supermarkets. The selected food products include ham & sausages, milk, milk-based drinks, condensed milk, butter, cheese, cream, ice cream, canned processed marine products, sausage and ham made out of fish, Miso (fermented soybean paste), soy sauce, mayonnaise and French dressing, tomato ketchup, vinegar, curry, sugar, wheat flour, bread, biscuit & cracker, chocolate products, chewing gum, potato chips, salad oil, oil for Tempura, margarine, corn starch, instant noodles, soft drinks, carbonated drinks, coffee drinks, tea drinks, sports drinks, beer, refined sake, *shochu* (clear distilled liquor), whisky, brandy, instant coffee, regular coffee; the selected non-food products include tobacco, pet food, panty stockings, disposable diaper, disposable diaper for adults, disposable diaper for babies, sanitary items, tissue paper, adhesive tape, toilet soap, laundry soap, laundry detergent, kitchen detergent, household detergent, cosmetics, perfume and eau de cologne, foundation, lipstick & rouge & eye make-up, lipstick, face cream, face powder, hair products, toothbrush, photo film, bath agents, leather shoes for men, leather shoes for women, binders, house-

**Figure 2. CR1-5 of total retail market in Japan**



Sources: JETRO (2007), Nikkei Marketing Journal (1992, 1996, 2005); Dawson and Larke (2004).

Next, we look at market concentration levels and HHI for the supermarket and department store industries in Japan for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 (2002 for the supermarket industry, as figures are not available) (Table 1).

In the supermarket industry, we do not find a significant increase in concentration. On the CR3 level, concentration increased by only 1%, and on the CR4 level it remained unchanged at 43%. The HHI also decreased from 678 in 1990 to 633 in 2002, indicating that the supermarket industry became more competitive in the time frame studied.

In the department store industry, the concentration ratio increased between 1990 and 2005 by 9% from on the CR3 level, and by 10% on the CR4 level. The HHI, however, decreased from 266 to 160, indicating that the supermarket industry too became more competitive in the time frame studied.

Industry	1990	1995	2000	2005
Supermarket	CR3	36%	45%	40% (2002)
	CR4	43%	52%	46% (2002)

	HH1	678	927	685	633 (2002)
Department store	CR3	23%	23%	32%*	31%**
	CR4	28%	28%	40%*	38%**
	HHI	266	282	-	160**

Table 1: Concentration ratios and HHI for the supermarket and department store industries (1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005)

Source: Japan Fair Trade Commission website. <http://www.jftc.go.jp/katudo/ruijiki/ruijekidate2122.html> (in Japanese)

\*Source: <http://www47.tok2.com/home/nakamura/po.pdf> \*\*Source: <http://www.yamaguchi-real.co.jp/report.html>

Judged by the definition of the Japan Fair Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice 1982 Merger Guidelines, all markets analysed, the total retail market and both the supermarket and the department industries can be considered as unconcentrated.

### Product market concentration

In this section, we analyse the product market concentration levels (CR3 and CR4) of selected food and non-food products for the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 (Table 2 and Table 3).

Our findings can be summarised as follows:

- The number of product markets classified as competitive (CR4 < 40%) is small compared to the product markets classified as having a loose oligopoly (CR4 between 40% and 60%) or a tight oligopoly (CR4 > 60%).
- An oligopolistic situation prevails in a considerable number of product markets (CR3 > 70%).

These findings are consistent with Cortes (2006). Cortes analysed 202 product markets in Japan in 1990, 217 product markets in 1995 and 331 product markets in 2000. He found that 81% in 1990, 93% in 1995, and 83% in 2000 of the product markets analysed can be classified as tight oligopolies.

CR3	1990	1995	in %	2000	in %	2005
>70%	10	11	42%	8	44%	9
61-70%	4	6	23%	3	17%	2
41-60%	11	5	19%	5	28%	2
21-40%	9	4	15%	2	11%	0
0-20%	2	0	0%	0	0%	0
Number of product markets	36	26		18		13
Mean	55%	65%		67%		76%
Standard deviation	0.233	0.210		0.208		0.135
CR4	1990	1995	in %	2000	in %	2005
81-100%	8	11	42%	8	44%	9
61-80%	10	9	35%	5	28%	3
41-60%	11	2	8%	4	22%	1
21-40%	6	4	15%	1	6%	0
0-20%	1	0	0%	0	0%	0
Number of product markets	36	26		18		13
Mean	61%	72%		74%		84%
Standard deviation	0.229	0.199		0.195		0.107
HHI	1990	1995	in %	2000	in %	2005
>1800	11	13	50%	12	67%	10
1000<HHI<1800	12	9	35%	2	11%	3
<1000	13	4	15%	4	22%	0

Source: Author's calculation based on data from the Japan Fair Trade

*Commission.*<http://www.jftc.go.jp/katudo/ruijiseki/ruijisekidate2122.html>

<b>CR3</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>in %</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>in %</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>in %</b>	<b>2005</b>
>70%	19	66%	10	53%	6	46%	9
61-70%	1	3%	5	26%	5	38%	1
41-60%	7	24%	4	21%	2	15%	2
21-40%	2	7%	0	0%	0	0%	1
0-20%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
Number of product markets	29		19		13		13
Mean	72%		75%		76%		71%
Standard deviation	0.204		0.16 2		0.164		0.198
<b>CR4</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>in %</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>in %</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>in %</b>	<b>2005</b>
81-100%	17	59%	8	42%	7	54%	9
61-80%	4	14%	9	47%	4	31%	2
41-60%	6	21%	2	11%	2	15%	2
21-40%	2	7%	0	0%	0	0%	0
0-20%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
Number of product markets	29		19		13		13
Mean	77%		82%		82%		76%
Standard deviation	0.193		0.13 6		0.147		0.179
<b>HHI</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>in %</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>in %</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>in %</b>	<b>2005</b>
>1800	20	69%	13	68%	9	69%	9
1000<HHI<1800	5	17%	6	32%	4	31%	4
<1000	4	14%	0	0%	0	0%	0

*Source:* Author's calculation based on data from the Japan Fair Trade Commission.<http://www.jftc.go.jp/katudo/ruijiseki/ruijisekidate2122.html>

The product market concentration levels are considerably higher than total retail market concentration. The same conclusion applies when comparing supermarket and department store industries with the selected product markets, although supermarket and department store industries show higher market concentration ratios than total retail market concentration. Table 4 summarises our findings and highlights the different levels of market concentrations. It shows CR3 and CR4 levels of total retail industry, the supermarket and department store industries, as well as selected food and non-food industries.

<b>Industry</b>		<b>1990</b>	<b>2005</b>
Total retail	CR3	3.1%	7.7%
	CR4	3.8%	8.7%
Supermarket	CR3	36%	-
	CR4	43%	43%
	HHI	678	-
Department store	CR3	23%	-
	CR4	28%	38%
	HHI	266	-
Selected non-food product markets (mean)	CR3	72%	71%
Selected non-food product markets (mean)	CR4	77%	76%
Selected food product markets (mean)	CR3	55%	76%
Selected food product markets (mean)	CR4	61%	84%

*Source:* Author's calculation based on various data.

#### **Value share of private labels**

According to a study by Planet Retail (as reported in Kunmar and Steenkamp, 2007), the worldwide average of the value share of private labels in packaged consumer goods in 2000 was 14%. The share in Western Europe and in the United States was 20%, and in Australasia, it was 15%. In Japan, in contrast, the value share of private label was only 2%, which is significantly below the worldwide average. Only Central and Eastern Europe, as well as China, showed lower figures (Table 5).

Region	Private share (% of total sales)
Worldwide	14
Western Europe	20
Central and Eastern Europe	1
North America	20
Latin America	3
Australasia	15
Japan	2
China	0.1
South Africa	6

Table 5: Value share of private labels (consumer packaged goods) in selected countries (2000)

Source: *PlanetRetail, as reported in Kunmar and Steenkamp (2007)*.

In its 2005 retail report, ACNielsen, a market and consumer research firm, compared retail sales across 38 countries for 80 categories and listed the value share of private label products and growth rates of private label products for each country (Table 6). They found that the value share of private label products was 17% over the 12 months ending the first quarter of 2005 compared 15% in 2003 across all countries and categories. They also found that the share of private label products varies widely across the countries included in the study. Switzerland records the highest share of private label products at 45%, and the Philippines registers the lowest at less than 1%. The emerging markets in Asia Pacific and Latin America had less developed private label markets than Europe or North America. Japan's share of private label products was 4%, with no change from the figures in the 2003 report.

Country	Private label share	Country	Private label share
Switzerland	45%	Norway	8%
Germany	30%	Ireland	7%
Great Britain	28%	Czech Republic	7%
Spain	26%	Hong Kong	4%
Belgium	25%	Brazil	4%
France	24%	Greece	4%
Netherlands	22%	South Africa	4%
Canada	19%	Puerto Rico	4%
Denmark	17%	Japan	4%
United States	16%	Israel	3%
Sweden	14%	Singapore	3%
Austria	14%	Chile	3%
New Zealand	12%	Argentina	3%
Italy	11%	Colombia	2%
Portugal	11%	Croatia	2%
Hungary	10%	Thailand	1%
Slovakia	10%	Mexico	1%
Finland	10%	South Korea	1%
Australia	9%	Philippines	<0.5%

Table 6: Value share of private label (PL) by country (April 1st, 2004 - March 31st, 2005)

*Source: ACNielsen (2005).*

ACNielsen (2003) further reports that Japan ranked tenth among the top ten fastest-growing private label markets. Growth rates were highest in the Asia Pacific region, emerging markets, and Latin America. ACNielsen (2003) attributed these growth rates to the expansion of large multinational retailers in these regions, including Japan, that were introducing private label products. Two years later, however, Japan had already dropped off the list of the fastest-growing private label markets.

How can the low value share of private labels in Japan be explained? Regarding the two retail store categories studied here, Japanese department stores largely refrained from developing their own private label products due to their strategy of selling high-brand goods and, in recent years, also due to the risks and costs associated with it (Kojima, 2010). Japanese supermarkets, on the other hand, have quite a long history of introducing private labels. According to a study by the Food Marketing Research & Information Center (FMRIC) (2010), 9.7% of the surveyed supermarkets started to introduce private label processed food products before 1970, 19.4% between 1970 and 1979, 16.1% between 1980 and 1989, 25.8% between 1990 and 1999, and 29.1% since the year 2000. The share of private labels in supermarkets, however, remained low. In 2008 and 2009, after the so-called "PB Boom" took place in Japanese supermarkets, which was mainly a reaction to the emergence of discount stores (Food Marketing Research and Information Center, 2010), the share of private labels is estimated to be, at most, 10% (Kim, 2011). Before the PB-Boom, it was considerably lower (confirming Japan's low figure of 4% in Table 6) because supermarkets focused on selling national brand products since the 1960s (Cho, 2008).

The results of our analysis of market concentration ratios and private label value share can be summarised as follows.

a) Market concentration ratios: Market concentration levels in the analysed food and non-food markets in Japan are considerably higher than totals for retail, department store and supermarket industries. Even the biggest retailer in 2005, Aeon, had a market share of only 3.4%. This would explain why even Aeon had difficulties in convincing manufacturers to develop direct trading relationships (Aoyama, 2007). The low figure in total retail concentration is supported by the fact that only a few nationwide retailers operated at the time (JETRO, 2004). In the drug store market, for example, even the industry-leading chains were only regional, and there were no national players. Similarly, in the home improvement industry, there were no nation-

wide chains. The industry leaders were all regional chains. Japan still has a large number of department store chains, whereas in many Western nations, the number of department stores has been reduced to only a few. As of July 2003, there were 99 department store operators in Japan. Only 10 out of these 99 operated nationwide, and the same 10 accounted for 57% of the total department store sales. The remaining 43% were regional department stores that focused on their respective prefectural capital (JETRO, 2004).

Factors contributing to high retail concentration include the presence of aggressive discounters who sell a limited selection of products (mainly shelf-stable food) at a very low price and with high purchase frequency. In Japan, although shopping frequency is high, Japanese consumers expect a large selection, including a variety of fresh products (Aoyama, 2007). In the time frame studied, Japanese retailers intensified competition on product selection rather than price and increased the number of products offered to consumers (Davies and Itoh, 2001; JETRO, 2007). Both factors, a large selection of goods and a variety of fresh foods, discourage increases in retail concentration. Competition on product selection rather than on price would also explain why only some of the largest retailers took advantage of the new regulatory environment by opening large numbers of new stores. According to Davies and Itoh (2001), there was an increase in the average store size among large retailers, but there was less of an increase in the total number of large stores. Retailers sought to benefit from an increase in scope (that is, obtaining a wider range of products at the same location by increasing store size) rather than scale (i.e., generating greater purchasing power from greater sales of the same goods by increasing store numbers).

b) Private labels: Both the value share and the growth rate of private labels in Japan were comparatively low during the time frame studied. According to ACNielsen (2005), the extent of private label development correlates with the level of retail concentration. It is unclear, however, whether the share of private labels in Japan is low because of a consumer preference for branded goods, or whether it is due to low retail concentration.

### **Wholesale industry dynamics**

A third power-related argument that speaks against an increase in direct trading relationships between retailers and manufacturers is the developments in Japanese wholesaling.

The widespread belief in recent years regarded Japanese wholesaling as moribund (Larke and Davies, 2007), especially as the increased use of the

Internet for business transactions rendered more and more wholesalers redundant as order-processing intermediaries between retailers and manufacturers (Nusbaum, 2000). However, the increasing involvement of General Trading Companies (GTC) in domestic distribution actually strengthened the role of the wholesale sector in Japan, thereby affecting the ability of supermarkets and department stores to establish direct trading relationships with manufacturers.

GTC are large and highly integrated wholesale organisations, belonging to the category of primary wholesalers. Their functions and importance, especially for Japanese international trade since their formation in the second half of the 19th century, have been extensively described elsewhere (see, for example, Yonekawa and Yoshihara, 1987). Important for our context is the fact that the GTC have started to establish large company group portfolios within Japanese consumer goods distribution (Larke and Davies, 2007). Large GTC have not only strengthened their position in Japan's domestic wholesale sector by investing in wholesale firms, but they have also assumed control of major retailers, which represents a new direction in GTC strategy. For example, in 1998, Itochu acquired a 30% stake of FamilyMart, a convenience store company; in 2000, Mitsubishi acquired 20% in Lawson, and in 2002, the company acquired a 10% share of am/pm, both convenience store companies; in 2000, Marubeni acquired a 10% equity stake in the leading supermarket company Maruetsu from Daiei, and increased the share to 30% in 2001; later, the company became a shareholder of Daiei itself by acquiring 5% in the company; in 2003, Maruetsu and Marubeni together acquired a 17.5% share of Tobu store, a mid-sized operator of food supermarkets; in 2000, Sumitomo purchased an equity stake of 12.5% in Seiyu, a major operator of food supermarket and general merchandising stores (Meyer-Ohle, 2004). Capitalising on both their existing embeddedness in the domestic market and their existing international supply network GTC can efficiently supply Japanese retailers with both domestic and imported products. As Larke and Davies (2007) write, all of Japan's largest retailers organise some imports themselves, but they rely on GTC for the bulk of their imports. According to the 2002 Census of Commerce by the METI, sales of primary wholesalers purchasing goods from overseas and selling them to retailers increased by 58% between 1994 and 2002. The GTC's international supply chains can be considered as near equivalents to the global supply chains operated by international retailers such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Tesco. Food and apparel have become almost entirely import driven sectors (Larke and Davies, 2007).

The close relationship between the GTC and retailers reduces the latter's ability to establish direct trading relationships with manufacturers because the GTC may insist on using their own facilities (Meyer-Ohle, 2004). In other words, with GTC increasingly controlling the retailers as well as their own supply chain, it is unlikely that large retailers can bypass them.

### **Conclusion**

This study focuses on the issue of whether large Japanese retailers (department stores and supermarkets) increased direct sourcing from manufacturers between 1990 and 2005. The following four research questions were used to guide our exploratory effort:

- Was establishing direct trading relationships with manufacturers a priority for large Japanese retailers?
- Did large retailers have the necessary power to shift the distributive functions that were performed by wholesalers to manufacturers?
- Did large retailers have the necessary power to circumvent the wholesale sector?
- Did large retailers have the necessary resources to integrate the distributive functions?

The results are as follows.

First, establishing direct trading relationships with manufacturers was not a priority for large Japanese retailers for strategy- and efficiency-related reasons. To service their bank loans, retailers sought to increase sales by maximising their sales space and by competing with their rivals with respect to product selection. This strategy made trading through wholesalers a more efficient approach for many retailers. Furthermore, the use of consignment sales and of sales personnel who were dispatched by manufacturers or wholesalers increased, allowing various retailers, particularly department stores, to reduce the costs and risks associated with their strategies of frequently introducing new products. Concurrently, these operational practices (namely, the use of consignment sales and of dispatched sales personnel) increased retailers' financial and skill dependence on wholesalers and manufacturers.

Second, large retailers lacked the power to shift functions that were performed by wholesalers to manufacturers. This lack in power was exacerbated not only by the existence of a very low value share of private label products but also by the fact that department store and supermarket industry concentration ratios were considerably lower than product market concentration ratios.

Third, general trading companies (GTCs), which belong to the category of primary wholesalers, have increasingly assumed a stake in or control

of major Japanese retailers and wholesalers. Given the involvement of these GTCs in national distribution, it is unlikely that large retailers could considerably increase direct sourcing from manufacturers in Japan by circumventing the GTCs. Furthermore, due to the retailers' increasing dependence on the international supply chains of the GTCs, it is also rather unlikely that large retailers would source a large share of their internationally sourced goods directly from foreign manufacturers.

Thus, contrary to the widespread belief, the findings of this study suggest that retailer-initiated direct trading relationships with manufacturers in Japan did not significantly increase between 1990 and 2005. More research is needed to elucidate the sourcing strategies of large Japanese retailers. This study emphasises various areas requiring further investigation and serves a basis for future empirical studies which are urgently required.

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## From the injustice to Rights

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### Abstract:

Depending on the values and beliefs of the times when they are made, the messages of films representing war experiences range from nationalistic propaganda to strong antiwar feelings that go beyond the boundaries of national identities. Many postwar Japanese films portraying WWII exposed the pain, suffering and horror of war with a strong “thou shall not wage war again” indictment. They echoed Japan’s transformation from an aggressive empire into a nation that renounced the right to wage war under the new constitution and the landmark for world peace due to the peace activism after Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Yoneyama, 1999). The majority of scholars studying antiwar films in Japan have criticised their focus on national suffering as a failure to come to terms with Japan’s war responsibility (Sato, 1998; Standish, 2005; Tanaka, 2009; Orr, 2001). This article responds to these critiques through a close analysis of cinematic representation that tackles the dichotomy between nationalism and universalism as two ineffective ways of incorporating Japan’s role in WWII. This dichotomy haunts peace discourses in Japan, split between national victimisation and a naïve universalism that erases historical specificities. While these critiques are valid, I hope to complicate the dichotomy through a close analysis of what each film has to offer in terms of peace education. This article analyses the role of peace education in 1950s Japanese films, situating them within the debates surrounding peace discourses in postwar Japan. I will explore the role of peace education in two types of Japanese antiwar films: atomic bomb films: Genbaku no ko (Children of Hiroshima, Shindo Kaneto, 1952), Hiroshima (Hiroshima, Sekigawa Hideo, 1953); and films representing the front line experiences in WWII: Ningen no jōken (The Human Condition, Kobayashi Masaki, 1959-1963). Discussing the different cinematic means of conveying the message of peace, I will argue that Children of Hiroshima relies on a melodramatic discourse of healing and forgetfulness; Hiroshima creates a visceral type of education that inscribes the trauma of war on spectators’ bodies; whereas The Human Condition constructs a moral education based on a humanist critique of the subjection of individuals to institutional forms of power. The purpose of this paper is to show how the cinematic language of each film contributes in a specific way to peace education.

**Keywords:** Peace education, Hiroshima, cinema studies, The Human Condition.

## Introduction

Is any description of national wartime suffering a sign of amnesia about Japan's atrocities during the wartime period? Is peace a universal concept or is it tied to national identities? I will analyse in this paper the strategies of peace education in two atomic bomb films, *Genbaku no ko (Children of Hiroshima)*, Shindo Kaneto, 1952), *Hiroshima* (Hiroshima, Sekigawa Hideo, 1953) and films representing the front line experiences in WWII: *Ningen no jōken (The Human Condition*, Kobayashi Masaki, 1959-1963). I will argue that while these three films are anchored in national identities, they strive to achieve a certain universalism by redefining not only what it meant to be a Japanese in WWII but also what it means to be human. I chose these films because I believe that they have an important role in peace education as a form of learning from the past.

On the Criterion Collection of *The Battle of Algiers*, Gillo Pontecorvo's 1966 film, Oliver Stone and other famous directors praised the film for presenting the sacrifices on both the French and the Algerian side. They argue that human suffering has no national boundaries, an idea that stayed with me as a persistent question. Do films that critique war educate their audiences against war in general or do they perpetuate national divisions and conflicts by creating a discourse in which the identity of historical actors matters more than their peace message? The justified critiques against Japanese antiwar films tend to brush them aside for their failure to incorporate Japan's atrocities during WWII. This gesture of brushing them aside also erases these films' efforts to offer peace lessons for future generations. I will offer in this paper a nuanced reading of cinematic strategies forming a peace discourse in the 1950s-1960s in Japan, while being aware of the critiques brought against the films. I will argue that *Children of Hiroshima* relies on a discourse of healing and forgetfulness; *Hiroshima* creates a visceral type of peace education through vicarious traumatic inscription of bodily pain on the bodies of spectators; whereas *The Human Condition* creates a discourse of moral education through the critique of power institutions that lead to war and consequently to human pain and misery. All three films strive to reach a universal dimension of humanity while being strongly anchored in the representation of national suffering. Atomic bomb films define a universal humanity as bodily vulnerability to extreme suffering, while *The Human Condition* defines it as a universal core that we all share but we forget because of our subjection to national institutions of power.

## Peace Education and Lessons from the Past

Many authors have pointed out that peace does not mean only the absence of war. For Ian M. Harris and Mary Lee Morrison peace education is a moral education. "Peace education confronts the forms of violence that dominate society by teaching about its causes and providing knowledge of alternatives" (2003:9). Peace education in its version of pacifism "transforms individual behavior and beliefs" and "withdraws allegiance to violent institutions" (Harris and Morris, 2003: 20). We can see in this definition that peace is both an individual transformation and an awareness of social institutions that promote conflict. Peace education is an attempt to integrate the past as a lesson for the future, a phenomenon present in the majority of antiwar films made in Japan in the 1950s. However, this definition also problematises the theoretical controversies surrounding Japanese antiwar films as descriptions of a national victimisation that precludes the integration of Japan's own aggression during the wartime. I argue that the double aspect of antiwar films as recreating historical memory and as inscribing lessons for the future informs many of the debates around their pacifist value and potential.

Peace education needs to transcend the aversion to the violence of war by creating knowledge about the ways in which national and transnational conditions lead to conflict and the ways individuals are assimilated into war. Since peace is future oriented and the memories are past oriented, a viable peace orientation implies Japan's coming to terms with the past, a belated phenomenon Lisa Yoneyama (1999) observes as happening only during the last decades. However, during the 1950s and 1960s many Japanese citizens were involved in various peace movements and discourses, among which I would include these two categories of Japanese antiwar films that represent the horrors and human misery of war.

The purpose of this essay is to show how the films bridge the gap between wartime and postwar Japan through the recreation of past memories as lessons for peace. The recreation of memories always serves specific purposes related to the concerns of the present. Both the atomic bomb films and the films representing Japan's involvement in WWII were specifically aimed at teaching future generations about the horrors of war but their strategies and implications are different. In the following part I will offer a brief historical view of the role played by cinematic representation in the postwar peace discourse.

## Film and Peace Activism in Japan's Postwar Context

The radical change from the wartime military ideology to postwar Japan as a symbol of peace was only possible through a reflexive coming to terms with the past that dominated cultural production between 1945 and 1960s. Isolde Standish refers to the generation of filmmakers active in this period as "humanists" because their films portrayed serious interrogation of what it meant to be human and what it meant to be Japanese (2005). Despite this self-interrogation and preoccupation with issues of memory in artistic discourse, scholars talking about this period criticise the failure of an effective coming to terms with Japan's atrocities against other Asian nations—an argument which requires not refutation, but a more nuanced reading of the tensions between nationalism and universalism in the 1950s antiwar films.

Japan's hope for peace in the postwar years was soon challenged by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in 1960, when Japan became U.S.'s ally in the cold war. In her book on the war memory in Japan, Franziska Seraphim argues that in the 1950s and 60s in Japan, "the proximity of war both in time (WWII) and in space (Korea) spurred an immensely visible peace movement which proclaimed the relation between these two wars in humanitarian and political terms" (Seraphim, 2006: 19). Sato Tadao too argues that the imminence of another war was the impetus behind many serious pacifist films during this period (1998: 60). In 1953, Imai Masashi made the commercially successful *Himeyuri no tō* (*The Tower of Lilies*), and Kinoshita Keisuke made *Nijushi no hitomi* (*Twenty-four Eyes*) in 1955. Both films described the suffering of the Japanese people during the war; they were criticised for their melodramatic portrayal of the wartime period. The description of Japanese suffering and victimisation created an obsessive focus with national mourning and precluded awareness of the suffering inflicted by Japan on other nations. Even the serious intellectual reconsideration of war seen in the publication of *Sho Showashi* (*A History of Showa*), coauthored by Toyama Shigeki, Imai Seichi and Fujiwara Akira, or *Gendai seiji no shisō to kōzōō* (*The Thought and Structure of Modern [Japanese] Politics*), by political scientist Maruyama Masao, failed adequately to address issues of war responsibility and the Japanese atrocities in Asia (Tanaka, 2009). As Tanaka Yuki observes, "all these works were heavily inward-looking rather than outward-looking" (2009). The majority of films portraying the experiences of WWII focused on the suffering of the Japanese people in the final stages and the loss of WWII.

The representation of the atomic bombing was particularly problematic because of the relationship between Japan and the U.S.

During the Occupation period (1945-1952), SCAP (The Supreme Commander of Allied Powers) censorship forbade any representation of atomic bomb effects. "Filmmakers were only permitted to show the bomb contextualised as a strategic instrument which was the only way to end the war. The visual effect of the bomb was to be avoided, as was any depiction of civilian victims" (Broderick, 1999). This censorship explains why the representation of Hiroshima in film emerged in 1952 with Shindo Kaneto's *Genbakū no ko* (*Children of the Atom Bomb*). A nationwide movement against the atomic bomb emerged in 1954 when a Japanese boat was exposed to radioactive fallout at Bikini Atoll. The movement was initiated by housewives in Tokyo as a campaign to ban the A- and H-bombs; it expanded into the first World Conference against the A- and H-bombs (Yoneyama, 1999: 14).

It is important to note that there were mothers and teachers who started the peace movement, which shows a concern with using the war experience as a national and universal lesson in peace for future generations. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki single out Japan as the only nation which has experienced the effects of atomic bombing; its unique suffering positioned Japan as a hallmark for universal peace. The discourse against the atomic bomb defined peace as the universal abandonment of nuclear weapons. The representations of memory in atomic bomb films rely on this singularity of national suffering, but they also aim to offer a universal lesson against nuclear weapons.

We can see that the period 1945-1960 was marked by a strong preoccupation with memory, national victimisation, and peace that dominated artistic and intellectual discourse. In a similar way to individuals experiencing a traumatic event, the national experience of the trauma of suffering in the war created an inward-looking form of mourning balanced out by a genuine desire to use the experience of trauma for future peace both for Japan and for the world. In the following part I will analyse the role of the cinematic medium in the representation of past memories.

### Cinema as Embodied, Affective History

Films have an important role in the construction of national memories through the embodied, affective representation of historical events. As Tessa Morris-Suzuki has suggested, "the world on the screen brings together things that, for analysis, or structural purposes, written history often has to split apart" (Morris-Suzuki: 2005: 141). The medium of cinema emotionalises, personalises and dramatises

history revealing its impact on individual lives. However, this recreation of past events is not without importance in terms of education as a form of learning from the past to make a better future. The lessons of the past also depend on the strategies of representations that would effectively touch spectators. Scholars such as Elaine Scarry (2003) and Susan Sontag (2003) have pointed out the difficulty encountered by scholars and artists alike to create a discourse out of the pain, injury and death implicit in the traumatic experiences of war. The enormous toll of pain and suffering on the human body stops representation in its tracks, revealing the profound gap between the ultimate reality of suffering and its transformation into a discourse. The moral purpose of writers and filmmakers that want to educate through the lessons of history, is to engage spectators at a deep, affective level and ultimately to transform them.

In order to explore the strategies used by the above-mentioned three films to promote peace education, I will turn to E. Ann Kaplan's four categories of cinematic viewing of films that reconstruct traumatic historical events. First is the position of being "vicariously traumatized—running away or wanting to know more." (2005:10) Second, and the most ethically problematic, is the position of the voyeur, where the suffering of others is consumed for visual pleasure. Third is that of "comforting cure, an attempt to heal and forget" (Kaplan, 2005:10). She defines the position of witness, the fourth in her category, as the "most politically viable, keeping cognitive distance and awareness denied to the victim by the traumatic process" (Kaplan, 2005:10). The two atomic bomb films construct a peace message that highlights the suffering brought on by nuclear bombing. However, as theorists of peace education pointed out above, aversion to war does not mean an effective form of peace education, since it precludes a more politicised understanding of the role played by nationalism in the waging of war.

*The Human Condition*, on the other hand, constructs a position of witness by interrogating the ways in which individual subjectivity is constructed by institutional forms of power that promote violence and finally war. Kobayashi's film addresses an important issue pointed out by Kaplan. "The crucial question... is whether a culture is able to understand trauma as an episode in the longer chain of structural mutations in modern systems that have accumulated a record of violence, suffering and misery" (Kaplan, 2005: 12).

For Joana Bourke, ideologies that promote war carefully wrap the bodily suffering and pain inflicted on human bodies into spiritual, aestheticised discourses that see war as a glorious enterprise

(Bourke: 1996). On the contrary, films that critique war rely for their central message on the pain and suffering of bodies, either of soldiers/participants or of civilians. The evil of war is equated with immediate bodily pain, deprivation and suffering. Is the representation of the body's pain a trope for what connects us all as human beings regardless of national boundaries—in other words a lesson in universal pacifism? Does it matter that the bodies are marked by Japanese, Chinese, Korean, American identities? Since antiwar films are both recreations of past experiences as national memories and universal lessons for the future, the national identity of the suffering bodies is of utmost importance. Although the vulnerability of the body to pain and suffering is a trait shared by humanity in general, bodies are connected to national identities. The main critique scholars have brought against representations of Japanese wartime suffering and the suffering of people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the focus on the suffering of Japanese bodies.

### Atomic Bomb Films and Peace Education: Healing and Vicarious Trauma

Both atomic bomb films I consider here were commissioned and financially backed by the Japan Teachers' Union, a relevant detail considering the educational hope invested in these films. They were supposed to teach not only Japanese people but the whole world about the horrors of nuclear holocaust. However, as Sato pointed out, "the lack of international recognition for Japanese films focusing on the atomic bombings demonstrate that many countries around the world, not only the United States, consider it improper for Japan to condemn the damaging impact of the atomic bomb" (Sato, 1998:63). This conundrum haunts Japan's relation to WWII as an experience of suffering that lacks acknowledgement because of Japan's infliction of suffering on other Asian nations. Sato pointed out that the peace education in *Children of Hiroshima* was not powerful enough to start an antinuclear movement.<sup>1</sup>

The bombing and its consequences, the pain and suffering of the victims, are described from the witnessing point of view of a Hiroshima-born teacher through flashbacks of events before and after the blast. The teacher travels back to Hiroshima where she adopts an orphan child and witnesses the scars and the suffering of survivors. The scene of the bombing is short, and the film dwells more on the legacy of suffering, fear and anguish of orphaned children and survivors. The scene of the bombing constructs a fast-paced montage of a ticking clock with images of daily life of Hiroshima's children: playing, crawling, eating... interrupted by the iconic mushroom cloud that makes way for horrific images of scarred and burned bodies, in-

cluding the famous scene also present in the Hiroshima Memorial Peace Museum of the darkened trace of a sitting person who was pulverised on the spot. This scene engages spectators to the traumatic event of bombing at an immediate, visceral level, but the film avoids a lengthy, vivid description of bodily pain, creating a discourse of what Donald Richie has referred to as "*mono no aware*," an elegiac representation which creates pathos as a form of healing (Broderick, 1999). For this reason, the Japan Teachers' Union perceived it as "a tear-jerker without political orientation" and commissioned Sekigawa Hideo to make a more politically engaged film about the bombing (Lowenstein, 2004: 146). The film's melodramatic style creates a discourse of healing and forgetfulness that precludes an effective peace education.

*Hiroshima*, made by Sekigawa Hideo in 1953, reconstructed with fidelity the horror of the atomic bombing, being more successful in uniting the pervasive antiwar feelings of Japanese people. Similar to *Children of Hiroshima*, *Hiroshima* starts within the space of a school in a post-bombing time frame. The space of the school, the teacher as the main character, the radio voice talking about the history of the atom bomb attack and the discussion in the classroom about Hiroshima and its survivors are all self-reflexive references to education. The representation of memories connected to the atomic bombing activates strong affective responses, serving as a lesson for the future prevention of such human tragedy. *Hiroshima* constructs at a narrative level the discourse of education and the importance of the meanings future generations ascribe to the experience of the atomic bombing. Unlike *Children of Hiroshima* that dedicated less than five minutes of the film to the bombing experience, Sekigawa dedicates almost two quarters of the film to the representation of the horror of bombing effects. At the moment of the dropping of the bomb, the screen is dark, followed by a few white frames, all in silence. Paralleled by the soundtrack of requiem music, the camera moves in a slow pan over ruins and unimaginable human pain. The "horrid tapestry" of images recreates the traumatic deaths and the incredible bodily pain and anguish (Vroman, 2011). The film personalises some of the figures such as the teacher who leads a group of burned girls to the river, or the mother who witnesses in horror the death of her child. The apocalyptic images flood spectators with bodily affects of pain, horror and trauma. Despite the low-budget costuming and unrealistic effects, the knowledge that the event was real can produce a strong emotional reaction in spectators. The film was distributed and shown in schools and cultural events in an effort to

educate future generations about the horror of war and the dangers of nuclear holocaust.

Does the peace education intended by these films in terms of content, production and ethical commitment achieve universal meaning? Donald Richie argues that Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be viewed principally as "symbols," not only for the Japanese but also for the world (Broderick, 1999). The peace movement in Hiroshima and Nagasaki evokes universal associations of apocalypse and its intentions are to teach not only the Japanese but the entire world about the dangers of nuclear holocaust. Yoneyama critiques the universalist message of peace created by the anti-bomb discourses surrounding Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They stand as symbols both of nuclear atrocity and of the peace that followed WWII. Her study outlines the discrepant memories around Hiroshima that defy the ideal of universal collectivity. "The memories of Hiroshima's destruction, secured within the global narrative of the universal history of humanity has thus sustained, at least in the dominant historical discourse, a national victimology and phantasm of innocence throughout most of the postwar years" (1999:13). For Yoneyama, both the universalist discourse of nuclear atrocity and that of peace were haunted by an inadequate coming to terms with Japan's imperial past and they served the specific interests of Japan-U.S. alliance.<sup>2</sup>

While I agree with Yoneyama's critique, I want to point out that the traumatic shock of atomic bombing prevented a successful coming to terms with history at this moment in time. The films turn historical events into a visceral, emotional experience, recreated via the representation of bodily suffering and agony. I argue that the representation of bodily pain in these two films has three aspects: emphasis on suffering and victimisation as a form of national mourning; the cinematic recreation/repetition of a historical traumatic experience charged with powerful affect; and, lastly, inculcating a visceral aversion to war due to the association of war with agony and pain.

I will examine *Hiroshima*'s role in peace education by bringing into dialogue theories of traumatic representation with Linda Williams' notion of "body genres." For Cathy Carruth, "to be traumatised is to be possessed by an image or an event" (1995:5). The traumatic experience has only affect, not meaning, and it is inscribed directly on the body. While this theory refers to the effect of trauma on the individual, what effect does its visual representation create? The films recreate real traumatic experiences, vicariously engaging spectators with historical trauma. Although Linda Williams deals with entertaining, popular genres, her observations about the relationship between body and

cinema is valid for exploring the atomic bomb films. She notes as one feature of the body genre the “spectacle of a body caught in the grip of intense sensation and emotion” (1991:4). One central idea in her argument is that when viewing body genres, spectators are “caught up in an almost involuntary mimicry of the emotion or sensation of the onscreen bodies” (William, 1991:4). The representation of intense feelings connected to the body such as pain, fear, pleasure, involves spectators at a bodily level through visceral contagion. *Hiroshima* represents the atrocity of nuclear death and pain, inducing a visceral reaction in spectators through the association of war with intense anguish and suffering. This might be called visceral education, because it disengages spectators from war at an almost unconscious, somatic level. They engage spectators in what Kaplan referred to as “vicarious traumatisation” (2005:10).

There are two problems with the representation of historical trauma through bodily injury in terms of peace education. First, aversion to war does not necessarily lead to an understanding of what peace implies. Second, identification is correlated with experience, and experience with national identity. Although we share bodily vulnerability to pain and death as human beings in general, the cinematic representation of pain and suffering will have a much deeper impact on people who are closer to the experience through national or other forms of collective identification.

While *Children of Hiroshima*'s reliance on melodramatic strategies failed to offer an adequate discourse of peace education, *Hiroshima* offered an important lesson in affective, somatic antiwar responses created through vicarious traumatisation.

### **The Human Condition and Moral Peace Education**

*The Human Condition* is based on a six-volume best-selling novel by Gomikawa Junpei (1916–1995). In each part of this over nine-hour long epic, Kobayashi portrays the contradictions between various dehumanising ideologies and the main character's humanist conviction. Each part of the film critiques a certain institution: capitalist imperial exploitation, the imperial military, combat ideology and finally, communism. Part one, *No Greater Love*, portrays the main character's failure to implement more humane treatment of Chinese labourers in a slave labour camp run by the Japanese in Manchuria. The second part, *A Soldier's Prayer*, is a searing exposure of the cruelty and sadism in the imperial military system that Kaji (Tatsuya Nakadai) must join after being drafted. Part three, *The Road to Eternity*, problematises Kaji's identity as a Japanese at the end of the war, hated by the Chinese and imprisoned by the Russians.

The film follows a single male character from the period of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria through the capture of Japanese soldiers by the Russians in 1945, after the Japanese surrender. There is a tension between his pacifist principles and the dehumanising institutions of militarism, colonial capitalism and Stalinism, which create moments of high emotional intensity. This tension remains unresolved, and the film ends with the death of the hero. One important difference from both the atomic bomb films and from the majority of antiwar films produced in this period is that it creates a pacifist, humanist message by incorporating the whole history of Japan's involvement in WWII: imperial expansion, militarism, the Sino-Japanese war and the Pacific War. This historical perspective offers a moral lesson about the systematic nature of war suffering, which is produced through the cooperation of dehumanising institutions. The peace lessons offered by the traumatic representation of extreme bodily suffering in *Hiroshima* is replaced by a minute exploration of technologies of bodily control and dehumanisation. These bodily technologies make war possible through systematic alienation of individuals from other individuals and of bodies from human, subjective emotions.

Made fourteen years after the end of the war, the text of the film has an emotional authority that goes beyond national victimisation towards the incorporation of what had been repressed from Japan's history, namely its colonial aggression. Kobayashi, the film's director, was himself conscripted to war despite being a self-avowed pacifist. He refused to be promoted from the rank of the private as a manifestation of his critical attitude, an attitude that finds full expression in his film. (Bock, 1978: 248) The film has become for Kobayashi the expression of his personal experience and philosophical problems of Japan's WWII trauma. The main character acts as the postwar conscience based on a universalising discourse of peace that constantly challenges the imperial aggressive war and attempts to atone for it. The film stresses out the moral implications of peace by criticising three dehumanising regimes. Evil is not only war but all institutions that strip human beings of their humanity through the power of some people to subjugate and oppress others. *The Human Condition* does not only represent the pain and suffering of war but it also creates a discourse of pacifism as an ideal threatened by institutional and ideological power. As Harris and Morrison have shown, pacifism is an act of human repentance, “the acknowledgment of violence in ourselves and others,” and it implies a form of humanity that rejects power (Harris and Morrison, 2003:20).

The main character in *The Human Condition* is a mediating consciousness between the pacifist postwar period and the war experience itself, embodying an idealistic pacifism that critiques dehumanising ideological systems. The individual becomes a vehicle for the exploration and denunciation of military ideology as well as for the representation of a possible universal humanism quenched by national institutions. At the level of national subjectivity, both victimisation and war responsibility are explored by the film; we can find in it the paradoxical core of Japan's cultural dilemma after WWII. Blind obedience to authority and lack of individual thought were deemed responsible for the Japanese version of fascism, an idea explored by *The Human Condition* through the complicated relationship between the individual and the ideological technologies of power that produce the subject. This idea brings me back to my question in the beginning of this essay. Is pacifism a form of universal humanism that transcends national boundaries by acknowledging our shared humanity?

The first part, *No Greater Love*, describes the main character's efforts to find a middle ground between abusive colonial practices and his deep conviction that "human beings must be treated as human beings." He comes into conflict with two foremen who symbolise the corruption of the colonial industrial system. According to this system, the goal of production exceeds any consideration for the conditions in which production takes place. When Kaji (Nakadai Tatsuya) complains to the mine manager, his view is that in a state of war, one cannot stop to ask moral questions. These two justifications allow for the cruel and sadistic exploitation enacted by the two foremen who do not regard the Chinese labourers as human beings. The situation gets worse when the military police enter the scene and propose to send POWs as slave labourers.

The most important scene represents Kaji's interaction with the leader of the Chinese POWs. The head of the military police requires them to guard the prisoners and not allow them to escape but a few of them do. Kaji tries to cover over the incident but Okazaki reports to the military police that some prisoners have escaped. The brutal and sadistic head of the military police decides that the seven men who had allegedly attempted escape should be executed. Kaji desperately tries to call off the execution but to no avail. Before the execution he talks to the leader of the POWs. The shot-reverse-shots are interspersed with close-ups of their faces on either side of the electrified barbed wire. Their belief in humanism unites them but the war circumstances force them apart. Wang pinpoints Kaji's situation: "your life has been a series of errors

stemming from the conflict between your work and yourself... It goes without saying, this moment is the crossroad. Will you just wear the mask of humanism, while being an accomplice to these murders, or will you restore the beautiful name of humanity?" This is a fundamental question that haunted many pacifist intellectuals like Kobayashi during and after WWII. Kaji fails to convince his superiors and thus loses faith in himself. The first part of the film ends with his imprisonment and torture at the hands of the military police. He is finally drafted to the army, another institution of dehumanisation and cruelty. The main character is a subject of ideology through the enactment of colonial exploitation and war violence but at the same time his inner self struggles against these ideologies, finding meaning in affective relationships.

The second part of the film portrays Kaji's indictment of the entire military system based on the brutalisation of the weak and providing training for cruelty and sadism. The army as a state repressive apparatus enacts its ideology through punitive force generally on the body. I will turn to Michel Foucault in order to explain how power inscribes the body. Foucault outlines the military dream of society also present in the Japanese imperial army, a dream in contradiction to Kaji's humanist ideals. "As for the military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not to the state of nature but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility" (1997:69). What is important for Foucault in this political anatomy of the body is the link between increased aptitude and subjection to an increased domination. The purpose of discipline is to make the individual body a functional part of the war machine, operating in perfect order and compliance with other individuals acting in the same way. In the colonial-industrial system, cruelty and violence were justified for production, while in the army violent punishment was allowed, for the purposes of making the individual body functional as a machine in combat. The harsh discipline of the body forms military subjects that repress individual affect. We can see throughout the second part of the film the mechanisation of men's bodies through severe training, punishment and deprivation. As Foucault suggests, "the naturalisation of the power through the body required it to be docile in its minutest operations" (1997:156). The posture of the soldiers' bodies in the film acquires the uncanny appearance of automatons.

The individual in the army is almost anatomically part of a larger system. The distribution in the

military barracks partition the individual in order to survey him; but at the same time, it creates rank hierarchies, against which the film directs most of its criticism. Besides the grueling training, recruits are abused by second- or third-year privates who are in turn abused by veterans. After being promoted, Kaji tries to protect the new recruits from the sadistic abuse of veterans; he is abused many times in their place. In a Foucauldian sense, he is only partly constituted by power and thus does not entirely become its vehicle. His inner self remains protected from the inscription of discipline on his body. He tells his men that they must make individual judgments during combat, in stark contradiction with the usage of signals that Foucault mentions as an important part of military discipline.

Part three, *The Road to Eternity*, scrutinises the chaos at the end of the war and criticises the ideology of communism that in Kaji's and his friend's dreams offers equality for all human beings. Surviving the onslaught of Russian tanks, Kaji and two of his men head towards South Manchuria. The defeat temporarily places Kaji back in the situation he longed for, that of the individual who is not subjected to ideologies against his will. However, he carries in his memory the unbearable weight of his identity as an instrument of power, his subjection to abusive systems. His relative freedom places him within a clash of ideologies, some of them on the brink of extinction. From the point of the view of the army, he must be either dead or a deserter, while from the point of view of the Russians and Chinese he is a war criminal.

On their way they witness the violence of the Russians who rape and kill refugee women. When they finally end up in a Soviet labour camp, all their illusions about communism crumble. In an ironic reversal of situations, Kaji becomes a POW and he endures grueling treatment. Russians, too, value authoritarian tyranny, abusive hierarchies and hostility towards the individual similar to the Japanese feudal system. Despite his constant criticism of the dehumanising Japanese colonial and army systems, he is perceived as the embodiment of the Japanese military. He tries to defend himself by arguing against the power exercised by all ideological systems and placing individual life as the only value but the translator misinterprets his words. "Russia's mission too sacrifices individuals... the fact that socialism is better than fascism won't keep us alive." The film comes full circle in a bitter irony and ends with his death of cold and starvation after escaping from the POW camp.

As Standish suggests, "the only possible solution is his death as the technologies of power operating on him are too great for human life to withstand" (2005: 141). Kaji's death enacts the myth of

the tragic figure, operating the identification with failure ubiquitously present in Japan's postwar discourse. Does his death create the message that the mechanisms of power prevail over human dignity, empathy and sense of justice? It is a pessimistic ending, in tone with the disillusionment and despair faced by many intellectuals in the aftermath of war, but I argue that the film creates an important lesson for peace through its critique of power institutions that create disciplined subjects. The ideologies of the Japanese colonial system, the army system and socialism are all dehumanising ideologies that Kaji marginally challenges and the film criticises. The collective and the individual problematised in the postwar Japanese discourse are inextricably linked while victimisation coexists with war responsibility.

*The Human Condition* highlights peace not as the absence of war but as a permanent struggle against ideological systems that alienate people from other people and colonise subjectivities through the disciplining of bodies. The suffering in the war is a systematic buildup of violent institutions rather than the result of a single horrific event like the nuclear bombing. The film's exploration of Japan's imperial violence offers a politicised version of peace education through the witnessing of Japan's war atrocities and its focus on the moral dilemmas of the individual's subjection to national institutions of power. In Kaplan's words, the position of witness is the "most politically viable, keeping cognitive distance and awareness denied to the victim by the traumatic process" (2005: 10-11). The peace lesson offered by the film is the critique of nationalism from the point of view of a witnessing subject, as a system that alienates individuals from their humanity.

### Conclusion

I have analysed in this paper the cinematic strategies used by *Children of Hiroshima*, *Hiroshima* and *The Human Condition* to address Japan's past as a peace lesson for the future. Placing them in the context of critiques brought against Japanese artistic and intellectual production for failing to come to terms with Japan's past, I have argued that all three films are anchored in nationalist discourse but their message aims to reach a universal dimension in terms of peace education. The most viable and politicised lesson appears in *The Human Condition* through the position of the witness who exposes the colonisation of subjectivities by systematic violent institutions that lead to war and suffering. It is also one of the very few films made in the 1960s that portrays Japan's imperial past. *Hiroshima* offers a less politicised peace lesson as visceral traumatisation through the inscription of aversion to war on spectators' bod-

ies. *Children of Hiroshima* is less effective in terms of peace education because it offers a melodramatic discourse of forgetting and healing that dominated the popular cinematic representation of WWII. Given the postwar politics in Japan and the failure of the massive protests against The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between Japan and U.S. in 1960, peace education in Japan remained tied with the universal anti-nuclear movement haunted by Ja-

pan's problematic relationship with its past. The effectiveness of peace education lies in the dialogue between the past tainted by national atrocities and the ideal of pacifism as respect for human life and awareness of institutions of power. Although the films are problematic in terms of their focus on national suffering, they also try to transcend national boundaries reminding us of a repressed sense of shared humanity.

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## Two Central Borderlands in the Modern political Situation

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### Abstract

This article explores how the public space of urban Japanese commuter trains is negotiated and what this means for public gender relations. In the social context of a train ride, one means by which strangers try to protect their personal territory is by managing their gaze, including averting their eyes through reading and keeping their eyes closed by sleeping or pretending to sleep. There are certain rules of behaviour, especially for women who are under more pressure than men to keep their bodies under control, and for men who derive enjoyment from looking at women. By paying attention to changes in the napping behaviour of men and women, it is evident that while gender-specific and age-related power relations in Japan favour the salaryman, young women are increasingly demanding public space for themselves by deciding how they can occupy this space and behave within it. One of the most widely noted facts about Japanese train passengers is that so many of them fall asleep. Observers might get the impression that Japanese commuters react like Pavlov's dogs when they get on a train; they look for a seat (preferably at the end of a row), sit down, put their bag on their lap, place their arms around the bag, drop their head down, close their eyes, and fall asleep. In this article, I explore the public space on Japanese urban trains. I discuss how behaviour in this space is being negotiated and evaluated, paying particular attention to gender and age relations. What do men and women do during the train ride? How is their behaviour regulated and talked about? How do they use this public space and how do they relate to one another? I will argue that an important way in which public space is managed is through the gaze, which can invade other people's space but can also protect one's space from the gaze of others. In this context, men are generally the 'looking subject', whereas women are the 'object of the gaze'. Thus the demands on women for decency and decorum are much higher than for men. Napping on the train plays an important role in the 'management of the gaze'. This kind of

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### Apart and dishevelled hair

An eye-catching ‘activity’ of both men and women on Japanese trains is that they sleep. When exploring Japanese media to find out what the Japanese themselves make of this phenomenon, I discovered a remarkable gender difference. Men are rarely the object of discussion, and if they are, it is usually related to their assumed exhaustion from hard work. A Google search of ‘image Japanese salaryman’ brings up a large number of seemingly unconscious men in suits standing, sitting, or even lying on the floor. Despite this, the vast majority of comments in Japanese media relate to women, especially young women. For example, in *Marie Claire Japon*, Anzai Mizumaru suggests that “sleeping women are a symbol of the peaceful state of the country,” as it shows what a safe country Japan is (Anzai 1995:13). More often, however, commentators on women’s sleep express moral disapproval of women’s *inemuri*, particularly criticising their body posture while asleep. In the article ‘Anata wa daijōbu? Kakkō warui, hazukashii, jōshiki shirazu onnatachi’ (Are you alright? On women who have bad manners, are embarrassing, and do not know how to behave), the women’s magazine *an an* published the opinions of readers about inappropriate behaviour for women. The following letter from a women’s outfitter, Nagata Mie, is representative of many comments:

I often see women on the train who sit there sleeping with their legs wide apart. If they also have long hair that hangs down like a curtain, this looks very bad. Although I am a woman myself, I don’t know where to look. It really should be taboo for well-brought-up women to fall so fast asleep in front of other people. (*an an*, 5 February 1993:51)

“Legs wide apart and hair loose”—these are the two issues I encountered most often in the media when it came to young women sleepers. The admonition that women should keep their legs modestly together is neither specific to Japanese culture nor difficult to understand. Indeed, Marianne Wex (1980:331), in her study of male and female body language in Germany, comes to the same conclusion. German media also describe the open legs of girls and women as a soliciting pose, whereas the same pose for men is interpreted as a form of display behaviour (see also Molcho 1993:121–123).

My own observation is that most women and girls on trains take care to sleep with their legs together and in a relatively stable upright position. They normally place a bag on their laps—which is interpreted by Israeli mime artist Samy Molcho (1993:122) as a further “protection of their chastity”—and cross their arms over it, leaning their head forward or to the side, if they cannot hold it up any

longer. Children are taught from an early age to put their belongings on their lap in order not to bother other passengers (see Noguchi 2006:158–159); doing so also protects against theft. Although I have kept a careful eye out for such cases, it was not until April 2011 that I observed a young woman in shorts with legs carelessly open further apart than her hips. I assume that most of the women who lose control over their bodies in this way are completely exhausted or drunk, often travelling home on the first train in the morning after an all-night party.

Some (especially younger) women sit with crossed legs, apparently to avoid the open-thigh position. Still, the possible loss of conscious control may cause a problem. Innovative business people attempted to find a solution to this in the early 1990s. They produced handbags that women could put on their laps. On the sides were supports that could be flipped down and used to keep the thighs together. This invention was advertised on television but apparently did not achieve commercial success. The main problem was that many women who had fallen asleep with this device secured over their thighs awoke suddenly at their station and, without thinking of the bag, tried to get off the train, only to trip and fall (Kawai Yū, 25 March 1996).

Even outside the confines of the train and at times when they are awake, girls are trained from primary school onwards to put their knees together when they sit, so as not to expose their underwear. As a result, one seldom observes women with their legs further apart than the width of their shoulders even when they wear trousers, whereas men—whether sitting, walking, or standing—tend to have their legs spread out much more (Getreuer-Kargl 2003:204–220). Social etiquette books, of which many are still published today, instruct both genders in how to sit and stand properly. For men, knees and heels should be slightly apart, for women closed; both should have their body upright (see Iwashita 2002:26–31). The so-called *ganimata* leg position (literally ‘crab thighs’, i.e. sitting or standing with knees and toes pointed inwards) is recommended to help women avoid the open-thigh position and to create some tension in their bodies more generally. Until at least the Second World War, Japanese girls of all social classes were trained not to sleep with their legs wide open and to avoid moving around during night-time sleep in their *futon*, while there were no such instructions for boys. A girl or woman was not supposed to sleep in the form of the Chinese character 大 for ‘big’ (*daimonji*); the ideal shape was the

character 気 for *ki* (energy) or the hiragana さ *sa* (Smith and Wiswell 1982:10; Clark 1994:107; Sugimoto 1938:37). Young married samurai women were not even supposed to show their sleeping face to anyone (*negao o miseru na*). Preparing for ritual suicide (*jigai*), samurai women tied their legs together to ensure a ‘decent’ posture in death. And the same idea was propagated at the end of the Second World War, when women were warned that they could be raped and were instructed to tie their legs together with the *obi* (belt) of their kimono, so that if they were killed by the enemy (the American soldiers), their dead bodies would not suggest anything inappropriate.<sup>1</sup> Teaching girls “decent sitting postures” was one of the most important aspects of femininity training in prewar Japan (Sugiyama Lebra 1984:42). Likewise, while walking and sitting, women wearing kimono usually pointed their knees and toes slightly inwards, as Kon Wajiro observed in the 1930s (quoted in Gill 1996). While it might be obvious that such leg positions have been influenced by kimono-wearing, keeping one’s thighs neatly together at all times is considered to be proper etiquette for women regardless of their attire. As mentioned previously, this is also true in other countries, but perhaps in Japan there is more emphasis on explicit training through means such as etiquette books.

Men, on the other hand, have few inhibitions and do not have to fear criticism if they sit open-legged or even lean their heads back, which leads some to open their mouths and snore. The latter is, however, considered bad manners even amongst men themselves. By spreading their legs, men assure themselves a certain degree of physical stability, so that they do not topple over easily. While the amount of space taken up by male and female passengers differs, both men and women prefer the outer seats, where one can lean on the handrails. Takayama Izumi, a woman from Nara in her late twenties, confirmed my observations on the sitting position. She too seeks a seat at the edge, sits with legs together, places her bag on her lap and lets her head hang forward slightly (Takayama Izumi, 20 October 1995).

More surprising than the reference to the open legs, however, is the recurring critique of long, loose hair in connection with *inemuri* by women. I had long wondered about the meaning of this obsession with hair. But then I was provided with an explanation in an interview with Mr. Nagamatsu (pseudonym), a 48-year-old Tokyo ward-official, who placed arriving at work late or arriving with unkempt hair, an unshaven face, and informal dress, in the category of being *darashi ga nai*.

*Darashi ga nai* means that this person is believed not to lead a proper life. [...] Especially for working people, it is a matter of shame to be called *darashi ga nai*, isn’t it? [...] It depends on each individual case whether one gets promoted or not. But a *darashi ga nai* person cannot be entrusted with a desirable, difficult assignment. [...] It means that this person is not reliable. It means that they cannot put their emotions in order. Maybe order is not the right word [...] they cannot control their emotions. In the end, it means that the person is too weak to suppress their emotions. (Interview with Mr. Nagamatsu, 19 December 1994)

Improper grooming is viewed as a sign of unreliability, because it reflects an inability to control the inclination to let oneself go. Thus, a direct connection is drawn between proper hair grooming and the diligent performance of one’s duties. The well-disciplined management of one’s appearance is an important measure in keeping with the requirements of a social situation. The condition of one’s hair reflects the spiritual state of one’s mind and symbolises (both male and female) energy and vitality (Muchi 1993:188; Aramata 2000). This symbolism is most clearly expressed in Japanese horror stories, in which female demons, ghosts and horrible ‘old women’ are always depicted with long, dishevelled hair (see also Formanek 2005:49).<sup>2</sup> This kind of uncontrolled female energy is seen as threatening (or exciting), because when a woman stops consciously controlling herself, such as when she falls asleep in public, and if her body posture becomes looser, this is seen as a sign of abandoning herself, which may act as a sexual stimulus for some men and may also be irritating for some women to observe.

I suggest that, in a sense, hair can be likened to bare breasts as secondary sexual characteristics. Historically, Japanese women (and men) have paid much greater attention to hair and the neck-line when considering a woman’s beauty and erotic qualities than to breasts (Chaiklin 2009:40). However, even in Japan, the female breast has been sexualised to a much greater extent than the male breast, even though female breasts have a practical function of feeding infants. Like long, loose hair, depending on the context, bare breasts are not necessarily regarded as indecent. On European beaches, for instance, they have become increasingly common. As sociologist Jean-Claude Kauffman, however, observes in his ethnographic study of the male gaze on women’s bare breasts on French beaches:

naked breasts may only be presented in a state of motionlessness. [...] Any uncontrolled movement is seen as unseemly and ugly. By running, walking or jumping across the beach or swimming

in the sea with her breasts swaying around, a woman revokes the social convention of rigidity and for this reason no longer enjoys the protection of seeming non-observation (quoted in Löw 2006:122).

By analogy, I suggest that freely moving and uncontrolled hair in public trains seems as irritating to some people as watching bare breasts in motion, while carefully groomed long hair is perfectly acceptable. When a woman falls asleep, and her hair falls over her face, it seems to become erotically loaded, a sign of her uncontrolled sexual energy, and is thus either criticised or watched with appreciation. In addition, the woman might also hide her uncontrolled face behind a curtain of hair. This may give her a feeling of protection from the gaze of fellow commuters, but at the same time may make it more intriguing for others to transgress this protection and invoke their own fantasies.

Thus, despite a general acceptance of *inemuri* on commuter trains, it is clear that certain rules of behaviour exist, especially for women. I therefore suggest that it is necessary to elaborate three different aspects that help us further understand gender and how *inemuri* on the train is discussed. Firstly, how can *inemuri* on the train be understood theoretically/sociologically? Secondly, what is the social context of a train ride and the role of the gaze in communication inside the train? And thirdly, I will consider the function of *inemuri*, and also of feigning sleep, in the light of gender relations and gender-specific roles on the train.

### Theorising *inemuri* on the train

In order to understand social rules underlying *inemuri* on trains and other public and social spaces, it is necessary to look at the sociology of *inemuri*. I have already explained that *inemuri* refers to the social aspect of sleep within a situation that is not usually considered appropriate for sleeping. Erving Goffman's concept of "involvement within social situations" gives a clue to the tacit social rules of *inemuri* on the train. In *Behavior in Public Places*, he writes: "The rule of behaviour that seems to be common to all situations... is the rule obliging participants to 'fit in'" (Goffman 1963:11). Social and cultural competence means knowing what is appropriate in each situation (Goffman 1963:24), and behaving accordingly. For the individual, behaving in a situation means being 'involved within' it. "Involvement refers to the capacity of an individual to give, or withhold from giving, his concerted attention to some activity at hand" (Goffman 1963:43). This attention is subjective. Outside observers—people present in the same situation as well as the researcher—judge the participant's involvement based on linguistic expression and body idioms, i.e., the appearance and forms of expression of

nonverbal communication. No one can prevent giving information to others about themselves and their involvements through their clothing, hairstyle, facial expression, posture, and gestures (Goffman 1963:37–38).

Goffman's further distinction between 'main' and 'side involvements' helps to understand the—mostly tacit—social rules concerning *inemuri* in situations such as on the train, when nothing in particular needs to be done and where there is no personal connection to other people. Goffman writes:

A main involvement is one that absorbs the major part of an individual's attention and interest, visibly forming the principal current determinant of his actions. A side involvement is an activity that an individual can carry on in an abstract fashion *without threatening or confusing simultaneous maintenance of a main involvement*. Whether momentary or continuous, simple or complicated, these side activities appear to constitute a kind of fugue-like dissociation of minor muscular activity from the main line of an individual's action. Humming while working and knitting while listening are examples. (Goffman 1963:43; emphasis added)

Although a side involvement is described as "a kind of fugue-like dissociation of minor muscular activity from the main line of an individual's action," it still makes sense to consider sleeping while on the train a side involvement. *Inemuri* is not normally the main reason for using a means of transportation (although I have heard and read about people who take the train to catch up on their sleep, e.g. Torii 1995), yet—crucially—*inemuri* does not endanger the main involvement, namely, travel. Another indication that sleep can be categorised as a side involvement is Goffman's referral to a specific form of side involvement—an 'away' (a concept itself borrowed from Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead), which is defined as a type of inner migration from an activity, such as daydreaming or autistic thinking (Goffman 1963:69–75).

I suggest that sociologically, *inemuri* on trains and in similar social situations must be seen as such an *away* or side involvement rather than as sleep. In principle, *inemuri* is a widely tolerated and frequently practiced side involvement in trains. As a rule of social behaviour, however, the body idioms must be adjusted to the main involvement of the situation to show that the person is *socially* not asleep. Through clothing, make-up, shaving, and hairstyle, as well as by control of the limbs, the sleeper has to make sure to 'fit in' (see Goffman 1966:24–27). Even during *inemuri*, part of one's awareness is directed at travelling, attested by the fact that sleeping passengers are still able to observe signals that are relevant for them. The vast

majority wake shortly before their station and get off.

### Inside the train: social space and the gaze

Public transportation's particular characteristic as a public space influences the behavioural rules which govern social interaction, including sleeping. But what kind of space is the train? Urban sociologist Isomura Eiichi (1959:83–84, 1976:130) classified urban space into three categories: 'primary space' such as the home, 'secondary space' such as the workplace, and 'tertiary space' such as city squares, market places and public transportation. In both primary and secondary spaces, communication is largely guided by knowing one's social position in relation to others. By contrast, people use the train in order to transit from one place to another. The characteristic of this tertiary space is that people maintain anonymity and in this sense are ultimately free and equal; social status and upbringing are not problematised. Thus, they only temporarily 'communicate' with others and rarely need to consider how their behaviour might affect any further relationship with a specific person on the train (quoted in Tanaka 2007:413).

Nonetheless, even though the space in the train is "open to everyone who has bought a ticket" (Ogatsu 2010:10–11) and train passengers meet without caring about each other's social status or about building relationships, it is by no means unregulated and unproblematic, not least because the train is a space where complete strangers may come into bodily contact to an extent that it is normally reserved only for intimate partners (Horii 2009:104). The "territories of the self" (Goffman 1971) can be invaded by touch, gaze, sound, and smell (Horii 2009:108). When trains were first introduced to Japan, people had difficulty understanding the social nature of the train ride and negotiating appropriate conduct as this transitional and marginal space allowed for both public and private behaviour. Especially during long-distance travel, most people would make themselves feel at home by taking off their coats (sometimes their shoes), enjoying lunch, and chatting with fellow passengers. Until the postwar era, it was not uncommon to see men sitting on the train in their long undergarments, and this could still be seen in rural areas as recently as the early 1980s (see Hinder 1943:16; Mitch Sedgwick, personal communication, 15 March 2011). The Japanese Railways Operation Law (*Tetsudō eigyō-hō*) of 1900 suggests that not everyone had such a homely association with the trains and that some experienced the train as rather threatening, as the law forbade violence against railway employees and throwing stones at the trains. It also limited access for certain groups.

Men were not allowed to enter women-only compartments and, according to Regulation No. 32 issued by the Metropolitan Police in 1902, the following people were not allowed to board a train: drunkards, sick people with transmittable diseases, and people with dirty clothes that would make other passengers feel uncomfortable. Furthermore, people had to avoid travelling with bad smelling and bulky luggage, and had to refrain from loud singing and noisy talking, as these would inconvenience fellow passengers. As sociologist Tanaka Daisuke points out, apart from demanding hygienic precautions against the spread of diseases, these regulations dealt with all the senses except for the visual one. Compared to other senses, the visual sense and the gaze received very little attention in legal regulations (Tanaka 2007:43–44).

This does not mean, however, that the gaze was or continues to be unproblematic. Studying the history of American train rides, the cultural historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch (2002:71) points out that before the emergence of mass transportation in the nineteenth century, people had never been in the situation of meeting strangers face to face for minutes or even hours on end without needing to communicate verbally. This emphasis on looking over listening in the communication between strangers was a new experience brought about by the introduction of urban mass transport. With people in close proximity to each other being forced to look closely at others, particularly during rush hour commuting, travelling can become an uncomfortable and unsettling experience (see also Freedman 2002:23, 41). With train transport in particular, passengers are almost always seated facing each other. Being stared at by strangers causes discomfort and irritation: "What do they want from me? Is something wrong with the way I look?" As sociologist Martina Löw argues:

It is above all the gaze that palpably overcomes boundaries, extending one's own space into someone else's. [...] When we construct our own spaces, we can either ignore foreign objects or make use of them to mark the boundaries of this space. [...] this process is socially monitored through gazing techniques. Bodies are protected by spaces; at the same time, however, these spatial boundaries invite conquest. (Löw 2006:124)

Gaze can work in two ways. First, with one's gaze one can conquer someone else's boundaries. On the other hand, people employ "an inspection of their surroundings as a means of protecting themselves from gazes" (Löw 2006:127). Techniques of "civil inattention" had to be developed and learned, says Goffman (1963:84), to demonstrate to others that "one appreciates that the other is present (and that one admits openly to having seen him), while

at the next moment withdrawing one's attention from him so as to express that one does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design" and also to signal that one is no threat. (This applies in general. However, cross-culturally, there are enormous variations in such techniques of 'civil inattention', often leading to misunderstandings and conflicts.)

It is therefore not surprising that while laws and regulations were quiet about the gaze, certain measures were introduced to prevent the gaze intruding into fellow passengers' private spheres. The space on the train lends itself to reading and a variety of books and newspaper formats, such as small paperbacks (*bunko-bon*) and discussion forums (*zadankai*), were developed specifically for commuters. Newspaper producers adjusted their publication time to the morning and afternoon rush hours so that people could buy them before boarding the train. This helped people not only to make use of the commuting time, but also helped them to avert their eyes from fellow passengers. Already by the early Meiji period, the Japanese were avid readers. One problem, however, had to be solved: up to this point, they had been used to reading aloud. On the trains, they had to learn to read silently, which required a considerable amount of training. From around 1920 onwards, announcements and advertisements were increasingly posted in train compartments, so that people could have something to read, even if they had not brought a book on the train. Again, these were intended to be read in silence without disturbing others. The "management of the gaze" (*manazashi no taisei*) was thus crucial for the way public space in trains was created and regulated (Tanaka 2007:45).

### **Gendered bodies**

It is important to remember that the bodies which are in close proximity on the train are gendered. Public gender relationships were thus another important issue that needed to be negotiated in the context of public transportation. Notably, men are generally the 'looking subject' (*miru shutai*), while women are the 'object of the gaze' (*mirareru taishō*) (Jack Wolff 1985, quoted in Tanaka 2007:46). Women, as the gender that is looked at, are required to display appropriate conduct—that is why they are expected to keep their legs neatly together and their hair well-groomed; this demand was already raised during the first days of urban public transport. They are also obliged to protect themselves by means of their gaze. This gendered gaze-relationship was used proactively by public transport companies to direct behaviour. In 1925, the city bus company started to employ female assistant conductors to improve passengers' behaviour and praised them in 1931 in an advertisement that declared that "their treatment of passengers is

friendly and a gentle flavour somehow wafts in the air in the compartments (*shanai no kuki ga nantonaku yawaraka aji o obiru*)" (Tōkyō shidenki-kyoku 1931, quoted in Tanaka 2007:48).

There was also a second group of women for whom public transport was a workplace. In contrast to the assistant conductors, however, they were not a controlling eye on the passengers' behaviour. Instead, they invited the gaze of the male passengers. An article in the *Tōkyō 16 Shinbun* of 28 June 1908 criticises the fact that so many young enchantresses (*yōfu*), or sex workers, were looking for their clients on the train, and demands that an end should be put to this practice. This suggests that the women in the sex trade made active use of the train space to find clients for their business. Many men apparently reacted positively to these offers, but they did not always distinguish between female passengers who were looking for clients and those who were not. In the early twentieth century, secretly watching young women during their commute became a popular *topos* in the predominantly male literature. Tayama Katai writes in his novel *Shōjo-byō* (Girl Fetish):

Because watching living beings is more difficult than gazing upon silent nature and sensing that he might be caught in the act if he stared too directly, the man pretended to look to the side and flashed quick glances at the girls. As someone once advised, when watching girls on trains it is too direct to look them right in the face and too conspicuous to watch from a distance, for the other passengers might become suspicious. And so it is most convenient to sit diagonally opposite, at around a seventy-degree angle. Because the man had such a fetish for girls, he, of course, did not need to be taught this trick and instead had naturally discovered it on his own, and he did not waste any opportunity to use it. (Translation Freedman 2010:51; Tayama 1993:679)

This is only one example of describing 'girl watching' in novels.<sup>4</sup> In real life, male students had made a hobby out of trying 'unwittingly' to get into close physical contact with female students commuting to school in crowded trains. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, this 'hobby' among the male students of Tokyo University was referred to as "trainology" (*torenorōjii*) (Tanaka 2007:46–47). The students, in Tanaka's assessment, "discovered the train, in which they could touch other bodies in abundance, as a place to interact with the other gender. And then, as they observed and assessed each other, they actively pursued 'trainology' as a way to interact with the other gender" (Tanaka 2007:47). The sources are silent about the reactions of the girls, but considering that this situation was repeated on a daily basis, it is

easy to imagine that some of them must have felt tormented. At that time, the notion of sexual harassment did not yet exist, but in 1911 a women-only train, called *hana densha* (flower train), was introduced during commuting hours in urban areas (Freedman 2010:57; Tanaka 2007:47).

Unfortunately, in his article on ‘body techniques’ in urban transport in the first half of the twentieth century, Tanaka makes no mention of *inemuri*, even though contemporary sources (cf. Hinder 1943:16; Sansom 1936:29) provide clear evidence that it was common. The obvious explanation for this is that *inemuri* was taken for granted and, as sleepers do not generally disturb others, the topic was not raised prominently by his sources. Nonetheless, I believe that the history and theoretical considerations elaborated above are helpful in evaluating *inemuri* and social behaviour on Japanese trains today.

### **Regulating behaviour on the train**

Since the 1970s, the railway companies in Tokyo have used so-called *manā posutā* (manner posters) to regulate and encourage appropriate behaviour on public transport (Horii 2009:92–100). In recent years, the usage of the mobile phone has been the single most important new issue of regulation. The JR Higashi Nihon Railway Company, for example, demands that people switch off their phones when they sit or stand near the priority seats<sup>5</sup> and otherwise put them on so-called *manā* mode (vibration) so as not to disturb others. People are not supposed to speak on their phone (although they do so on rare occasions for urgent calls, when they speak with a low voice and for a limited period), but instead use it to send and receive text messages and e-mails, play games, or search the Internet. Thus, as with reading books and posters, the mobile phone is mainly used for diverting the eyes and making the best use of time. Phone conversations disturb people not only because of the noise, but also because they make people witnesses to private and sometimes intimate exchanges. They are forced to become voyeurs to strangers’ secrets.

This type of discomfort is obviously related to another issue that has been a subject of emotional debate in recent years: young women applying their make-up on the train, usually on trains heading to urban entertainment centres like Shibuya, Shinjuku, and Ikebukuro. I am always fascinated by how skilled these women are. With a steady hand they curl their eyelashes into shape, and apply eye-liner, eye-shadow and lipstick. However smooth the motion of the trains may be, it is nevertheless quite an art. Women do not brush their hair on the train, as this would perhaps be impractical without a hair-dryer and sprays. Moreover, strands of hair would

be shed all over the carriage, invading other people’s space and outraging fellow passengers.

Remarkably, after noisy and pushy people, observing a woman doing her make-up ranks highest among what makes people feel uncomfortable on trains. Although people regard this as a new phenomenon, there were complaints about women putting on make-up on the train even in the early twentieth century (Tanaka 2007:46). The women themselves are not always sure why they get criticised. ‘Gdno’, a young woman who had recently moved to Tokyo to live on her own, asked an Internet community on 12 February 2004: “Why is it that one should not put on make-up on the train? Please give me reasons that I can understand.”<sup>6</sup> She received sixteen answers. ‘Marvy’ opines, seconded by another blogger, that it is for the same reason as why you should not talk on the phone: “It’s not so much the noise that disturbs people around you, but if you talk cheerfully on the phone with someone, people around you feel neglected. In the same vein, when you put on your make-up on the train, the men around you realise that there is no-one making herself look attractive for them. Unfortunately there are many lonely people like this on the train...”

I am not sure how many men actually feel lonely observing girls putting on make-up, but it is certainly true that these women do not beautify themselves for the sake of their fellow commuters. The reason that they feel free to do so, is that their fellow passengers are completely irrelevant to them. In any case, the majority of the answers point in a somewhat different direction. “It’s like changing your clothes on the train,” says ‘aki73ix’. “If we lose our feeling of shame, with time, people will actually start undressing on the train.”

Seen from a different perspective, the young women who put on make-up, and are thus ‘quasi-naked,’ do not protect themselves from the gaze of others, much as people who talk on their phones to close friends in a public space do not seem to care that strangers listen to their private conversations. Although—as much as protecting their chastity by keeping their legs neatly together and their body upright—they are required to protect themselves by means of their gaze, they do not appear to be overly concerned by this. At the same time as they are being made the object of the gaze, by ignoring criticism, they take the power to define the tertiary space. They ‘conquer’ this space and make it their own. Moreover, they give out the message that the onlookers are social non-persons, not unlike servants of the upper classes in Europe in whose presence it was possible to discuss private matters or get undressed without a second thought.

Supporting this view, ‘hatene’, one of the bloggers, explains to ‘Gdno’ that by putting on their make-up on the train, women deprive men of their sense of social authority and their manly erotic identity. This means that, in the end, girls who put on their make-up in public are threatening the existing social order and power relations. Men and also older women often find this fact irritating; and they are also upset at being made into voyeurs, similar to when they have to listen to people’s private conversation on the mobile phone (although some people might actually enjoy this indiscretion). And this is where *inemuri* fits into the story.

#### ***Inemuri as a ‘social camouflage cloak’***

When gaze in close proximity is embarrassing or invades other people’s space, avoiding others’ eyes is a civilising technique that makes this situation bearable. It signals that one does not intend to cross boundaries, and avoids observing other people crossing these boundaries. Closing one’s eyes is simpler than reading or occupying oneself with a mobile phone. Moreover, *inemuri*, like sleep in general, can release people from social ties and demands (cf. Schwartz 1973:20) and is also a kind of inner migration. It does not matter whether someone is in fact asleep or merely has their eyes closed; it is important whether they are asleep or not in the perception of other passengers. Thus, it is not surprising that numerous people I asked said that they did not really sleep; they simply closed their eyes in order to relax mentally and physically.

There is a special term in Japanese denoting feigning sleep: *tanuki neiri*, literally, ‘raccoon-dog sleep.’ In Japanese folklore, the *tanuki* is reputed to be a mischievous creature and a master of disguise and shape-shifting. By feigning sleep, the *inemuri* practitioner becomes invisible as a social actor. In other words, *inemuri* becomes a “social camouflage cloak.”<sup>7</sup> It is obvious that those who are sleeping perceive their environment only in a limited way. In doing so, they avoid both gazing at others and observing others gazing at them. Provided that *inemuri* is socially acceptable, sleepers are not held fully responsible for their behaviour.

As a ‘social camouflage cloak,’ *inemuri* works in a similar way as the state of drunkenness: a few glasses of beer or sake ease attempts at erotic overtures (see Allison 1994:122–123). Moreover, it is known that salarymen are able to criticise their supervisors without having to fear the consequences when they get together for drinks after work. The “alcohol, and not the drunkard [is seen as] the cause of the behavior” (Smith 1992:147). The social act of drinking alcohol places one in a special social position, rather than the toxic effect of the alcohol itself. Alcohol consumption, however, is a compli-

cated matter. It would be naïve to believe that the day following an outburst at a drinking party everything is really forgiven and forgotten. Young employees have learned that those who take literally the call for *bureikō* (drunkenness, in which all social hierarchies and politeness are cast aside) and indeed criticise their boss freely when they go out drinking in the evening are not among those quickly promoted. As a result, they only act as if they have let themselves go, while in fact remaining very much in control of themselves (Sumihara Noriya, 30 August 2003). Nevertheless, drunkenness is an important opportunity to discuss conflicts that may not be addressed during the working day. Finding the right balance between frankness and social constraint requires a great deal of cultural competence.

*Inemuri* works, of course, in a different way and in different situations. Sleepers are usually not aggressive; yet one can often observe—to return to the example of erotic advances—that train sleepers sometimes lean their heads against the shoulder of their neighbour. I have seen many sleepers and have observed that most of them are mindful not to do this. Most people try to occupy the seat at the end of the bench or lean their head to the front. I would even go so far as to say that those who place their head on the shoulder (or occasionally the lap) of their neighbour have thrown off conventional restraints and have simply let themselves go.

On 9 August 2006, in the Internet discussion forum *Yomiuri* online,<sup>8</sup> a person with the user name ‘Hachi’ initiated a discussion by asking the community how they react when a sleeping neighbour on the train leans against them. ‘Hachi’ elicited 63 wide-ranging answers and reactions. Some said that they themselves often slept and were therefore quite happy to allow others to use their shoulder to relax. Others clearly considered this a nuisance and said that they stood up abruptly, so that the sleeper would topple over, or they gave up their seat to avoid the person. Interestingly, as opposed to other media, hair is not mentioned in these comments. One woman related that she had no trouble letting a woman five years her elder sleep on her shoulder, but later realised that the woman had dirtied her favourite coat with the make-up she was wearing. Regardless of such incidents, quite a number of people agreed that they did not mind a neighbour leaning against them. However, most people’s answer depended on their neighbour. A person who calls herself ‘an aunt with bad taste’ (13 August 2006) found it sweet when a young woman leaned towards her, whereas she did not allow this from middle-aged and elderly men. One woman in her thirties, ‘Nono’ (12 August 2006) writes bluntly: “If it is a woman or a student, or even a male who

gives a clean impression, I don't mind if they lean on me a little bit. But if it's a filthy guy, I stand up."

These opinions confirm my earlier findings that attractive women and men are acceptable or even welcome as both headrests and sleepers. It is the middle-aged and older men, the so-called *oyaji* or *ojisan*, who are unpopular, especially when they seem drunk. I suggest that one reason for this is that *oyaji* appear to like to put their head on the shoulder of a young woman as a form of sexual harassment that can hardly be sanctioned. As in the early twentieth century, some men seem to see it as a sport to put women in a state of discomfort. Moreover, in a society in which physical contact in daily social communication is largely avoided, train passengers can to some degree 'steal' the warmth and comfort of human body contact. In doing so, a lasting relationship is not envisioned. They do not have to assume any responsibility for such a relationship nor fear the consequences. The worst that can happen is that the shoulder is pulled away. Because everyone knows that one loses control during sleep, it is possible to use this opportunity to do things which are socially unacceptable. By using *inemuri* as a camouflage cloak, it is possible to engage in this 'game'. Just as it is not the fault of the drunkard but the alcohol when they behave out of the ordinary, it is also not the sleeper but sleep that is viewed as responsible for inappropriate behaviour. Similar to the way in which one needs only a few sips of alcohol in order to be considered drunk, for this camouflage effect it does not matter whether the person is actually sleeping or merely has their eyes closed.

This conclusion was confirmed to me many times. For example, at the end of a public lecture about sleep and *inemuri* during travel that I gave at a symposium organised by the Institute for the Culture of Travel (Tabi bunka kenkyū fōramu) on 4 April 1996, a man in his early sixties asked me what I had to say about propriety (*reigi*). Without waiting for my answer, he told me that he often pretended to be asleep in order to lay his head on the shoulder of a female neighbour. He found my comparison with that of a drunken person, which I gave him only at that point, very appropriate. In his book *Asobi to Nihonjin* published in 1974, Tada Michitarō describes the disregard of social rules (*fureigi*) as a traditional type of amusement for Japanese men (quoted in Allison 1994:122–123). To a certain extent, there is a social awareness of people pretending to sleep, and some manner posters request that men should be considerate and take care not to lean their head on their neighbour's shoulder.

When I Googled the words '*densha*' (train), '*chikan*' (groping, sexual harassment) and '*inemuri*', the first sites that popped up were advertisements for pornographic videos, most of which showed middle-aged men sexually attacking middle-school girls in uniform; there are several thousand such videos on offer (see also Horii 2009:36). Such tastes are fed by tabloid magazines which are mostly read by salarymen with relatively low levels of income and education. *Shūkan Shinchō*, for instance, featured a photo essay under the title 'Musumetachi no shanai *inemuri*-byō' (Narcolepsy [the colloquial term for narcolepsy is *inemuri*-disease] of our daughters on the trains; 14 December 1995:11–15), categorising their bodily postures. Even though the aim was to show young women sleeping in the early morning hours, many of the men pictured next to them are also clearly sleeping. While the women have their legs crossed or closed, it is often the men who sit with their legs spread open hip-width or more.

In the last twenty-five years, the topic of *chikan* or *sekuhara* (groping, sexual harassment) at the workplace, in collegial groups, and in the public transportation system, has been discussed widely in the media, resulting in radically changed awareness and attitudes. It is especially the *oyaji*, middle-aged men, who are depicted in anti-*chikan* posters, although by all accounts younger men (aged between fifteen and twenty-five) seem to be the ones who grope most frequently (Burgess and Horii 2012:49, 51). Likewise, the introduction of women-only train carriages since late 2000 on several routes is closely linked to the image of the lecherous, if rather pathetic, middle-aged office worker. Middle-age, of course, is a relative term. To a teenage girl even a twenty-five-year-old may appear middle-aged (Horii 2009:50–56). Groping on trains was also targeted by the Gender Equality Bureau in the Cabinet Office in 2006.<sup>9</sup> The introduction of women-only carriages has to be seen in connection with this. Whereas there is much public support for the existence of women-only train carriages, in interview surveys conducted by sociologist Horii Mitsutoshi, most women say that they generally use them only if the carriage happens to be conveniently placed near their platform entrance or if it is less crowded during rush hours. A number of women say that they feel safe in these carriages and a few commented that they feel more comfortable away from the male gaze, suggesting that the "male presence demands behavioural regulation and control, and its absence is experienced as liberating." Noteworthy also, however, is that the respondents' most common complaint was about the physical presence of men, especially their smell—the so-called "*oyaji* smell" (Horii 2009:157–161).

'Aging odour' in men over forty was 'discovered' by scientists of the Shiseido cosmetics company in 1999. In spring 2011, I saw an advertisement on one of the Tokyo subway lines, suggesting that even men in their thirties were prone to smelling badly. '*Kusai*,' or smelly, however, is not necessarily to be understood literally, but rather as referring to the 'aura' of a middle-aged man. It is this particular cultural image associated with *oyaji* that makes people, especially younger women, dislike them.

This discussion about *oyaji* and the strategy of avoidance through *inemuri* is reflected in popular culture. In the opening episode of the TV drama series *Densha otoko* (Train Man; Fuji TV 2005),<sup>10</sup> passengers feign sleep when a drunken working-class *oyaji* stumbles through the train annoying everyone. *Inemuri* is clearly presented as the obvious strategy to avoid getting involved, in the hope that the *oyaji* would not take notice of them. When a shy young man, later dubbed '*densha otoko*' by an online community of bachelors, overcomes his fear and tells the man to stop molesting the young woman sitting opposite him, this is seen as an exceptional act of courage by everyone who has witnessed the scene (despite them officially being asleep). The episode shows clearly both the social appreciation for helping people who are being threatened (reinforcing the *oyaji* as the prototypical molester), and the strategy of *inemuri*, or more precisely *tanuki neiri*, as a camouflage cloak.

### **Power, gender and public space**

I suggest that recent changes in the rules of behaviour on trains reflect a renegotiation of gendered and age-related power relations. 'Trainology' and pornographic depictions of sleeping women, who are thus unprotected and innocent, suggest that modern male identities have been created around gender relationships that relegate men to active social (and economic) roles, whereas women are considered dependent, reactive, innocent and pure. In the postwar period, it was the white-collar worker (salaryman) who assumed the role of the backbone of economic growth and stability, and became the hegemonic model of masculinity (Dasgupta 2003). Demands on men in the workplace have always been high; they have to show that they fulfill all the responsibilities both of a company employee and a breadwinner for their family. If we think of Michel Foucault's findings that "the constraining, almost compulsive gaze men cast at female bodies is always bound up in a complex of power and knowledge" and the fact that the "sexualisation [of the male gaze] is an expression not merely of men's desire but also of their position of power" (quoted in Löw 2006:127), then we may conclude that pornography that uses schoolgirls and

sleeping women clearly reflects issues of unequal gender relations and of salaryman masculinity.

However, since the economic recession began in the early 1990s, many men have been finding it increasingly difficult to fulfill this role, especially when they are made redundant by their companies or when they are not able to secure themselves a good job after completing their education (Obinger 2009; Hidaka 2010). Suicide rates have risen considerably since around 2000, particularly among middle-aged men,<sup>11</sup> often because of job loss, financial problems, and the consequent threat to their identity as responsible members of society. These developments have begun to undermine the desirability of the 'corporate warrior' identity, sparking the development of a 'men's liberation movement' in Japan and making space for alternative negotiations of masculinity (Taga 2005), although hegemonic notions still remain strong (Dasgupta 2005).

At the same time, women have also begun to question the postwar common sense of the gendered division of social roles, in what Karen Kelsky has called women's "'defection' from expected life courses" (Kelsky 2001:2). They have been looking for more active social and economical positions, due to the feeling that marriage—although desirable—may not be compatible with their preferred life styles. Since this has resulted in a decreasing birth rate, the Japanese government has been keen to introduce family reforms, such as encouraging fathers to participate in childcare. Based on the assumption that women might be more willing to engage in child-bearing and child-rearing when supported by their male partners, the government launched various campaigns in the late 1990s and 2000s positing the "nurturing father" as an ideal to supersede the stereotypical, hard-working "absent father" (Roberts 2002). Nevertheless, whilst statistics suggest that an overwhelming majority of Japanese women, as well as men, now acknowledge that participation by the father in childcare is desirable, realities are slow to change (Nakatani 2006), although some inroads have been made (Ishii-Kuntz 2003). Moreover, it can also be argued that such campaigns are aimed at preserving and 'saving' the traditional postwar concept of gender roles, rather than radically altering them (cf. Takeda 2011). As well as many women defecting from expected life courses, many young men are also increasingly subverting traditional gender roles. Known as 'grass-eaters' (*sōshoku danshi*), they supposedly place little importance on relationships with women, and therefore by implication also marriage, and they do not aspire to careers in the corporate world, instead preferring to work on a temporary and casual basis as so-called 'freeters'

(cf. Deacon 2016). Thus, while traditional ideals of the roles of men and women continue to exist, they are also rejected and subverted, especially by younger people, leading to changing power relations, a change that is also reflected in how the space in commuter trains is used.

It goes without saying that not every uncomfortable touch on the train is intentional, and not everyone who falls asleep, leaning their head on their neighbour's shoulder, is a molester. Due to recent debates and socio-economic changes, many middle-aged men feel very insecure and are concerned about not intruding on their fellow passengers' space. Today, some go out of their way to keep both their hands above their head by holding a strap throughout the whole commute, even when they are exhausted, in order to make sure not to unwittingly touch a woman and cause offence. More generally, the vast majority of train passengers try to avoid physical contact as much as possible. On the commuter trains of the Hankyū line between Osaka and Kyoto the seats are known as *romanchiku shiito* (romantic seats) because they are so narrow. Most men on these trains lean toward the passageway and avoid physical contact.

A woman from Kyoto in her early thirties offered her own story of the *romanchiku shiito*. When she was travelling home, a young, very good-looking man got on the train and sat down in the empty seat next to her. Since she was tired, she fell asleep. When she awoke, she noticed that she had unintentionally leaned her head on the young man's shoulder and, moved by embarrassment, thought: "Now he will think I'm some kind of flirt!" (Kinoshita Yūko, 2 April 1996) She was therefore very aware of the fact that the young man could have interpreted her behaviour as an attempted advance.

#### **"Please offer your seat..."**

There is a more common reason for feigning sleep in public transport than that of sexual advancement—namely, making sure that one can keep one's seat. Starting in 1973, 'silver seats' (priority seats for the elderly) were gradually introduced (Horii 2009:8), and on local public transport passengers are generally requested to give up their seats to pregnant women and the elderly. But many people are tired and do not want to stand up. Moreover, judging a person at first sight is not always easy. An overweight woman might be upset for being thought to be pregnant, and a grey-haired person might feel too proud to be given a seat (Ōkubo 2008:57–63). In anonymous tertiary space, it is possible to be impolite, but with eyes closed, a person is socially invisible and thereby socially quasi-nonexistent; thus, any potential for conflict is removed from the outset. There is no doubt that the Japanese see through this mechanism in their eve-

ryday interpretation. Yet since it is impolite to wake sleeping persons, and one can never be quite sure whether they are really asleep or not, sleepers are generally not disturbed. In their annual public postercompetition in spring of 1996, the Eidai Tokyo Subway awarded the first prize to a poster depicting sleeping *tanuki* sitting on a bench while an elderly woman stands in front of them. Next to her it reads: "Metropolitan *tanuki* who live underground." Below the drawing it says in unambiguous Japanese and English: "Please offer your seat to an elderly or physically handicapped person."

In commuter trains, it is often the same people who take the same train together every day. Many take the same seats, observe each other, know their looks, habits, and the station where they disembark. Behaviour is closely monitored. However, usually nobody talks, unless they are travelling with friends. A young woman, Bancha (11 August 2006), in the Yomiuri online blog mentioned above, relates her story:

In my earlier job, I used to get on the train at the first station, sit down always in the same seat and immediately fall asleep for about thirty minutes, after which I had to get off the train. Until a colleague who had observed the situation mentioned it to me, I hadn't noticed that the person who sat next to me was always the same young man. Obviously, I had always leaned my head on to his shoulder, so my colleague even thought that he was my boyfriend. Once, when I overslept, the young man woke me up: "We have arrived at your station. You'd better get off." Shortly after this, I changed my job and now no longer take the same train. I don't even know what the man looked like. I could not even thank him or excuse my behaviour.

Although she had never spoken to this young man or consciously noticed him, their unconscious (at least on her side) but regular physical touch had created a caring, if limited, relationship.

#### **Conclusions**

Urban transport, especially commuter trains, creates spaces in which strangers are in close physical proximity with each other. It is a public space in which social relations, including public gender relations, might become problematic and need to be managed. One way in which this is achieved is through gaze. Gaze can invade the personal space of other people, but can also be used as a means of protecting oneself against the gaze of others. When people come in close proximity with strangers for prolonged periods of time, the gaze can become problematic and techniques of 'managing gaze' need to be employed.

Closing one's eyes (whether in fact asleep or not) means that the sleeper is obviously not in con-

trol of what is going on in the environment. Apart from compensating for a lack of nocturnal sleep, *inemuri* (napping) is therefore an important way to relax socially. As *inemuri* functions as a ‘side involvement’ or an ‘away’ in the social situation of the train, rules of behaviour are not those of sleep but of commuting. The main concern is the body posture, which must be kept under control in order not to physically invade other people’s space or to signal disorderliness and indecency. This is particularly true for women who are the object of gaze, rather than the one gazing at others; the onlooker has the power to interpret what he sees.

Seen from a different perspective, *inemuri* puts the commuter into a socially different state, comparable to drunkenness, as it allows people to misbehave and to lose control over their environment to a certain degree, functioning as a ‘social camouflage cloak’. This degree is negotiated and depends on the social power of the people involved. An analy-

sis of the gaze, as well as *inemuri*, therefore provides not only an insight into the nature of the space of a train, but also points to gender-specific power relations in Japanese society. Recent socio-economic changes have led to a questioning of men’s roles as breadwinners and pillars of society. There is also a physical reaction against their very presence, and the urban commuter train is one space in which these changes are negotiated through the body. Seen as pathetic and smelly, *oyaji* have become the symbol of an increasingly unstable economy and society. By paying attention to changes in the behaviour of men and women in commuter trains, it is evident that while gender-specific and age-related power relations in Japan favour the salaryman, young women are increasingly demanding public space for themselves by deciding how they can occupy this space and behave within it.

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#### Notes

[1] See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jigai>; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Femme-47-ronin-seppuku-p1000701.jpg>.

[2] Note that the modern 'mountain witch' (*yamanba*), a fashion and lifestyle icon for girls, which was at its peak in the early 2000s, is often associated with this symbolism. Nevertheless, such girls are certainly not careless about their hair, as can be learned from many websites (e.g. <http://www.wikihow.com/Put-Makeup-on-Like-a-Yamanba>. Accessed 13 December 2010). Nevertheless, in public discourse, *yamanba* have been characterised not only as ugly, but also as sexually deviant and even as a sign that civilisation is coming to an end (cf. Kinsella 2005).

[3] Following Albert Hunter, in American urban sociology, the term 'parochial space' is perhaps more common. It refers to a space that is neither entirely private nor entirely public. Such parochial space is "characterised by a sense of commonality among acquaintances and neighbors who are involved in interpersonal networks that are located within 'communities'" (Lofland 1989:10). Thus, the application of this term has only limited usefulness.

[4] On the male gaze on the female body and gender relations in boys' manga (*shōnen manga*) see Jones 2016:31–34.

[5] There is some concern that the radiofrequency energy of mobile phones may interfere with cardiac pacemakers; however, according to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), current research suggests that mobile phones do not cause significant health problems for pacemaker wearers.

[6] See <http://q.hatena.ne.jp/1076585879>. Accessed 17 September 2009.

[7] I have taken the term 'camouflage cloak' or 'Tarnkappe' from *The Song of the Nibelungs*, an epic poem in Middle High German, in which the hero Siegfried owns a camouflage cloak that makes him invisible; English readers might be more familiar with Harry Potter's invisibility cloak.

[8] <http://komachi.yomiuri.co.jp/t/2006/0809/098780.htm?o=0&p=1>. Last accessed 18 December 2010.

[9] See: <http://www.gender.go.jp/danjo-kaigi/siryo/ka36-2.pdf#page=71>, page 69.

[10] The story is based on a real event and has also appeared as a novel, manga and film.

[11] <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyu/suicide04/3.html>.

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## The criminality, and the Part-time of Work in Kirino Natsuo's

*Auto*

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### Abstract

This paper examines depictions of women's bodies in Kirino Natsuo's 1997 psychological crime thriller *Auto* (Out), focusing on the novel's engagement with the ways in which Japan's persisting domestic logic has informed contemporary economic structures and, by extension, complicated the question of Japanese female subjectivity. Ultimately, this reading aims to illustrate that the popularity of Japanese crime fiction is embedded not in the genre's reproduction of literary conventions, but rather in its capacity to politicise the act of reading by offering audiences a critical lens through which to examine reality. Kirino Natsuo's crime fiction paints a complex picture of contemporary Japanese urbanity. Her portraits of the modern Japanese city are gritty, her explorations of the criminal mind compelling, and her depictions of contemporary Japanese social relations unnerving, and often unequivocally bleak. Yet Kirino's fiction does not merely present a pessimistic vision of humanity—rather, it calls attention to a number of largely invisible cultural conditions, frequently via the voices of characters representing social groups who have been historically relegated to the margins of public discourse. Kirino's 1997 novel *Auto* (Out), which earned the writer France's prestigious Grand Prix for Crime Fiction, is perhaps the most representative example of this quality of Kirino's work. Via its intimate exploration of the lives of four women who are housewives by day and bentō factory workers by night—and who are propelled by desperation into the criminal underbelly of modern-day Tokyo—the novel illuminates some of the particular ways in which women's bodies have been positioned as instruments of late Japanese capitalism, and in doing so underscores the gendered logic according to which not only private relations but also grander socio-economic institutions in modern Japan operate.

**Keywords:** gender in Japan, feminism, Japanese genre fiction, women in the work-force.

To date, analyses of *Auto* conjointly reflect one predominant tendency: to view the work as one concerned first and foremost with domesticity and the immediate financial problems with which housewives in contemporary Japan are faced. While in her own study of the novel Amanda Seaman (2006, p. 197) acknowledges that Kirino presents a “troubling portrait of gender, class, and economic divisions in contemporary urban Japan,” her analysis offers little insight into the novel’s engagement with broader cultural concerns, instead focusing on what she argues to be the intractable situations of its female characters and, ultimately, the exclusively private victory of Masako over her rapist. Similarly, Linda White (2008, pp. 15-16) underscores Kirino’s concern with a domestic sphere shaped by male privilege, arguing that the text offers an “ethnography-like portrayal of the lives of part-time working mothers in the 1990s,” as well as “important sociological insights into the gender dynamics of contemporary middle-class families.” Obayashi Mieko (2008, p. 60) echoes this sentiment, writing that three ‘keywords’—money (*kane*), housewives (*shūfū*), and family (*kazoku*)—represent the primary ideological concepts around which *Auto* is situated.

The familial troubles that plague *Auto*’s characters undoubtedly represent some of the work’s most explicit themes; however, to focus exclusively on such matters represents an extremely limited approach to the narrative. In *Auto*, Kirino positions the domestic sphere at the axiom of what will rapidly expand into a much broader exploration of Japanese identity politics, and particularly the problem of female agency in a society that operates according to a kind of maternal logic, that is, an insistence that female bodily economy is largely defined by women’s propensity for procreation and child-rearing. Among the scholars named above, Seaman is the most attuned to this characteristic of the novel, and her reading identifies numerous important connections between Kirino’s portrayals of women’s roles in the domestic sphere and the gendered logic according to which public life unfolds. However, Seaman’s reading of the novel’s conclusion—in which she echoes Kirino herself in likening the work to Kobayashi Takiji’s proletarian novel *Kani kōsen*—falls short, embracing the rather fallacious distinction between public and private that *Auto* attempts to dismantle:

Whereas Kobayashi leaves his protagonists preparing to confront their capitalist overlords, Kirino leaves Masako gazing into the sunset, planning to extricate herself from the circuit of home and factory that had defined her. To be sure, Kirino raises the hope that Masako will find a better place and a

better life—the same hope that motivates Kobayashi’s characters. These hopes, however, are private ones; fulfilling them allows Masako to escape society’s ills rather than confront them, leaving her erstwhile friends excluded not only from the center, but even from the peripheries that have allowed them some sense of place, of identity, and of belonging in an otherwise hostile world. (2006, p. 214)

Seaman also writes that Kirino, along with fellow female crime writers Miyabe Miyuki and Nonami Asa, “stop short of suggesting any real changes to the *status quo*. This is perhaps a reflection of the deeply conservative nature of detective fiction itself, with its interest in establishing order and preserving social harmony” (2004, p. 189). In my view, Seaman’s conclusions fail to consider both the symbolic implications of Masako’s defeat of her rapist and, more broadly, the grander role of fiction, and perhaps especially genre fiction, as a vehicle for social critique in contemporary Japan. This is not to suggest that *Auto* offers its readers an easy answer to the problems posed by gender inequality—if anything, the novel’s bleak conclusion illuminates the complexity of this very issue. Yet in its construction of a fictional landscape for the exploration of female subjectivity, *Auto* not only underscores some of the real-world implications of Japan’s domestic logic for women, but also invites its readers to witness a dismantling of hegemonic perceptions of female bodily economy vis-à-vis our heroine’s emergence as an autonomous agent of self.

In her essay on Heidegger, the modern novel, and feminism, Mizutani Chizuko (2003, p. 8) alludes to the broader ideological scope of *Auto*, suggesting that the novel is at its heart concerned with the problem of being. In Heideggerian terms, she explains, ‘the world’ is constituted not by a self-evident, objectively existing reality, but rather by highly subjectivised spheres of being (namely “the self-reflective consciousness” [*jiko hansei na ishiki no nai aru mono*], “the place in which one is” [*jiko no iru basho*], and “my home” [*wa ga ie*], as described in Michael Gelven’s commentary on *Being and Time*). In *Auto*, the ontological relationship between space-time and being—that is, the assumption that one’s existence is constituted by her recognition of ‘here’ as ‘my home’—is problematised via the depiction of characters who desire to extricate their self-identifications from the spatio-temporal moments in which they exist.

More pointedly, *Auto* underscores the problem of subjectivity by presenting the ‘home’ (both literally and in the broader societal sense) as a ‘not-home’—that is, as a site in which the novel’s prin-

ciple characters are inscribed with meaning by external forces while being denied the agency to fully explore the possibilities of self—a process which for Heidegger (1962, p. 33) constitutes the principle mode by which one understands herself in terms of existence. In *Auto* this largely philosophical discourse of being is rendered material via Kirino's depictions of women's bodies as sites of commerce within both the private and public realms. The present analysis of *Auto* examines Kirino's depictions of bodies, devoting particular attention to the novel's engagement with the implications of Japan's maternal logic for women, whose perceived value as potential and actual wives and mothers has been employed to legitimise their continued relegation to the margins of the public workforce even into the twenty-first century. In doing so, it will move toward the possibility that the novel's violent conclusion functions as a metaphor for the sexual politics of capitalism, and thus engages with the issue of female agency in a manner that transcends the ostensibly 'private' realm and enters into an interrogation of the gender politics that inform the socio-economic topography of contemporary Japan.

Perhaps the most indisputable evidence of *Auto*'s predominant concern with labour is located in Kirino's depiction of the *bentō* factory in which the novel's four women are employed. Although a thorough examination of the diverse ways in which this space is portrayed is beyond the scope of this essay, a consideration of a few key passages suggests that the factory is intended to function as a microcosm of the broader economic system within which Japanese social life functions. In the earliest pages of the text, Masako, anticipating a long day of work, realises the profound bleakness of the factory site, positioned here at the crux of a grander urban landscape whose oppressive qualities assault one's senses:

As she stepped out of her car, she was enveloped by the humid July darkness. Maybe it was the muggy heat, but the darkness seemed incredibly black and heavy. Mixed in with the smell of gasoline fumes coming from the Shin-Oume Express, the stinking odor of deep-fried food hung faintly in the air. It was a smell that emanated from the *bentō* factory where she was headed for work. (Kirino, 1997, pp. 7-8)

The profound melancholy that "envelopes" [*tsutsumareru*] this space is further emphasised as Masako makes her way from the parking lot to the factory, reflecting upon the "incurable gloominess" [*ukkutsu wa nani o shitemo iyasare wa shinai*] of her workplace.

Soon thereafter, the qualities attributed to this space are expressed in more corporeal terms as the

narrator describes the efforts of the factory workers who man the production line:

To flatten the cold, solid squares of rice in such a brief moment required a great degree of strength in the wrists and fingers, and moreover, the stooped posture was hard on the lower back. After an hour of this, pain would shoot from the spine through the shoulders, and it became impossible to lift one's arms. Because of this, the task was passed off to the new employees. (Kirino, 1997, p. 21)

The attention Kirino devotes to the physically demanding aspects of the workers' labour thrusts the body itself to the forefront of this scene. Her explication of the "wrist and finger strength" [*tekubi to yubi no chikara*] required to flatten the rice, descriptions of the "shooting back and shoulder pain" [*senaka kara jyōnen made itami ga hashiri*] that result from such labour, and depiction of the loss of one's inability to control her own body [*ude mo agararanaku naru*] within the factory highlight the ways in which the process of manufacturing boxed-lunches for others' consumption ultimately devours the labourers themselves.

The passage cited above is significant not only as an example of Kirino's characterisation of the factory space, but also as evidence of the novel's concern with bodies, and particularly women's bodies, as sites of production and consumption. This theme should be understood as one heavily embedded in contemporary Japanese labour practices, which in truth have served both to improve upon and complexify the longstanding problem of Japan's gendered division of labour. On the one hand, Japan has made significant strides toward the inclusion of women in the professional world. Rates of higher education completion and permanent job placement among Japanese women have risen considerably in recent decades, and the number of women who choose to remain single or childless continues to increase. Nevertheless, in Japan domesticity<sup>1</sup> and career work remain to a large extent mutually exclusive, a trend that Tomiko Yoda (2000, p. 894) assesses in her discussion of what she describes as the nation's 'maternalisation':

A vast array of ideological and institutional pressures that engender women through their association with domesticity has not shown much sign of abating. Even women's return to work after marriage and childbirth has been recuperated into the domestic logic. Mother's paid labour is perceived to be an extension of her maternal function, since it typically supplements the household budget to acquire better housing for the family and better education for children. The persistent maternalisation of home and woman has been a major ideological support for society's preservation

of the gender division of labour and the heterosexist family organisation.

Yoda's comments underscore a reality with which *Auto* is eminently concerned: the fact that perceptions of female bodily economy within Japan are guided by an institutionalised maternal logic according to which women are largely excluded from opportunities to gain financial agency within the productive labour sphere in order that they remain tied to the reproductive one. In examining Kirino's depictions of women's bodies as sites of production and consumption across multiple realms of labour—private and public, legitimate and illicit—the remainder of this essay attempts to move toward an understanding of the novel as one critically engaged with the sexual politics of late capitalism within Japan.

*Auto*'s plot is set into motion by the abrupt transformation of the timid wife, mother, and part-time factory worker Yamamoto Yayoi into a violent spouse murderer in a moment that as Kirino herself notes has been a difficult event for *Auto*'s readers—and men in particular—to come to terms with: "Men were very shocked that a wife could kill her husband. That was really a provocative idea" (Duncan). In her portrayal of Yayoi, Kirino offers an intimate depiction of the psychology of an abused woman whose voice has been brutally silenced. This theme, however, transcends the boundaries of the domestic realm, for the violence enacted upon Yayoi within the household is extended into the productive labour sphere through the persistent deployment of her body as a site affirming the implications of Japan's domestic logic for women within and across both the private and public arenas. More pointedly, Yayoi is figured as a site of simultaneous production and consumption, her evolving physicality serving as an outward manifestation of her gradually deteriorating psychological state and illuminating the reality that labour functions as the most vital practice around which human identities and relationships are arranged.

Yayoi's suffering at the hands of Kenji is manifest in the form of an abdominal bruise which comes to signify her tortured psychological state at multiple points in the narrative. Moreover, although the bruise, like Yayoi's domestic conflicts, remains concealed from all but her co-workers, the mark comes to be associated with a stain on her work uniform, a reminder of the often brutal conditions under which she is employed in the factory. That Yayoi is a victim of domestic abuse is apparent upon her initial appearance in the text, in which she slips on the greasy, sauce-covered factory floor, and Masako, while helping her up, notices the mark:

Underneath Yayoi's turned up work uniform, Masako noticed a large, blue-black bruise on her abdomen. Was this the reason she was so lifeless? The mark was conspicuous on her white belly, like an ominous mark impressed upon her body by a god. (Kirino, 1997, p. 23)

Forced to work the remainder of her shift wearing a sauce-covered smock, Yayoi, already distracted by her husband's abuse the night before, is now further humiliated and returns home from the factory in a more fragile state than the one in which she had arrived. It is on this same night that she murders Kenji in a fit of rage. Immediately prior to the killing, the bruise is referenced once again:

Hatred. That's what you call this feeling, thought Yayoi Yamamoto as she gazed at her body's reflection in the full-length mirror. Near the center of her thirty-four year old naked body, right in the pit of her stomach, was a conspicuous, blue-black, circular bruise. Her husband Kenji had punched her there last night, and within her a strong feeling had been born. No, it had been there before [...] At the moment she had realised it was 'hatred,' it had spread like a black rain cloud and possessed her. Now, it was the only thing inside her heart. (Kirino, 1997, p. 83)

This passage suggests that Yayoi's bruise, as a physical manifestation of the pain she has endured, provides the motivation she needs to finally extricate herself from her unhappy marriage. However, the relief she experiences upon Kenji's death is temporary, for as the novel progresses the "ominous mark" [*fukitsu na shirushi*] on her abdomen, like the stain on her work uniform, functions not only as a perpetual reminder of her feelings of hatred toward Kenji, but also as a signifier of the brutality to which she has been subject within both the domestic sphere and her workplace.

After Kenji's death, Yayoi's state of mind becomes increasingly fragile as she struggles with, on the one hand, her growing desire to share her pain, and, on the other, her fear that the bruise, if seen, will affirm her guilt. As the women prepare to begin working the day after Kenji's death, the narrator further parallels Yayoi's bruise to the stain on her uniform, describing her as absentmindedly gazing down the conveyor belt as Masako meditates upon the conspicuousness of the dried pork sauce on her unwashed smock. Here the stain once again stands in for Yayoi's bruise, signifying the violence that she must silently endure. Furthermore, the extreme visibility of the stain comes to represent Yayoi's deepest fear—that the mark on her stomach will be her downfall:

And yet, when she was under the watch of suspicious eyes, Yayoi couldn't help but to think that they could see through to the bruise on the pit of

her stomach. The pain gave her the desire to strip off her clothes and expose her bruise for everyone to see, but to do so would be extremely dangerous. (Kirino, 1997, p. 309)

As Yayoi's bruise fades she becomes increasingly uncertain that killing Kenji has solved her problems. One day, recalling the early days of their relationship, she is suddenly overwhelmed with sadness and regret. However, her regret subsides as she is once again overcome by anger, removes her wedding ring, and hurls it into the garden. In this scene the narrator again hones in on Yayoi's body, this time in a description of the pale mark imprinted upon her finger by her wedding band:

Yayoi gazed at the empty ring finger of her left hand, the November afternoon sunlight emphasising its whiteness. The pale band left by the ring that had not been removed once in eight years brought about a suffocating feeling. It was a feeling of loss. However, it was also liberating. At last, a sign that it was all over (Kirino, 1997, p. 221).

In the above scene the narrator suggests that although Yayoi's bruise has disappeared, the abuse she has endured has left a long-lasting impression on her psyche. The suffering she has undergone is once again manifest corporeally, this time in the form of the "suffocating" *[setsunai]* imprint left upon her finger by her wedding ring. However, this passage points also to the possibility of recovery as the darkness of Yayoi's bruise and the pain it represents come to be starkly juxtaposed to the pale band of skin on her finger, a symbol of her newfound "liberation" *[kaihō]* from the constraints represented by the ring. With her bruise vanished, Yayoi casts away her hatred, along with her fear of being found out. She is determined to start anew with the help of the fifty million yen in insurance money that she is awarded in the wake of Kenji's death. However, the possibility of her recovery is subsequently stifled when Satake demands that she hand over the money lest he report her deeds to the police.

In her final scene in *Auto*, Yayoi replaces her wedding band, covering the pale mark she earlier perceived as a sign of freedom and drawing attention once again to the cultural stifling of her voice. Unable to dissociate her self-conceptualisation from either the domestic role that afforded her some sense of economic stability and purpose or the criminal realm within which she had gained a sense of agency, the act that had granted her a temporary sense of freedom is transformed into the cause of her downfall.

While the early pages of *Auto* offer its readers a complex portrait of Yayoi's character, her friend and colleague Kuniko is afforded comparatively little development upon her initial appearances in

the narrative. Aged twenty-nine and characterised by vapidity and rampant consumerism, Kuniko spends far beyond the means provided by her meager salary at the *bentō* factory and survives only on the mercy of her many creditors, who become increasingly insistent on being repaid as the narrative progresses. She is obsessed with her own appearance and the appearances of other women, and compensates for her insecurities by going deeper and deeper into debt. However, beneath Kuniko's lavish spending habits, obsession with looks, and irresponsibility exists a woman whose self-worth, *Auto*'s narrator reminds us, is tenaciously bound to her perceived labour value.

Kuniko's over-consumption of material goods drives her into debt (and into the hands of loan sharks), and this same over-consumption is reflected in her relationship with food, which at times functions as Kuniko's only source of comfort. The attention the narrator devotes to describing Kuniko's eating habits is significant. While the other women of *Auto* go to great lengths to ensure that their families are well fed, Kuniko possesses no domestic responsibilities and is depicted time and again devouring hot dogs, cake, and soda, in addition to *bentō* lunches produced at the very factory in which she is employed.

In my view, Kuniko's relationships with both food and material goods may be understood as a projection of a deep sense of personal inadequacy that stems from her non-participation in either the ordinary domestic or professional spheres. On the one hand, her lack of family severely limits her opportunities for developing relationships outside of the workplace. On the other, her lack of career skills precludes her from achieving financial stability. She is, in a sense, doubly-silenced, and her body becomes a site of negotiation, functioning as her only means of participating in the consumption of that which her labour produces:

Kuniko got up around noon and turned on the TV. After that, she had a boxed-lunch—one made in the factory where the women worked—that she'd bought from the nearby convenience store. It had probably been made on the next line over from hers. She was pleased to see that the beef lunch had been assembled by some of the newer workers. Because the new ones couldn't keep up with the speed of the conveyor belt, they didn't have time to spread the meat properly, so there were far more twisted chunks of beef than usual. This kind of lunch was a lucky sign, she thought. It was going to be a good day. (Kirino, 1997, p. 129)

Although Kuniko experiences exhilaration upon devouring her meal, her reality, like the boxed-lunch's bloated portion of "twisted beef" *[yojireta gyūniku]*, is a reflection of the vicious cycle of

production and consumption upon which the financial success of the *bentō* factory depends. Just as the factory figuratively consumes its workers, demanding the entirety of their physical strength in order to maintain the highest possible profit, Kuniko consumes in order sustain her perception of her own value: "She bought things to satisfy her desires, and out of these new things more desires were born. It was a gradually escalating cycle. In the end, this chase was the reason for Kuniko's existence. More than this, it was the entirety of her existence" (Kirino, 1997, p. 131). This comment suggests that Kuniko's desire to divorce herself from her labour leads only to her participation in the same rampant consumerism that is sustained by the work that she and other precarious labours perform. Furthermore, her desire, or "appetite" [*yokubō*], is revealed to be her downfall. In a sense, she simultaneously devours and is devoured by her labour—a notion that is taken to an extreme as Kuniko's story comes to an end.

Kuniko's quest for autonomy, or at least temporary monetary gain, drives her to participate in the disposal of Kenji's body and thus enter into the sphere of criminal labour wherein the friendships of *Auto*'s women ultimately break down. Although initially hesitant to embrace Masako's businesslike approach to the task at hand, Kuniko soon finds herself quite comfortable with her role as a criminal—that is, until she falls into the unforgiving hands of Satake, who murders her and sends her body to her former co-workers. The narrator's description of Kuniko's corpse is strikingly similar to the text's depiction of the twisted hunks of beef in the boxed-lunch Kuniko had earlier consumed: "Two fat, white legs, their ankles unbound, with bruising on the backs of them. Yoshie screamed and hid behind Masako. Next came a flabby torso that showed no signs of having been wounded. Two blubbery breasts hung at either side. She was fat, but it was the body of one at the peak of womanhood" (Kirino, 1997, p. 200). Subsequently, Kuniko's former co-workers undertake the task of chopping up her body and packaging it for shipment, just as the women had previously sliced, portioned, and tidily packed strips of meat into boxed-lunches at the factory. In this way, Kuniko's short-lived sense of freedom is transformed into her ultimate denial of autonomy.

While Kuniko's problems stem largely from her relegation to the outer fringes of the domestic sphere in which women her age are expected to participate, Azuma Yoshie's compulsory participation in domestic labour is one of the greatest causes of both her financial instability and her steadily decaying morality and psychological state. A widow, mother of two children (including a delinquent

teenage daughter who has a son of her own), and the caretaker of her senile mother-in-law, Yoshie, like Kuniko, represents a kind of doubly marginalised figure in society—namely, a housewife without a husband.

Yoshie spends her days fulfilling her various domestic roles and her nights working at the *bentō* factory, barely making enough money to survive. In her portrayal of Yoshie, Kirino depicts a woman whose own livelihood, as well as that of her family, depends solely upon her labour both within and outside of the domestic sphere, and whose self-perception is accordingly firmly rooted in her dual roles as mother and wage earner. However, as her family becomes an increasingly burdensome impediment to her desperate struggle for financial autonomy, Yoshie is left with no option but to extricate herself from her identity as homemaker by entering into the realm of criminality and, ultimately, destroying the very family around which her reality revolves.

Kirino deploys heavily visceral imagery in order to juxtapose the domestic and peripheral spheres of labour in which Yoshie participates. Such images begin to emerge early in the narrative, wherein Yoshie arrives home after a night at the factory and is confronted by the odour of her own house: "As she noiselessly opened the door, Yayoi immediately noticed the faint smell of disinfectant mixed with excrement. No matter how often she aired the house or mopped and hung the floor mat, she could never banish the odour" (Kirino, 1997, p. 42). The revolting "smell of disinfectant mixed with excrement" [*kurezōru to funnyō no nioi*] described here is heavily reminiscent of the aforementioned scene in *Autowherein* Masako, standing in the factory's parking lot, finds herself enveloped by the "stinking odour" [*kusai nioi*] emanating from the factory (Kirino, 1997, p. 7).

Subsequently, Yoshie is forced to change her ill-tempered mother-in-law's diaper while simultaneously dealing with her resentful teenage daughter Miki. As Yoshie realises how embarrassed her daughter is of the family's financial predicament, she finds herself unable to scold Miki for her attitude, thinking to herself, "I'm the most ashamed, the most miserable of all. But there's no way out. Who else would save them? They had to stay alive. And even if she felt like a slave, even if she always had to do the low work, she thought, she couldn't quit. There was no other way" (Kirino, 1997, p. 48-49). The notion that Yoshie is a "slave" [*dorei*] becomes increasingly powerful throughout the remainder of the text, and as her responsibilities begin to weigh increasingly heavily both on her body and mind, her family, much like

the factory, comes to represent a suffocating force. Propelled by financial desperation into the sphere of criminality, it is only in embracing her role therein that she is finally able to achieve some degree of autonomy.

When confronted with the first corpse to be disposed of, Yoshie finds herself too frightened to touch it; however, the promise of a large sum of money easily qualms her fears: "Now that it was categorised as a job, Yoshie began barking orders as if she were at the head of the factory assembly line" (Kirino, 1997, p. 144). As the plot thickens, Yoshie is convinced with comparable ease to participate in Jumonji's new business venture, and in this endeavour, too, she finds herself quite naturally taking charge. An expert when it comes to the slicing and portioning of meat and the assembling of boxed-lunches, Yoshie is equally adept at butchering and parceling corpses. Moreover, she is fully accustomed to her role as a night-time labourer, and this new job opportunity, which must also be conducted in the shadows, in fact entails far less arduous work than the labour in which she is engaged at the factory.

Just as Yoshie is able to achieve some financial stability, however, both her familial relationships and her factory friendships begin to break down. Her daughter steals the money she has earned and runs away from home, and Masako, for the first time, is unwilling to bail her out. Subsequently, a body that the two women have been contracted to cut up is revealed to be none other than their recently murdered co-worker Kuniko—a message from Satake, who is out for revenge. Yoshie is thus rendered both financially and emotionally destitute, and, it would seem, on the brink of being physically devoured entirely by the demands of those around her: "Tonight she was wearing the windbreaker that she wore every winter. Masako remembered how thin and worn its flannel lining had become. It seemed Yoshie would also wear out one day" (Kirino, 1997, p. 284).

In Yoshie's final struggle for independence, only one option remains: the destruction of everything that has for so long constituted her reality. Overcome by the resentment expressed by her family members, she sets fire to her house (presumably with her mother-in-law still inside), signifying her withdrawal from the domestic sphere and the casting off of her self-identification as homemaker. Subsequently, having become alienated from her former friends, she decides to take her meagre insurance settlement and leave town. "Yoshie found a way out," thinks Masako, as she bids her friend farewell for the last time (Kirino, 1997, p. 288). Yoshie does find a way out—the fire consumes her home and with it the obligations that consume her.

However, her prospects, like those of Yayoi and Kuniko, are grim.

While Katori Masako, like all of *Auto*'s women, spends her nights working in the *bentō* factory and her days attempting to impose order upon a crumbling family unit, she differs from the novel's other female characters in one crucial respect. The other women of *Auto* are engaged in constant struggles for financial stability, yet Masako, always business-like, is by comparison financially secure and becomes increasingly so as her skills at corpse-dismemberment are put to use by her *yakuza* employers. Nevertheless, Masako's story, like those of *Auto*'s other female characters, is one of an individual whose womanhood has, for the entirety of her adult life, defined her perceived value in both the private and public spheres.

Masako, we learn, had once been an office worker, but had lost her job during her company's downsizing after years of enduring the humiliation of being denied pay raises and passed over for promotions in favour of her younger male co-workers. Having vowed never again to work in an office, she had taken on a job at the *bentō* factory in order to supplement her husband Yoshiki's income. Although Masako prefers her factory job to the notion of returning to the professional world, as my analysis thus far illustrates, the conditions under which she is employed at the factory reflect the broader historical and economic conditions out of which popular perceptions of women's labour value in the Japanese home and workforce have emerged. Like the office, wherein perceptions of Masako's labour value reflected a common assumption that the primary role of women is as homemakers, the factory is a heavily gendered space wherein women are relegated to the menial task of food preparation, which is considered to be appropriate labour for their gender. In turn, the factory is a site of systematised violence not unlike the domestic sphere wherein Masako diligently fulfills her household duties in spite of her loveless marriage and resentful teenaged son. Thus Masako, like *Auto*'s other women, comes to be defined by the labour in which she is engaged.

Interestingly, however, Masako does not enter into the business of corpse dismemberment out of financial desperation; rather, she is motivated by a different kind of desire for power. While the other housewives of *Auto* strive for financial independence through the destruction of bodies, as Masako's longing for autonomy becomes increasingly urgent it is in bodily destruction itself that she comes to locate agency.

One of the most shocking elements of Masako's character is the enthusiasm with which she approaches the task of corpse dismemberment. When

Yayoi calls her to confess that she has murdered Kenji, Masako offers her assistance without hesitation, and, as she prepares to begin the task of chopping up Kenji's corpse, finds herself frighteningly eager to begin the job: "A person in her right mind couldn't think about such a thing, but the desire to take on the challenge of figuring out how to surmount these circumstances had already been born" (Kirino, 1997, p. 128). Although Masako experiences a brief moment of repulsion as she and Yoshie prepare to dismember the corpse, her almost obsessive desire to complete the arduous task quickly motivates her to get the job done. Wearing rubber gloves and vinyl aprons pilfered from the factory, and armed with her sharpest sashimi knives, Masako approaches the job quite methodically, finding herself surprisingly calm as "the narrow bathroom became choked with the smell of blood" (Kirino, 1997, p. 145)—much like the air surrounding the factory is saturated with the "stinking odour of fried food" (Kirino, 1997, p. 7).

Masako's morbid attraction to the mutilation of bodies only intensifies as the novel progresses, and as she and Yoshie find themselves ankle deep in the steaming innards of their first assignment, Masako finds herself strangely numb to the gruesomeness of their endeavour: "As they continued dismantling the corpse, the floor became soaked with blood, the foul smell of entrails filled the air, and the pieces of human body scattered about the room created a scene just like last time. However, this time it felt just like a job—remarkably different, easy" (Kirino, 1997, p. 102). To be sure, Masako's seemingly innate abilities to dismember and parcel corpses, like those of Yoshie, are broadly contextualised by her years of working with meat and assembling boxed-lunches both in the household kitchen and the *bentō* factory. However, Masako possesses an ability that Auto's other housewives do not: the capacity to view corpses that had previously embodied human life as mere "garbage" [*gomi*]: "Dealing with a corpse was not unlike throwing out the trash. Garbage was an absolute fact of life, and who was throwing away what was no one else's concern. Of course, one had to resign oneself to being thrown away, too, when the time came" (Kirino, 1997, p. 105-6).

Although Masako's perception of corpses as garbage appears callous to her friends and business partners, it is soon revealed that her predisposition toward the gloomy darkness that encompasses both the factory and her new labour stems from a desire to extricate herself from the oppressive realities of everyday existence:

Days of living an honest life, free from loneliness and guilt. Days she did not want to go back to. Things are fine as they are now, Masako thought.

When pebbles warming in the sun were turned over, the cool, moist earth underneath was exposed. Now, Masako relished this gloom. There was no dampness in this soil, but it was familiar and tranquil. She was like a bug, all curled up. Yes, she had become a bug. (Kirino, 1997, p. 114)

Masako emerges from her self-imposed isolation psychologically transformed. Uninterested in participating any longer in a society that has consumed every ounce of her being, the destruction of others' bodies comes to constitute her only mode of achieving a sense of power. Furthermore, as Masako grows increasingly comfortable with her new employment, her long-repressed sexual desire begins to reemerge, and does so in a fashion that serves only to further illustrate the extent to which her alienation has altered her perception of the value of life.

As Masako begins to rediscover her sexuality, her desire takes the form of a longing to succumb to the violence that she has struggled against for so long. Following the completion of her first dismemberment job, the exhausted Masako falls asleep only to be awakened by an erotic dream about being strangled by an unknown man. When, upon awakening from this dream, Masako asks her husband Yoshiki why they no longer have sex, he reminds her that she was the one who decided to take a nightshift job as a means of circumventing the potential to be hurt again. It is evident here that just as Masako's womanhood, which is perceived to embody a predominantly reproductive value, leads to her workplace devaluation, her failure to embrace the roles of wife and mother is the cause of her sexual devaluation at home. In turn, just as the *bentō* factory functions for Masako as a kind of refuge from the isolating conditions of the full-time professional realm, her yet-to-be-fulfilled desire to be murdered represents a bleak but preferable alternative to her emotionally and sexually unfulfilling domestic life.

When Masako agrees to dismember the corpse of her erstwhile friend and co-worker Kuniko, she is faced with the horrifying reality of her desire. Gazing at Kuniko, whose lacy black panties have been stuffed into her mouth by Satake, Masako realises that death is anything but seductive. Likewise, as the threat of Satake becomes progressively more imminent, Masako, now caught in the criminal web she has spun, begins to realise that this sphere of labour is not, in fact, a source of empowerment, but rather a gruesome iteration of the consuming work in which she participates in the factory and at home: "The yellowish-white fat stuck firmly to the palms of both of her hands and wouldn't come off. It had made its way deep beneath her fingernails and smeared all over her fin-

gers. No matter how much she scrubbed her hands, how often she washed them, Kuniko's fat repelled the water, refusing to come off" (Kirino, 1997, p. 245).

The viscous fat that coats Masako's hands is a heavily symbolic image, functioning not only as a grotesque reminder of the excessive consumption represented by Kuniko's fleshy body, but also as an abject manifestation of Masako's inescapable feelings of hopelessness, powerlessness, and vulnerability. In her decision to go through with the dismemberment of Kuniko's corpse, Masako seeks to dismantle that which Kuniko's body represents, as well as to undermine Satake by demonstrating her lack of fear. Ultimately, however, the insoluble fat proves to be as meaningful as the bruise on Yayoi's stomach, the twisted hunks of beef in Kuniko's boxed-lunch, and the noisome odour of Yoshie's apartment—all of which signify the oppressive conditions of the women's existence. By this point in the novel, Masako has realised what she has become; however, just as she cannot wash away the fat on her hands, she is far too invested in criminality to extricate herself from her situation—a notion confirmed when Satake captures her and takes her to an abandoned *bentō* factory, wherein the novel's tensions are played out in a grisly scene of torture, rape, and death.

In the scenes depicting Satake's rape of Masako, Kirino starkly contrasts Satake's physicality with Masako's wit, persistently countering the rapist's dreamlike experience of the act with his victim's capacity to maintain her composure as she seeks to escape her tormenter. Although Satake is a criminal, he is fundamentally weak. Always under the watchful eye of the law, he persistently strives to adhere to mainstream notions of appearance and behaviour in order to maintain the image that the labour in which he participates is legitimate, as well as more or less morally sound. As such, women like Masako—that is, women who have the audacity to traverse the boundaries of social norms, who are unconcerned with maintaining the appearance of normalcy—come to represent a threat to his own sense of autonomy. The one advantage Satake possesses is his brute strength, and so it is only through the destruction of what he perceives to be transgressive bodies that he is able to achieve the recognition he desires. As such, Satake discovers within himself a sadistic enjoyment of "inflicting pain" [*kagyaku*] and "sharing in death" [*shinkyōyūshita*], for it is in these fleeting moments that his fantasies of empowerment may be fulfilled (Kirino, 1997, p. 73).

Throughout the course of *Auto* the defunct *bentō* factory in which Satake brutalises and rapes Masako is persistently associated with the

threat of sexual violence against women via a tangential plotline involving a series of assaults that take place on the site. In her own analysis of the text Seaman (2006, p. 212) comments on this fact, writing that rape is "a form of public violence against women that serves to constrain the behaviour of women in general, since the fear of being attacked turns supposedly 'public' spaces into places of private danger." Although Seaman's observation is astute, her view of rape as an act circumscribed within the private realm is a problematic one, and particularly in light of the novel's insistence that 'private' endeavours such as family, friendships, and sex are frequently regulated by public value systems and institutions (and vice-versa). In her analysis of *Auto*'s conclusion Seaman embraces this fallacious distinction, largely divorcing the rape of Masako and its aftermath from the broader cultural conditions with which they engage in order to argue that the work fails to challenge the unjust socio-economic conditions that it exposes. By contrast, I will argue here that the events of the final pages of *Auto* should be considered in terms of the text's eminent concern with labouring bodies and as such embodies a number of broader implications concerning the problem of female agency within late capitalist Japan.

After Satake captures Masako, he takes her to the abandoned factory wherein he strips her of her clothing, ties her to a conveyor belt, and repeatedly beats and rapes her. Kirino adopts a compelling method of conveying the scenes that take place in the defunct factory: the reader experiences the rape first from the perspective of Satake and, later, from Masako's point of view. The impact of this narrative shift is powerful. In placing the reader first in the dominant position of the rapist, Kirino returns to a narrative tactic that she repeatedly employs earlier in the novel by denying the central figure—in this case, Masako—any degree of subjectivity. Instead, she immediately thrusts the reader into the uncomfortable position of identifying, if only for a brief time, with Satake, who, while not a particularly sympathetic character, exhibits an intense longing for affirmation. After Masako fatally wounds Satake, the events leading up to this moment are recounted, this time from Masako's perspective. In a sense, this second narrative of the events in question is even bleaker than the first, for the reader is already acutely aware of what is in store for our protagonist. However, even more powerful than the feelings of humiliation, fear, and hatred projected by Masako is the manner in which her experience of these events is delicately intertwined with *Auto*'s overarching concern with the female body as commodity.

Satake's initial rape of Masako is brief, and the narrator offers little insight into either Satake's motivations or Masako's perception of the situation, except to suggest that for Satake the act is a futile exercise in self-control—he ejaculates prematurely—while for Masako it is a matter of life or death that hinges upon her capacity to understand her victimiser:

Satake was in a dream, thought Masako as he raped her. An endless dream that only Satake understands, and within which she was merely a flesh-and-blood implement. It was better not to think about how one might escape another person's dream. Instead, she needed to figure Satake out. Then she could anticipate what was coming next, so that she could stay alive. (Kirino, 1997, p. 318-19)

The notion that Masako is merely an “implement,” or “tool” [*dōgu*], for the fulfillment of Satake’s sadistic fantasy alludes to earlier characterizations of Masako, as well as the other characters discussed here, as figures who serve similar functions within their everyday lives. Having realised her role within Satake’s fantasy, Masako initially accuses him of being sexually perverse, but soon thereafter comes to believe that he is neither a deviant nor a madman, but rather someone “wandering in a passionate search for something” that has yet to become apparent to her (Kirino, 1997, p. 319).

Subsequently, Satake resolves to wait for sunrise so that he may perform the act again, this time with the goal of fulfilling his desire for power by watching her face as he rapes and tortures her in the same way that he had his previous victim. At this juncture the interconnectedness of the sexual violence being imposed upon Masako and the brutal conditions endured by the variety of labourers represented throughout the text are paralleled in no uncertain terms:

The ruins of a factory. A concrete casket. When she thought about the two years she had spent her nights working in a place like this, she couldn't help but wonder if she was fated to die here. Was this the cruel fate that awaited her beyond the door that she herself had opened? (Kirino, 1997, p. 320)

The coffin-like factory in which Masako is imprisoned becomes a powerful allegory, representing the stifling and seemingly inescapable conditions of modern existence. As if to affirm this, Satake subsequently inquires of Masako, who is physically bound to the conveyor belt: “You made those boxed-lunches on this kind of thing, didn’t you?” (Kirino, 1997, p. 308). From Satake’s perspective, this question successfully strengthens Masako’s feelings of hatred toward him. However, the revelation of Masako’s point of view marks this moment

as a point of deep introspection as she begins to realise that her desperate quest for freedom has led her down the same dreary road upon which Satake treads:

Masako lay on the conveyor belt like food being transported down the line, trying to conceal her fear. Satake was right—she certainly never would have imagined she’d be tied up here. The factory’s conveyor belt. Yoshie, who determined the speed of the belt, had an out. But her own escape was now blocked by this man. ‘Hey, how did you chop up those bodies?’ Satake asked her, delicately making a line across her neck with the tip of his finger [...] ‘You’re exactly like me. You’re on a path from which you can’t turn back.’ (Kirino, 1997, pp. 321-22)

The narrator’s comparison of Masako’s body to “food being transported down the line” [*beruto konbeya ni noserareta tabemono*] is perhaps the text’s most explicit representation of the female body as a tool of capitalism. Here Masako is, quite literally, bound to the conveyor belt upon which food had previously been sliced, portioned, and packaged for consumption, just as in her everyday life she is bound by socio-economic constraints to her consuming roles as factory labourer and home-maker. Moreover, Satake’s inquiry regarding her dismemberment job, accompanied by his mock decapitation of her own head, affirms that which Masako had already begun to realise: that her most recent endeavour is not, in fact, a way out, but rather yet another dead end. Masako discovers in this moment that she is indeed becoming like Satake—she is emotionally numb and feels empowered by her destruction of others. However, even this knowledge does not dampen her will to survive, and as Satake begins to rape her for the second time, she continues to search for a means of escape.

Satake’s second rape of Masako is depicted in considerably more detail than the first, and moreover delves much deeper into the psychologies of both characters. Of Satake’s perception of the event, the narrator writes:

Satake pulled open her eyelids. He looked for fear, or the hatred that surpassed it. While frantically searching inside of Masako, he held her. But what was he searching for? The other woman? Masako? Or himself? Was this a dream or reality? Though he had no sense of time, the body of the woman he was having sex with seemed to be becoming one with his own. It was okay if he was no longer part of this world—from the beginning he hadn’t ever compromised. (Kirino, 1997, p. 311)

This passage is a quintessential example of Satake’s delusions of power. Having been outwitted by Masako on an intellectual level, he now

derives immense pleasure from his ability to physically subdue her, to make her enjoy the rape in spite of the feelings of hatred that he had earlier attempted to arouse. However, Masako's perception of the rape differs considerably. That which Satake perceives to be pleasure on her part is, in truth, yet another example of Masako's resilience, her ability to survive in even the most despondent of situations. On the verge of freezing to death in the cold factory, she is reinvigorated by the warmth of his body inside of hers and is able to resume her task of figuring out what it is that Satake is searching for. Here her hatred for Satake becomes intermingled with feelings of pity for her rapist, a man whose pleasure relies on his being despised by others. Although Satake confesses earlier in this scene that he hates her "because she is a woman" [*omae ga onna dakara da*] (Kirino, 1997, p. 310), as she is being raped Masako begins to realise that it is not merely her womanhood that Satake hates, but rather the fact that she is a woman who has outsmarted him.

Masako subsequently undergoes a perceivable psychological transformation as she is once again confronted with the fact that Satake embodies the same sense of desperation that she does:

Just as she had thought she wouldn't mind being killed by him, Satake now wished to be destroyed by her. Masako suddenly understood him. She loved him. As she realised this, she felt as though the dream in which Satake was trapped was dissolving, that he was moving closer to reality. Their eyes met, and they became one body. Within his eyes, only she was reflected, and an unbelievable wave of ecstasy took hold of her. She could die like this. But at that moment, the glimmering knife blade reflected the sunlight across her face, and she was thrust back into reality. (Kirino, 1997, p. 324)

In this passage Masako realises that her self-imposed isolation, her embracement of a life like that of a "curled up bug" [*maru de marrumatta mushi da*], is no different than Satake's own lonely life of solitude. However, her newfound understanding of Satake extends beyond either a sense of pity or a desire to be understood herself, for while Masako is momentarily pulled into his fantasy, she is quickly "thrust back into reality" [*genjitsu ni oshimodosareta*] while Satake remains thoroughly trapped within his dream—a dream which, in spite of his own delusions of power, is ultimately revealed to be his weakness. Taking advantage of Satake's disconnect from reality, Masako seizes the knife with which he had intended to stab her, and Satake is forced to abandon his fantasy a second time. For interrupting his fantasy, he viciously beats her; however, soon thereafter Masako gains the upper hand, fatally wounding Satake by slicing

open his face with a scalpel she had earlier hidden in her coat pocket.

While Masako is victorious over Satake, subsequent pages of the novel paint a grim picture of our protagonist as she comes to terms with the fact that she has sentenced Satake to his death:

Now the morning sunlight came pouring in the factory window, radiantly bright. Like the lights of a theater, stripes of dust connected the square windows to the dirty concrete floor. Shaking, Masako followed Satake's gaze and looked up toward the window. Her trembling was not from the cold. It was because of what she had done. (Kirino, 1997, p. 327)

Here the bright sunlight penetrates the factory, an auspicious sign that there exists a world outside of the concrete casket in which Masako has for the past several years been trapped. However, face-to-face with the disfigured Satake, who is rapidly bleeding to death, Masako has yet to realise that her opportunity for freedom is right outside of the factory door.

As Seaman observes, the fact that Masako's newfound liberation is somewhat undermined by her identification with her rapist problematises a conventional feminist reading of the text. While Masako's murder of Satake may be understood as a signifier of her freedom from modern conceptualisations of her value as a woman, she remains tied to her feelings of empathy for Satake, with whom she shares a desperate longing to escape the conditions of modern existence. Moreover, by murdering Satake Masako fulfills his desire, empowering him with the freedom he locates in death.

The troubling ambivalence that pervades these scenes constitutes a remarkable point of departure from the climax of the conventional psychological thriller, which tends to be situated around a relatively normative moral compass and whose quintessentially righteous protagonist either triumphs over, or is destroyed by (often via imprisonment, institutionalisation, or death), the villain. Diverging from orthodox perceptions of good and evil, Kirino momentarily obfuscates the discrepancy between victimiser and victim, pointing to the fact that late capitalism in Japan embodies major implications for all of its participants. However, in the final chapter of *Auto* Kirino points also to the possibility of Masako's recovery, which, we find, is located in her refusal to participate any longer in the defining spheres of labour around which her life is situated:

Masako stared at her fingernails, cut short to the quick. Because of her job, she had not allowed them to grow long once in two years. Her hands were thoroughly chapped from the constant disinfectant. Twenty years working at the credit union. Giving birth to a child, doing the household chores,

spending time with her family. What had those days meant? In the end these marks that indelibly stained her were undoubtedly no less than who she was. Satake was living an empty dream, and Masako was surviving everything reality had brought her way. Masako realised that her freedom was different than Satake's [...] Her own freedom—not Satake's, or Yayoi's, or Yoshie's—was surely out there. If one door closed behind her, she had no choice but to find a new one and open it. (Kirino, 1997, p. 334)

While this passage clearly marks a psychological turning point for Masako, Kirino scholars have yet to adequately address *Auto*'s concluding scenes. Seaman's analysis offers the most thorough attempt to understand Masako as a rape survivor; however, her notion that Masako's victory is an exclusively private one, I suggest, detaches Masako's experience from the overarching thematic concerns of the novel, in effect undermining the implications of the text as whole.

In her essay "Toward a New Feminist Theory of Rape," Carine Mardorossian (2002, p. 768) draws attention to the counterproductive potentialities of postmodern feminist discourses on rape survivorship, writing that such discussions frequently portray rape victims not as subjects, but as objects who are "irremediably and unidirectionally shaped by the traumatic experience of rape and hence incapable of dealing with anything but their own inner turmoil." Mardorossian (2002, p. 765) suggests, alternatively, that survivors of sexual assault are empowered not through the highly personal process of reclaiming the self, as Seaman suggests is the case with Masako, but rather through what she calls the "production of narrative":

The focus is on the potential for the invention of the self this word-shaped reality entails rather than the excavation of a core center. Rape is a reality that feels anything but real to the victim, yet this very same unreality can become the basis of a representation the speaker can manipulate and gain control of, that can command an audience's attention and be made intelligible in other than the available cultural terms. Empowerment in this respect is about accessing one's life as material rather than depth.

The distinction Mardorossian outlines between 'material' and 'depth' is exemplified in *Auto*'s final scene, quoted above. Meditating upon the corporeal

signs of her life history—her roles as factory labourer, wife, and mother, her confrontation with Satake, and her relationships with *Auto*'s other housewives—Masako embraces the reality of her past while simultaneously disallowing the cumulative trauma that she and her companions have endured to dictate her future. In other words, freedom remains a possibility for Masako not because she has discovered, or rediscovered, what Mardorossian (2002, p. 764) calls a "foundational self"—that is, an inner core or former self buried deep beneath trauma—but rather because she emerges from her experiences prepared to grapple with whatever reality hands her and determined to invent herself in her own terms rather than in those of others. To be sure, realising the potential to move forward necessitates the disruption of the family unit and friendships around which Masako's existence revolves; however, Masako's detachment from her defining roles in the home and factory does not, as Seaman suggests, imply the impossibility of public resistance. Rather, it signifies her conscious rejection of a patriarchal imaginary that governs both private and public life and which is manifest in Satake—in other words, a system of power relations in which women are bound to participate in the reproduction of a common narrative of victimisation.

*Auto* is one of a growing number of female-authored Japanese crime novels that beg us to reconsider the implications of the market successes of works of the genre both domestically and across the globe. As this analysis demonstrates, essentialist conceptualisations of crime fiction as a literature reliant upon the perfunctory reproduction of convention, as well as claims to the effect that crime and other popular genres function predominantly as vehicles of escape from modern existence, reflect a tremendous failure to consider the relationship between writers, readerships, and culture-at-large. As Kirino's writing illustrates, crime fiction embodies the capacity to grapple with the complex and ever-changing social realities of modernity, and moreover her popularity evidences the reading public's demand for, and critical engagement with, socially conscious art. As such, works like *Auto* offer readers a critical lens through which to examine reality, politicising not only the act of writing, but the act of reading, as well.

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### Notes

Concerning domesticity in Japan, it is important to understand the role of the *shufu*, or housewife, within the context of the nation's discourse on labour. As Mariko Asano Tamanoi (1990, pp. 19-20) notes, from a sociological perspective the urban middle-class housewife has, since the number of urban wage earners and their families began to grow in the late nineteenth century, come to be considered representative of the Japanese woman. Japan's sexual division of labour, she explains, gives women almost total autonomy within the family domain, and marriage in Japan, whether or not it is a romantic union, in many respects continues to be perceived as a "socially valued female career in which a woman finds self-fulfillment (*ikigai*)."

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## Criticism of Russian Eurasianism

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### Abstract:

The paper is dedicated in depth to the exploration of the Eurasianism and the neo-Eurasianism formed in its ideological basis. Works of Russian ideologists representing the Eurasianism idea, such as Danilevsky, Trubetskoy, Lamansky, Savitsky, Panarin and Dugin are critically analyzed. Russian Eurasianism is identified as a doctrine trying to prove the Eurasian hegemony of Russia and a politico-ideological system of Russian fundamentalism. It is implied that Eurasianism platform has been unilateral from its initial emergence striving for justifying the imperial politics of Russia and had not been able to escape from its partiality. However, Russia as a Eurasian state could gain an opportunity of favorable participation in the process of partnership among states in this region by relinquishing its claims to be an absolute dominant power both of Europe in Europe and Asia in Asia.

**Keywords:** Eurasia, Russian Eurasian Policy, globalization, Turkic states

The victory of the Russians in the Great Northern War and fragmentation of the Golden Horde in the south at the beginning of the XVIII century turned the Eurasia into the massive arena of battle. Announcing itself a state of empire in 1721, Russia took advantage of the weakening of Turkic states and empires in all spheres. After capturing all the strategic flanks along the Black and Caspian Seas, the Russian Empire enlarged towards Iran and China “through” the Caucasus and the Central Asia respectively. In 1905 the territory of the Russian Empire had already been reaching the largest scale in the history following the Turkish-Mongolian and British Empires. Its territory of 22.5 million square meters was lying across the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea in the north, the Baltic Sea - in the west and the Pacific Ocean in the east. This historic process that overlapped with the weakening of Turks and consolidation of Russians during the historical and geopolitical transformations occur-

ring in Eurasia at that time didn't change the geopolitical balance in favor of Turks and all Asians but changed in favor of Russians. Russia becoming a dominating empire of Eurasia captured not only a large proportion of this continent excluding Turkey but also put an end to the independence of Turkic states located in captured territories by moving Russian nationals to those territories in order them to dominate. Later, change in the political and ideological system of Russia - establishment of the Soviet Socialist Republics made this state known in the Eurasia even in the whole world as a superpower. Moreover, one of the giant poles of the international bipolar system was formed by this particular unitary state.

During its seventy-year existence, the Soviet Union wasn't able to maintain the balance of “dinosaur vastitude” and collapsed due to the fundamental mistakes made in its domestic, as well as international policies. When the Soviet Union collapsed

five of the fourteen republics seceded from it were Turkic states. Containing great traditions of statehood, these republics started nation-building process rapidly and assertively. With the dissolution of the USSR necessity to reform the Eurasian geopolitics on more rational basis had occurred. In such historical period, the eurasianism, which played a great role in the formation of the Russian Empire and was one of the political and ideological pillars of it, started reappearing in the Russian Federation that never broke off the royal pretensions. However, regardless how hard the neo-eurasianism tries to reappear in a new shape it actually doesn't differ from the classical eurasianism.

Classical eurasianism - is a doctrine trying to corroborate the Eurasian hegemony of Russia. Russian eurasianism is a political and ideological system of Russian fundamentalism. Particularly, the eurasianism settled on Pan-Slavism and Slavophilism frameworks, and later deepened on philosophical and culturological perspectives, worked very hard to eliminate contradictions in the Russian Empire's policy regarding the Europe and Asia, fix the "crack" in the dichotomy of Europe-oriented and Asia-oriented Russian society, and finally to corroborate its position on Russia's being more an Asian state rather than a European. It also caused continuous discussions being even on the agenda currently. Consequently, the eurasianism arose in the whirlwind of discordance of opinion had contradictory and challenging evolution as the history of this empire.

Reviewing the process of formation of the Russian Empire the prominent Russian philosopher Nikolay Berdyayev links the so-called "ambivalence" of Russia ever hesitating between Europe and Asia, to the "dualism" which is very distinctive to the Russians and had appeared as a manifestation of these characteristics in the reforms of the Peter the First [Berdyayev, 2011, p.18]. Peter Chaadayev trying to clarify Russia's "self-seeking" wrote in 1829: "We do not belong to any great families of the mankind. We are neither East nor West. We do not own any of their traditions either" [Chaadayev, 1989, p.508]. At the last quarter of the XIX century when the Russian Empire became hegemonic, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, a great Russian thinker had joined the debates on Russian identity with a strongly-worded thought: "We are Tatars in Europe and Europeans in the Asia" [Dostoevskiy N, 2008, pg.509]. This particular acknowledgment proves that the ethnos "Tatar" (called by Europeans following the name from Slavic nations), etc. Turks were perceived as the essence of Eurasia. Therefore, starting from the second half of the XIX century, Russian intellectuals and ideologists were thinking that this empire that was facing the di-

lemma of acknowledging itself as a European or Asian state, eventually should have to put the "Eurasian dress" on "shaped" properly to its geopolitical "status".

Later, as Vladimir Ilich Lenin ironically stated "Russia wearing the old hats thrown by Europe" was, in fact, longing to become a Europe-oriented state since the times of the Peter the First, as well as trying to imitate the Europe in all manners – from political to cultural. Pursuant to the process of Russia's growing into a hegemonic state while the ideological battle between Russian westernism and easternism, certainly Russia's self-assertion was gradually prioritizing the easternism (asianism) due to the geopolitical "weightiness". Based on the originality of the Slavic world, the Pan-Slavists, in general, were inclined to the position of denial of Europe. In his work "Russia and Europe", 1862, Nikolay Danilevsky author of a specific theory of Pan-Slavism, was trying to justify the necessity for Russia to view the relations with Europe from a new paradigm. Nikolay Danilevsky was identifying "the Europeanism as the illness of Russian life" and was considering the "struggle with the west as the only way of salvation" [Danilevskiy, 2008, p. 323, 529]. Danilevsky was admitting that "Europe belongs to Aryan nations, but Asia to Semitic, Turan (Turkic) etc. nations". [Danilevskiy, 2008, p.370]. The author was also informing that in fact, the Europe considered Slavonians as its enemies, not Muslims and Turks, and the Europe constantly attempted to embroil Turkey, the leader of the Turkic world with Russia, the leader of the Slavic world [Danilevskiy, 2008, p-s. 400-401]. Finally, the main purpose of Pan-Slavism that could be a basis for the idea of eurasianism was articulated in N.Danilevsky's views as follows: "... Seizure of Constantinople (Istanbul), the center of Orthodoxy as well as the junction of great historical memories could ensure Russia's vast superiority over the entire Eastern countries." Calling Constantinople as "Tsargrad" (City of tsar) the Russian visionary was describing it not only Russia's but also "Common-Slavic Union's capital" [Danilevskiy, 2008, p.s.467-470].

To resuscitate Byzantium, to make Constantinople (Istanbul) a center of Slovenian world – were no doubt an absurd utopia as a revival of Roman Empire. The imperialistic ideology in Russia reached such an immoderate bound in that period that Russians were looking at Europe in the west and Turkic world in the east and south as their competitors in their struggle to rule the entire world.

The eurasianism, having decisively settled on this very position, approaches the relationships with Asia with the new dimensions of Russian funda-

mentalist, in a manner differing from its ideological predecessor's – Pan-Slavism, and driven by the Russia's imperialistic geopolitics (necessity to bound to the east and south). Vladimir Lamansky in his work "Three worlds of the Asia-Europe continent", published in 1892, for the first time, assessed Russia as a Eurasian state. In addition, his position indicated that Europe and Asia are not two continents divided by the Ural Mountains, in fact, it is comprised of Europe, Eurasia and Asia: and Russia discovers its identity on this site that "connects these three worlds". Konstantin Leontyev, Vladimir Lamansky's contemporary follower analyzing further links the future of Russia, as a state, to Asia. His consideration was that denial from Europe should be accepted by Russia as a foothold and Russia must recognize the fact that "it belongs more to Turan world rather than the Slavonian" [Laruelle, 2012, p.3]. Hence, "Turan world" was perceived in Russian mentality as an area equal to Eurasia.

The more systematic concept regarding the classical eurasianism was proposed by Duke Nikolay Trubetskoy: "The history of Russia should be overviewed from the East rather from the West" [Trubetskoy 2007]. He introduces Eurasia as an area of custom civilization established by various nations inhabiting there. In addition, he also points out that 700 years back "Genghis Khan, who was not only the great conqueror but also the great organizer" already laid the geopolitical foundation of what was ensuring the integrity of Eurasia: "This modern state called Russia or USSR in this historical perspective (the 1920s) is a part of the Great Turk-Mongol Empire established by Genghis Khan... Russia's geographical territory coincides with the core area of this empire. "Russian statehood within the territory of Eurasia is also a heritor and successor of Genghis Khan's state" "...like Duke of Moscow is a heritor of Golden Horde". Nikolay Trubetskoy even reveals the genetic basis of this inheritance: "As the Ugro-Finnic and all Slavic nations, the Turkic blood is running through the veins of Russians. The fact that our brothers (not due to the language or religion, but due to the blood, character and culture) are not only Slavonians but also Turanians is usually disregarded" [Trubetskoy, 2007, p.14, 15-17, 31-36]. According to the Russian ideologist, the Eurasian state of Russia will find its historical self only when it conceives it is heritor and successor of great Genghis Khan! The aim is evident: in an effort to become hegemonic in Eurasia, Russia even claims its "blood brotherhood" with Turks whose territories it occupied, to neutralize the challenges regarding the "Turkish component" of Russian Empire.

Since 1917 - soon after the Russian Empire collapsed and the Soviet Union was established, the eurasianism was developed as a specific political and ideological framework within the movement of Russian emigrants: in 1932, the Eurasian party was established overseas. Peter Savitsky, one of the organizers of this party elaborated the eurasianism theoretically and developed its political platform. Remaining loyal to the ideas of eurasianism until the end of his life, Peter Savitsky, along with improving the Eurasian version of Russian geopolitics, shifted the eurasianism movement from a theoretical surface to the surface of practical activities. Similar to his ideological predecessors, Savitsky also ties Russia's destiny with Asia and considers that "continental sense" of Russian ethnus owned from Asians stipulates its domination in Eurasia [Savitskiy, 1997, p.155].

Doubtless, no conditions for visibility of eurasianism existed during the soviet period since the Soviet Union was officially following the communist ideology. It could only occur, in the best case, "between the lines" of certain ideas. Regardless the fact, the "concealed" expansion policy persisted by the Soviet Union was more pretentious and widespread than eurasianism. The idea of eurasianism commenced recovering in an openly and doctrinal manner only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This tendency is called "neo-eurasianism" [Laruelle, 2012, p-s.3-6] in the theoretical and analytical literature. The complex of new qualities of neo-eurasianism, which does not substantially differs from the classical eurasianism means it has outlined itself pursuant to the political realities of the modern era. However, more serious and dangerous difference occurs while comparing the historical situations: Nowadays, Russia, that "lets allied republics slip through its fingers", was not able to endure this "loss" and, for the first time in its history, initiates to bring the idea of eurasianism to the center of national policy that earlier was only going around this policy.

As of today, eurasianism process is developing in four evidently linked with each other directions: (1) in the scientific and theoretical, humanitarian and culturological concepts; (2) in the standings of public and political movements; (3) in the ideological platforms of political parties; (4) within the principal peripheries of Putin's national policy.

Challenges faced by the Russian state on the ways to keep and develop its geopolitical power within the progressive historical and political realities are introduced as a fundamental problem that "modern" eurasianists are focused on.

Alexander Sergeyevich Panarin, head of the Social and Philosophical Researches Center within the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Science

of the Russian Federation, introduces the Russian "Eurasianism" as an alternative and global idea versus the Western "Atlanticism" in his works such as "Russia in the cycles of world history", "Global political prognostication", and "Temptation by globalism" [Panarin;2000a,b,c]. The aim of introducing the issue in this manner is to justify the intentions of the current Russian state, inheritor of Russian Empire and USSR, to become a dominant political power again first in Eurasia and then in the whole planet. Panarin admits that "Russia is getting destructed" [Panarin, 2000, p.78] and talks with a sophistic logic from an unreal perspective for Russia. He explains the processes establishing frameworks for Russia's returned revenge as follows: "We are observing rivalry of Eurasia project: northern project (Russia), Muslim project (re-Pan-Turkism intentions) and Chinese project (re-revival of Great Silk Way). Last two projects were thought out as an attempt to link Atlantic and Pacific oceans avoiding Russia... The characteristic point is that both projects are oriented to the Caspian open oil resources [Panarin. 2000, p.163]. According to the author's points of view, if just the first - Eurasian "Russian project" was able to manage the processes, it would have all the chances to win. Panarin's version of "neo-eurasianism" seems to seek an ally for Russia "that was left alone in the desert." Although he was predicting the upraise of the new global alliances due to his state's dominance, [Panarin, p.1999], it becomes clearly visible every day how far it is from the political pragmatics: the fact is that stronger areas of interest that are not balanced with the "Russian project" of the global rivalry in are being formed in the Eurasian arena.

Componentization of eurasianism within the ideological platform of the political parties clearly illustrates that these parties are instrumenting this ideology to gain popularity among the conservative class of the Russian society, particularly the USSR-biased communists and the nationalists supporting radicalization of Russia's super statehood policy, as well as the cosmopolitans impersonating the universalist image of poly-ethnic Russia.

Alexander Dugin, who introduced the eurasianism to the attention of public and political movements in Russia, sets forth the "main principles of doctrinal Eurasia platform" in his book "Eurasian View". In general, Alexander Dugin's (currently a member of the Expert Council at the Russian Federation's State Duma) public and political activities are focused on restoring the Russia's "Eurasian super state" status within the Russia's integration into the former soviet republics. This particular book is comprised of the main provisions of the Action Plan of the All-Russian Political and Public Movement "Eurasia". The core paradigm of

the platform is suggested by Alexander Dugin, the ideologist of neo-eurasianism could briefly be designed as follows: neo-eurasianism is getting formed based on the ideology of the classical Eurasianism. The fundamental thesis of the classical eurasianism is that "the west is against the mankind" [Dugin, 2002, p.6]. For this particular reason, none of the nations and states imitating the West was able to determine its own policy. They always were in leading strings of the West and under its influence. Russia experienced the similar situation as well - the western oriented policy triggered its regression and loss of everything gained. "The crisis of idea in modern Russia" originates exactly from it. Nowadays, the westernism appears in the model of the globalism. Due to this reason, a resistance against this threat exists worldwide: according to the author, there is only one source of a mindset that can be an alternative to the unipolar world model in the form of globalism and it is Eurasianism. Priorities of the eurasianism movement are to "establish the Eurasian Union" on the basis of CIS by strengthening the idea of "Eurasia federalism" and to materialize "the axis of ally states" by extending strategic integration of CIS' internal space in the direction of Moscow-Tehran-Delhi-Beijing [Dugin, 2002, p-s.14-15]. As it happened in the past, today the "Veliko-Russians" are capable of guaranteeing "formation of a single nation" under a unique circumstance manifested from the "intersection" of Slavonians, Turks and Finno-Ugric ethnos. Confident in its significance, the eurasianism, which may become "a consolidated core of the extended spectrum of mindset, philosophy, geopolitical project, economic theory, moral movement and political forces", announces - "Eurasia is a planet" [Dugin, 2002, p-s. 34-35].

However, in his "project" Alexander Dugin goes backwards from the Russian Empire, Soviet Union and CIS practice and views that the "Eurasian Union" is supposed to originate in Eurasia, not within the ally of the sovereign states, but within the current Russian Federation's formation - in the form of the unitary state merged on the federal basis [Dugin, 2002, p.62-69]. Dugin introduces his "Common Eurasian Home" project with a certainty of an idealist and invites other Asian states - Mongolia, China, Japan, Iran, Afghanistan and India to join this "union" [Dugin, 2002, pgs.70-76]. Mr. Dugin, who wholeheartedly believes in "universal importance" of his job, decides to place Charter of the All-Russian Political and Public Movement "Eurasia" in the last pages of his books with an intention Eurasians would read the Charter and become a member of this organization. It is not a coincidence that in the pantheon of these beliefs, the Russian ideologist "adjusts" the tendencies of

eurasianism in his country with the state policy: the author states "Eurasianists hopefully accept the President Putin's policy on strengthening the Russian statehood and on reviving the geopolitical power of the Russian government" [Dugin, 2002, p.88].

The eurasianism is already a political policy pursued in the Russian Federation on the level of the public policy: Russia being not satisfied with the Commonwealth of Independent States isn't very likely to rely on this formal union very much and, in addition, not very sure about its perspectives, has seriously started working on the realization of "Eurasian Union" idea . On November 12, 2011, Russia, Belorussia and Kazakhstan signed the Declaration on the establishment of Eurasian Union (EAU), and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan approved their candidacy to membership. The Eurasian Union should be structured based on the phases of integration similar to the Free Trade Zone, Eurasian Economic Union, Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Community etc. This Union looks quite "attractive": the architects of the project think that if the idea is materialized, the territory of the Eurasian Union will be the largest in the world – 20,030,748 square kilometers, population – the seventh with 169,315,689 people, gross domestic product (GDP) – the sixth with 2.720 trillion USD. According to the authors of the project, "post soviets states (?) having announced their independence", such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Trans-Dniester or Nagorno-Karabakh Republics (1) can be admitted to the membership of the Eurasian Union. However, the Russian ideologists miss that it is a serious act of violation of the international law to provoke a piece of land belonging to the sovereign UN member state, which has undergone separatism, to join the Eurasian Union. The Eurasian Union is intended to be a confederative union of sovereign states allied under the joint – political, economic, military, and customs expansion. It is clearly articulated here that the process of conversion "of the Soviet Union into the Eurasian Union and of the communist ideology into Eurasian ideology" necessitates the establishment of the Union of this kind. The state-level architects of the Eurasian Union project are Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, and Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan. The Declaration on the establishment of the Eurasian Union (EUA) was signed within 40 days after Putin's article "The new integration project for Eurasia – the future which is born today" was published in the fall of 2011 when Putin yet was the Russian prime minister. Vladimir Putin, head of the Russian state believes that a power "capable of representing one of the poles of the modern world" would be formed following the

establishment of this Union, which would be a historical step forward in the geopolitics of Eurasia. The Eurasian Union, absolute establishment of which was planned to be completed prior to 2015 ("supranational" Eurasian Parliament supposed to inaugurate by this time), in the successive stages – in more extended and global integration plan , would grow into "Greater Eurasian Union" embracing China, India, Iran and even European countries!.. Will the modern international policy really allow Russia's worldwide hegemony centered at such pretenses?!

Apparently, while having a general review over the opinions and approaches of the Russian ideologists speaking for classic and new eurasianism such as Nikolay Trubetskoy, Vladimir Lamansky, Konstantin Leontyev, Peter Savitsky, Alexander Panarin, Alexander Dugin, as well as, the architects of the Eurasian Union project, it becomes obvious that neo-eurasianism platform that tries to justify Russia's imperialistic policy, like the orthodox eurasianism, wasn't able to get rid of evident delusions, extremity and de-constructiveness. Even the most skillful sophistry would not be able to conceal these shortcomings since the eurasianism, which became a doctrine of imperialistic ideology – is the continuance of the politics granting Russia an explicit predominance over the Eurasian nations primarily.

Initially, the Eurasianists anticipated the truth – the position they enthusiastically were defending would not be accepted in Eurasia. The reason is that Russia has always demonstrated unfairness towards not only the other nations, as well as the Slavonians who share the same roots with them but Russia hindered their independence and development. Russia even continually attempted to suppress Ukraine and Poland who own great traditions of statehood. Consequently, Russian Pan-Slavism has always remained as a dream. Russian Empire has permanently used both Pan-Slavism and eurasianism as an ideological tool.

The attitude of the Western European part of Eurasia towards Russia is the manifestation of the position of higher civilization. The west cannot find any rationale to equate Russia and itself or doesn't really wish to find it. The eastern part of the Eurasia (mainly the Central Asia) is not willing to get easily digested inside the abdomen of Russia. Therefore, the Asian opposition to Russia was and will be as severe as the European opposition. Consequently, Russia being pushed by both Europe and Asia always generates hesitancy and confusion in Russia's geopolitics and geo-civilization. Witnessing the irritated pushback from Europe, a more packed and compacted area, the Russian

Eurasianist intellectuals cannot find another remedy than strengthening within a rarer and looser Asia. The eurasianists, reluctantly coming back from Europe and finding a shelter in Asia, are dragging the geopolitical support towards the Asia. However, in fact, what they witnessed was that the part of Asia that is closer to them is the residence of Turkic civilization- those Turks who for many centuries (mostly during the Golden Horde period) established states in Slavonian lands and who actively took part in the development of ethno-genesis. Thus, the eurasianists nearly equalize the Turkic world with the Asian one. They are very well aware of the truth that to conquer the Turkic world means to conquer the Asian world [Laruelle, 2012, p.s.171-201; 202-204]. Indeed, the true authors of Eurasia's geopolitical history are Turks.

The peak of the Eurasian domination of Russia lasted from the end of the World War II to the 80s (around 40 years): it changed the political regime of European countries where it could create "satellite countries" for itself, it even was able to split a giant state like Germany into two parts. It yet moved forward over the Kuril Islands hit by the waters of the Pacific and abutted the costs of Japan. It involved a number of Far East countries of Asia (or part of some of them) including China, into its "socialist camp" like it happened with Eastern Europe. Therefore, the USSR, a dictatorship at the bottom, became a dominating state of one of the poles in the bipolar world model. As a result, disintegration processes started happening upon collapse of this state, which could not "incubate" a rational practice except applying the violent political policy resembling the "reforms of the Peter the First" to the international life: the republics forcibly allied under the Soviet Union, as well as the countries representing "the loyal socialist camp" assertively departed from it and joined the process of world building required long ago by the historical and political logics.

The times have changed: nowadays it is not possible to persuade and entice independent states, as well as sovereign Turkic republics in Eurasia into the Eurasian Union by any means. Furthermore, Russia is not as powerful as before to forcibly perform this action. In his researches ("Post-Imperium. A Eurasian story", "The End of Eurasia: Russia on the border between geopolitics and globalization") dedicated to Russia's real role in the modern international life, Dmitry Trenin, Russian political analyst, director of Moscow Carnegie Center describes ineffective prospects of Russia's neo-expansionist policy distinctly and credibly: "Twenty-first century: Russia is strikingly different

from the Russia of old. The collapse of communism ushered in an era free of ideologies and values... With its five-hundred-year-old (I think three hundred-year-old, JF) empire a piece of history and its superpower ambitions put to rest, Russia is now looking inward rather than outward [Trenin, 2011, p. 9]. It is impossible Russia becomes an empire again since the international political environment "prepares the national states and confides in them" [Trenin, p.13]. Analyzing the historical realities of Eurasian geopolitics and current situation Dmitry Trenin concludes that the eurasianists, who were eager to "Russify" this land, did not take the right approach from the very initial period: they have definitely made a historical mistake by concentrating from Europe to Asia on the absolute denial road. Meanwhile, "Russia is primarily not an Asian but a European country." For this reason, Russia's European prospects would provide it with more convenient opportunities: it would become a part of the Western civilization. On the contrary, Russia was lost in endless Asian lands and could not find a way to discover itself. In current historical circumstances, "Russia's role in establishing a center of attraction has come to an end." "Eurasianism is dead and it is no longer capable of strengthening Russia's standpoint either in Europe or in Asia" [Trenin 2001, pgs.94-99, 138-147].

Doubtlessly, Russia's new revenge in the post-empire politics may initiate more drastic consequences: it is either moderate or coercive manipulation would distance the states that had already experienced the most important, challenging and crucial stages of independence. Russia's continuing aggressiveness due to these "losses" might turn it into the "large-scale" and "rabid" North Korea. Ultimately, inevitable disintegration processes might commence inwards – this time in its new phase.

Here is the reason why Russia should not sway from "Slavonian Union" to "Eurasian Union" by deceiving itself with the illusions of "neo-eurasianism". In any case, Russia remains, as the largest state in the world by area and it has no need to extend its territories by "new unions" or "federations". It already has a number of unresolved problems within its huge territory. Therefore, Russia should end its ambitions to dominate over Europe in Europe and Asia in Asia since it is obvious in advance that none of the European or Asian states would agree with these pretenses. Modern Russia, after all, should implement its mission within the process of cooperation of normal transnational relations and should make its contributions to the development of this cooperation.

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## Political Commodities across the Southern Borders, political point of view

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### Abstract:

Since the end of the Cold War, Japanese prime ministers have played an important role in the realm of defense policy and politics. They have done so by empowering different actors (bureaucratic actors, independent commissions, or civil actors), through agenda setting, policy entrepreneurship, and symbolic acts of state. The power of the prime minister to directly influence policy, however, has varied from one prime minister to another. This paper compares three prime ministers: Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998); Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006); and Hatoyama Yukio (2009-2010). Though each of these figures was but one actor in a larger policy process, each nevertheless influenced Japan's overall defense trajectory. For this reason, a case study approach that compares elements of these prime ministers' approaches can tell us much about the limitations and potential of Japanese prime ministerial leadership, as well as provide important insights on relevant domestic and regional contexts.

**Keywords:** Japanese Prime Minister, foreign policy leadership, Japanese defense policy, Japanese defense politics, policy entrepreneurship.

### Introduction

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#### The Trajectory of Japanese Defense Politics and the Japanese Prime Minis- ter

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's defense policy has gone through significant changes. In the post cold war era, Japan's first major experience was the "Gulf War shock," where Japan was criticized for not providing a human contribution to coalition forces commensurate with its hefty financial contribution<sup>1</sup>. In the early 1990s, elites at every level internalized this incident as a failure. From this original shock, Japan has evolved into an active "civilian power," a staunch supporter of the US military presence in Asia (and to a lesser extent a supporter of its global security agenda), and a gradually "normalizing" middle power country (see

Izumikawa, 2010; Oros, 2011; Samuels, 2007; Shinoda, 2007b; Soeya, 2005). In the early 1990s, the government enacted legislation that allowed the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) to be more active in peacekeeping, and gradually adjusted its Official Development Assistance to become more active in the realm of UN-supported human security initiatives (Edstrom, 2008; Oros, 2008; Shinoda, 2007b). In the mid-1990s, the government also reconfirmed its commitment to the US-Japan alliance through a joint declaration between the US president and Japanese prime minister. In 2006, the two countries agreed to enhance military inter-operability by establishing joint bases. This agreement increased the integration of Japan's military establishment with that of the US (see Sunohara, 2007). Through-

out this period, the Japanese government also took steps to expand the role of military-civilian relations and expanded its military capabilities within the one per cent GDP limit on defense expenditures. Gradual changes in Japan's defense posture included: the elevation of the Japan Defense Agency to a ministry; more frequent dispatches of the JSDF for reasons of alliance contribution, peace-keeping, and disaster relief; and the acquisition of an operational Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system (Hughes, 2009; Tatsumi and Oros, 2007). Throughout this period, the legacy of Japan's colonial past has hindered relations with its closest neighbors. In addition, in the wake of multiple long-term crises—demographic decline, chronic deficits, the pension issue, and political immobilism—combined with the 11 March 11 tragedy of 2011, the question remains whether Japan can rehabilitate itself into a healthy middle power able to exert its influence in the region.

Against the backdrop of the last two decades of the post Cold War world—a period best defined by its uncertainty and periodic shocks—the transformation of Japan's defense policy and politics has been anything but inevitable. US-Japan alliance managers, politicians with differing visions and preferences, scholars, think tanks, and the actions of foreign governments have all influenced this trajectory. Along with these actors, Japanese prime ministers have played an important role in the realm of defense policy and politics. The Japanese prime minister, though weaker than heads of state in presidential democracies and weaker than the British prime minister, nevertheless plays an important role in policy by empowering different actors (bureaucratic actors, independent commissions, or civil actors), and through policy entrepreneurship, agenda setting, and symbolic acts of state (Angel, 1989; Hayao, 1993; Stockwin, 2008; Shinoda, 2000). The power of the prime minister to influence policy, however, has frequently varied by prime minister.

At first sight, Japanese politics would seem like an unlikely setting for a study of leadership, strategy, and policy entrepreneurship. After all, Japanese politics is usually associated with tedious consensus-building, gradualism, and at times even immobilism (Angel, 1989; Curtis, 1999; Sebata, 2010; Stockwin, 2008), not creativity, flexibility, and innovation. Yet, given the tenuous position of the prime minister—underpinned by his institutional restrictions and cultural norms against assertive leadership—effective prime ministers must often exert more ingenuity and skill than their counterparts in other government settings. Prime ministers must not only look carefully at the opportunities in front of them, but must also think carefully about

which actors will make the best partners, and which initiatives in the realm of defense will best support their domestic political power.

This essay employs a comparative case study approach to examine how different prime ministerial strategies and policy entrepreneurship have mattered in the realm of Japanese defense policy and politics. Three prime ministers have been chosen: Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998); Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006); and Hatoyama Yukio (2009-2010). These prime ministers have been chosen to provide maximum contrast on issues of policy preference, cabinet management, choice of political partners, and overall strategy. Though each of these figures was but one actor in a larger policy process, each nevertheless influenced Japan's overall trajectory in the post Cold War defense landscape. For this reason, a case study approach that compares policies of these prime ministers can tell us much about the limitations of various strategies, the role of prime ministers as agents in defense policy and politics, as well as provide important insights on relevant domestic and regional contexts. Most importantly, insights from these case studies can help us understand the challenges future prime ministers will face.

### Theorizing the Japanese Prime Minister as a Political Actor

A common theme in the political literature on Japan is the relative weakness of the prime minister in comparison to other heads of state, even the prime minister in Westminster styles of government (Angel, 1989; Mulgan, 2002; Stockwin, 2008; Shinoda, 2011). Hayao (1993), for example, characterizes the prime minister's role as "reactive," serving as a mediator of last resort when consensus breaks down in the normal running of the various subgovernments. Since Hayao's study appeared in the early nineties, several administrative reforms, new institutions, and changing public sentiment have given more formal and informal strength to the prime minister's office. Despite these changes, his overall characterization of the office remains relevant. Prime ministers continue to be weak figures within the Japanese political system because: one, they must contend with powerful subgovernments—combinations of elites from business, politics, the bureaucracy, and other organizations who have vested interests in specific areas of policy; two, they must expend their energy balancing and maintaining order within an unruly party; and three, cultural norms and the selection process for prime ministers often encourages prime ministers who can maintain consensus within the party, rather than leaders adept at implementing bold new policies.

Even reaching back before the postwar period in Japanese politics, the position of the prime minister has been weak. Before the war, the prime minister was little more than an equal among cabinet ministers. Often certain cabinet members, through the influence of their powerful bureaucracies, could rival the power of the prime minister. Much like today, dissent within the cabinet had the power to bring down the government (Angel, 1989; Stockwin, 2008). Factors contributing to this weakness include cultural inhibitions against aggressive leadership styles, a tradition of consensus building in Japanese politics, the strong position of subgovernments, and the influence of power brokers within the political parties (Angel, 1989; McCargo, 2004; Mulgan, 2002; Shinoda, 2000, 2011).

Descriptions of the role of the prime minister often refer to the preference of parties for leaders who have extensive connections, are skilled at fundraising, and typically make decisions only after extensive consultation. These skills are often necessary to maintain the coherence of a government (and the ruling political party) against strong centrifugal forces. A prime minister must deal with sectionalism on two sides: the side of the party faction, or *habatsu*; and on the other side, the power of the bureaucracies and other permanent members of the subgovernments such as interest groups (Shinoda, 2000, 2011). The same politicians who have been skilled at intraparty patronage and backroom dealings have often had little skill at “going public” (Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero, 2009; Shinoda, 2000; Hayao, 1993). In short, the skills that are needed to become a good “party man” are not the same skills that are likely to help win public popularity.

There are also compelling legal and institutional reasons for his weakness. The Constitution of Japan vests executive power in the cabinet (see Article 65) and deems that the prime minister represents the cabinet (Article 72). Article 6 of the Cabinet Law of 1947 more clearly establishes the limitations on the prime minister’s power, obliging him to seek the consent of the entire cabinet before exercising executive authority (GoJ, n.d.). Because the prime minister relies on the cabinet to wield power, the prime minister’s control over the cabinet determines his influence over government (Shinoda, 2000, p. 201; Shinoda, 2011, p. 50-51). Though prime ministers are technically free to choose their own cabinet ministers, in reality prime ministers have often been beholden to party elders in their choices. For a long time, intraparty competition and a weak support staff also limited the effectiveness of the prime minister. Though political and administrative reforms during the late

1990s and early 2000s increased the support staff of the prime minister and consolidated the number of cabinet ministers, thus making cabinet consensus easier, the problem of intraparty competition still remains.

Even given these observations, most authors (see for example, Hayao, 1993; Shinoda, 2000; Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero, 2009) recognize that the efficacy of prime ministers has varied greatly on policy issues. As broader studies of leadership outside of the Japanese case have demonstrated, how leaders use the various resources at their command—administrative resources, unusual opportunities, and symbolic resources—matters greatly in the outcomes of policy initiatives (Grove, 2007; Hardgrove and Owens, 2003; Machiavelli, 2004; Preston, 2010; Samuels, 2003). The same can be said of Japanese politics: the timing of prime ministerial interventions in the affairs of subgovernments, their choice of political allies, their use of institutional resources, as well as the public framing of their initiatives has made significant differences in the outcomes of their policy initiatives. Though no one approach is superior in and of itself, when the right approaches are combined, they can create a powerful political punch.

Among the ranks of prime ministers who have been remarkably effective are Tanaka Kakuei, Sato Eisaku, Nakasone Yasuhiro, and Koizumi Junichiro. There has been some consensus that the ability of the latter two prime ministers in particular has been due to several factors, including their conscious pursuit of strong executive power, their canny use of the media to produce a more high-profile prime ministership, and their use of expertise outside of traditional party and bureaucratic resources, such as advisory commissions and special advisors<sup>2</sup> (McCargo, 2004; Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero, 2009; Shinoda, 2007a). These “presidential” style prime ministers have typically used different resources because their “clients” were different. Rational choice approaches would note that in most administrations fellow party members make up the main clients that prime ministers need to satisfy to stay in power. However, prime ministers such as Nakasone Yasuhiro and Koizumi Junichiro instead saw their clients as the people of Japan. Indeed, their weak power base within the party during their respective tenures made it necessary for them to appeal to popular opinion to counter their intraparty adversaries. Thus, as we will see in his case study, Koizumi adopted strategies that helped him fight off the influence of party insiders and factions by directly appealing to the public to support his policies.

Though the prime minister faces major constraints in his execution of power, he also has many

significant resources that are unavailable to other actors. One, often as the leader of a party, he has control over who has membership in the party (as the Koizumi case study will demonstrate, this resource can be a powerful one). Two, he is the actor of last resort for the coordination of different sectional interests. Prime ministerial power thus becomes essential when extensive coordination is needed, as is often the case in issue areas that cut across several ministries, like trade and defense. Three, the prime minister is Japan's senior diplomat and the Commander in Chief of the Japan Self Defense Force. As the lead diplomat for Japan, the prime minister has the ability to override the Foreign Ministry and conduct "*tezukuri gaikō*" (hand-crafted diplomacy), as Nakasone did during his tenure, thus frustrating professional bureaucrats. Four, the prime minister has an extensive platform for defining the basic ideology of the nation (as we will see with the example of Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits). Five, the prime minister has the ability to appoint cabinet ministers (though this power is somewhat constrained by the need to maintain unity within the party). Six, the prime minister can use his public platform to seek popular support for policies. As we will see in the case studies, popular support is an essential resource for prime ministers who wish to challenge entrenched sectionalism. For this reason, skill in using the media is an important resource for the prime minister. Another important facet of prime ministerial power is the role of US *gaiatsu* ("outside pressure") in the formation of prime ministerial leadership. As Angel (1989) writes, in the early postwar years prime ministers often used the cover of US pressure to implement unpopular but necessary reforms like trade liberalization. US pressure thus can be an effective alibi for political leaders. As several authors (Sebata, 2010; McCormack, 2007; Shinoda, 2007a) argue in their own way, prime ministers—especially in the area of defense policy—have become addicted to US *gaiatsu*.

As this section has demonstrated, the prime minister faces significant formal and informal barriers to the execution of power, but also possesses a number of unique strengths. As the following case studies will demonstrate, during the post Cold War period, prime ministers have been remarkably different in the approaches they have taken to defense policy and politics as well as the amount of success they have had in pursuit of their chosen policies.

### **Case Studies**

The following short case studies examine the contributions of three important prime ministers—Hashimoto Ryutaro, Koizumi Junichiro, and Hatoyama Yukio—in the area of defense policy

and politics. Though each of these figures has played an important role in Japan's post Cold War defense policy and politics, as we will see, each chose a considerably different approach for achieving change, with varying levels of success.

### **Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998): Measured Pragmatism**

The prime ministership of Hashimoto Ryutaro (11 January 1996 to 30 July 30 1998, a tenure of 932 days) is an important, but nevertheless, neglected area of study in Japanese defense policy and politics. Despite being in power for just over two years, Hashimoto oversaw significant accomplishments in the area of defense. During his tenure he was able to: bring about the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (Joint Declaration); foster the 1997 US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (Joint Guidelines); help negotiate the return in principle of the Futenma Airbase in Okinawa; and foster stronger ties between civilian and military officials (eroding some of the inhibitions against civilian cooperation with military authorities). In addition, Hashimoto also demonstrated a great deal of prescience in broadening Japan's profile in relation to ASEAN countries (and Russia and Australia). Though these accomplishments came with a significant decline in relations with China, Hashimoto was nonetheless able to recover some ground with China as well. Perhaps more importantly, security-related initiatives helped Hashimoto (or at the very least did not hurt him) in his efforts at financial and administrative reform.

Hashimoto Ryutaro came to power at a time when many saw the US-Japan alliance as "adrift" (this term was used in the title of Funabashi's (1999) famous book on the subject, *Alliance Adrift*). In the immediate post Cold War period, trade issues had dominated the Japan-US bilateral stage, pushing defense and security issues into the background. To make matters worse, in the aftermath of the "Gulf War shock," Japan was going through something of an existential crisis in terms of its security identity. The shock of not having been acknowledged by Kuwait in their thank you letter to Allied Forces, despite Japan's 13-billion-dollar financial contribution, reverberated deeply in Japanese political consciousness. Thus, the uncertain security environment of the post Cold War era was compounded by a crisis of national prestige. In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, much of the debate focused on how Japan could increase "international contributions" (*kokusai kōken*) to security. Early contributions were imagined largely in UN-based multilateralist terms. Japan would soon begin to enter cautiously into the realm of UN peacekeeping operations. However, it would not be long before the character of this debate became

more firmly focused on the issues of the US-Japan alliance. Three crises in particular would bring the alliance back onto the agenda. In the first two, the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994 and the Taiwan missile crisis of 1995-1996, alliance mechanisms were found to be hopelessly vague, while Japan's political support for the US response had been found by US alliance managers to be inadequate. In the third crisis, the Okinawan rape case of 1995, it was the postwar US base structure on the island chain which would come into question. These events shaped a consensus among alliance professionals that the US-Japan security relationship needed to be reaffirmed and redefined.

Onto this stage stepped Hashimoto Ryutaro. Hashimoto was a seasoned Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) veteran who had made his political reputation through his tough trade negotiations with his US counterpart, Mickey Cantor. Despite his reputation as a tough negotiator with the US on trade issues, it soon became apparent to the US administration that Hashimoto was someone who could be trusted to stand up for the importance of the US-Japan alliance. The three prior prime ministers had all been relatively short-lived non-LDP prime ministers with few incentives to take political risks in support of the alliance. Hashimoto was well-known among his peers for his policy acumen and knowledge of how to work the bureaucracies (Okumura, 1998a; Funabashi, 1999; Tamura, 1998). From his predecessor, Murayama Tomiichi, he had inherited the lingering issues of an alliance "adrift," including the issue of what to do about the US bases after the infamous 1995 rape case. However, he had also inherited a ready-made process and significant resources to deal with these crises. These resources included the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) (a bilateral working group set up to work on the consolidation and reduction of bases on the island chain), a year-long consultation process between the Department of Defense and Japanese officials on defense issues, and the more specific language of the "Nye Report" which called for maintaining a US presence in East Asia of about 100,000 troops in total and about 45,000 troops in Japan.

Thus, Hashimoto was able to make use of shovel-ready initiatives such as the US-Japan Joint Declaration (accompanied with a summit meeting between the US and Japan) and the US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. While these initiatives were essentially the product of dynamic interactions between alliance managers acting as policy entrepreneurs on both sides of the alliance, Hashimoto was nevertheless an active participant in these negotiations and initiatives, both shaping their evolution and pushing initiatives further where he

could (see Akiyama, 2002; Tanaka, 2009; Funabashi, 1999). On 16-17 April 1996, President Bill Clinton and Hashimoto met and publicly reaffirmed the importance of the alliance relationship. Both parties signed the *Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century*. Many of the important building blocks for this document came from the ideas and language of the Department of Defense East Asian Security Report, or "Nye Report," that linked the US-Japan Security Treaty with peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region (MoFA, 1996; Funabashi, 1999; Tanaka, 2009). Like the Nye report, the Joint Declaration stated that the US-Japan alliance had underpinned the East Asia region's extraordinary economic growth. The document also reaffirmed maintenance of "about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region" (and by implication the maintenance of about 45,000 soldiers in Japan). More importantly, the document created a bridge to the Joint Guidelines by committing Japan and the US to jointly study "situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan" (MoFA, 1996). The agreement solidly reaffirmed the importance of the alliance, maintaining a status quo that had been built over the long years of the Cold War, and took a small step toward redefining the alliance, leaving the details for later negotiation under the revision of the US-Japan Joint Guidelines.

The meeting between Clinton and Hashimoto took place four days after the announcement of the return of Futenma Airbase. Unlike the Joint Declaration and the Joint Guidelines that were to follow, the Futenma agreement would be the "prime minister's play" (as Funabashi (1999:5) would famously dub it). Since Hashimoto had come into power earlier that year, he had taken a special interest in the Okinawan base issue and had made efforts to form a personal relationship with Okinawa's governor Ota Masahide, who had made his political career opposing the bases. Throughout the negotiations for the return of Futenma, Hashimoto had taken extra precautions to keep the negotiations secret from the bureaucracy and political parties, thus minimizing the possibility of a leak to the press. Throughout the negotiations, top officials worked largely in secret to make sure many of the basic details were worked out before the agreement went public (Tanaka, 2009; Akiyama, 2002; Funabashi, 1999). Thus, the announcement on April 12, 1996 of the return in principle of Futenma came not only as a surprise to the people of Japan, but also to many in the defense and foreign policy ministries as well. In retrospect, it would seem as if Hashimoto had paid a steep price for the return of

Futenma. One of the central conditions of the return - that the base's function would have to be relocated to another part of Okinawa - would become a chief sticking point that would sow local opposition to the agreement (opposition that continues today). Still, in the immediate wake of the deal, the agreement appeared to be a stunning political success. Moreover, the close relationship Hashimoto had forged with Governor Ota would help him to maintain an image of even-handedness as he worked both to reaffirm the alliance and reduce the base burden for Okinawans.

His early success with the alliance, including the largely successful summit meeting with President Clinton and the dramatic announcement of the return of Futenma Airbase, helped to solidify Hashimoto's popularity ratings, and thus, also opened the way toward a return to power for the LDP. Hashimoto's early successes in the realm of alliance management helped to pave the way for an ambitious program of domestic reform. Hashimoto would set up a high-profile advisory committee and announce audaciously that he would pursue reforms in six major categories (administrative reform, government finance reform, economic structural reform, financial system reform, social security reform, and educational reform). Over time, Hashimoto's reforms in finance and administration would prove to be groundbreaking in their own right (and indeed, his administrative reforms would pave the way for the more revolutionary leadership of Koizumi Junichiro). However, his decision to defer to party elder Nakasone Yasuhiro in a key cabinet appointment would prove to be a political disaster, significantly weakening his ability to pursue more extensive reforms.

Evidence of his shrewdness with defense policy (and indeed, foreign policy more generally), however, would continue throughout his administration. As Japan's chief diplomat and spokesperson, he displayed an uncanny ability to balance and reconcile the needs of various actors. In the latter part of Hashimoto's administration, much of his diplomacy would focus on alleviating various tensions and frictions that had arisen because of his decision to align more closely with the US's regional security agenda. As Japan nudged closer to the US through the Joint Declaration and became more ensconced in Washington's security agenda through revision of the Joint Guidelines, friction was inevitably created with China. Japanese-Chinese relations had been in decline for some time. The Tiananmen Square Massacre, anti-Japanese protests over issues of history and Japanese textbooks, and China's use of ballistic missiles to intimidate Taiwan had all in their own way contributed to a general decline in relations. Hashimoto, himself, contributed to this

decline through his 1996 visit to Yasukuni Shrine on his birthday.

Hashimoto announced at the beginning of his second administration that he would work hard toward improving relations with China. One method of alleviating tensions with China was to deny that revisions to the Joint Guidelines, particularly the pledges of support to the US in "situations in areas surrounding Japan" (MoFA, n.d.), had any specific geographical referent. To those who followed the negotiations and working groups, it was clear that "situations in areas surrounding Japan" must mean contingencies involving Taiwan and the outbreak of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. And yet, Hashimoto stuck hard to the logic that "situations in areas surrounding Japan" had no specific geographical content. The deliberate ambiguity of the guidelines, and Hashimoto's own denial that they contained any specific content, allowed Japan breathing room for a thaw in relations. In his visit to China in September 1997, Hashimoto would call for increased mutual understanding, dialogue, co-operation, and an effort to build a common "order" (Kitamura, 1998:77-78). After a long freeze in Japanese aid to China, Hashimoto came offering economic aid valued at approximately \$2.3 billion. In addition, he was the first Japanese leader to visit Manchuria since the end of Japan's war with China in 1945. As part of his trip, he visited a museum dedicated to the 1931 Manchuria incident (Garran, 1997, 5 September). Most importantly, Hashimoto would also endorse the Murayama apology for war time atrocities, setting a precedent for future prime ministers (even ones with conservative leanings) (Kitamura, 1998:89). Hashimoto was met with a remarkably friendly reception. If progress between the two countries had not been dramatic, at the very least a tolerable sense of normalcy had been restored.

Hashimoto was also influential in other important ways. Through his personal relationship with Boris Yeltsin, he was able to breathe new life into Japanese-Russian relations and give some hope for a breakthrough on negotiations over the northern territories (even if progress would ultimately prove elusive). Hashimoto would also raise Japan's profile in relations with ASEAN and Australia, setting the stage for greater cooperation with these nations in the future. He would also advocate joint research on ballistic missile defense with the US, setting the stage for greater cooperation during the Koizumi administration. Finally, Hashimoto would be the first prime minister in the postwar period to welcome uniformed officers into the prime minister's residence, setting a precedent for greater policy input from uniformed officers (Okumura, 1998a, 1998b; Kitamura, 1998; Funabashi, 1999). All of

these measures were important elements in Hashimoto's administration that would set the way for further measures by bureaucrats and prime ministers in the future.

### **Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006): Maverick Politics and Political Theater**

Koizumi Junichiro (26 April 2001 – 26 September 2006) ranks alongside Yoshida Shigeru, Kishi Nobusuke, Tanaka Kakuei, and Nakasone Yasuhiro as one of the most interesting and enigmatic prime ministers in Japanese history. Much has already been written about the style of Koizumi politics—books on his leadership often note his skillful use of mass media, his talent as a political “entertainer”, and his use of simple expressions (“one phrase politics”) and appeals to citizens’ common sense (Mikuriya, 2006; Iijima, 2006; Horiuchi, 2009; Uchiyama, 2010). However, beyond the style of Koizumi politics, there was one fundamental idea that gave Koizumi’s policies coherence. Insider accounts and personal testimony suggest that Koizumi understood that in order to enact controversial policies - like his policy of postal reform - he would have to draw on resources outside of his party (Mikuriya, 2006, p. 32; Iijima, 2006; Otake, 2006; Tawara, 2006). This included aggressively using the resources of the prime minister’s office (which had been strengthened by Hashimoto’s administrative reforms) to create project teams, negotiating with coalition partners and courting the rival Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and appealing directly to support from the public (Shinoda, 2007a). In addition, an important element of Koizumi’s strategy would be the use of dramatic political acts—many of them confrontational in nature—that would help to prove his resolve to the public and promote his own personal brand as a political reformer and maverick politician.

From Koizumi’s emphatic embrace of the alliance, to his personal trip to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il, to the symbolic politics of the Yasukuni Shrine visits, defense issues would become an important stage for “Koizumi magic.” Critics of Koizumi, such as Gavan McCormack, have argued that Koizumi’s “performance made up in emotional force what it lacked in intellectual consistency” (McCormack, 2007, p. 192). Indeed, there seems little in common among the individual threads of his defense and foreign policies. His emphatic embrace of the US and support of often unpopular US objectives, his personal courtship of the US president, his normalization diplomacy with North Korea, and his stubborn visits to Yasukuni Shrine seemed to share few, if any essential elements. However, what seem like disparate and incoherent actions appear in hindsight to have a consistent and coherent strategy. Each policy act

helped the prime minister keep the population engaged, supported his image as a reformer and maverick, and demonstrated his acuity in achieving short-term policy goals, thus boosting his support among the population. These successes, in turn, would help to support his ultimate political goal of postal reform.

To understand why the approach was appealing (and perhaps even necessary!) one first must understand Koizumi’s domestic situation. In the race for the presidency of the LDP party, Koizumi had largely been expected to lose to former prime minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, who had the support of much of the party’s elite. However, public dissatisfaction with the prior LDP prime minister, the gaffe-prone Mori Yoshihiro, had spurred the LDP to change the rules for electing their the party president. Prefectural chapters were awarded a larger number of votes. Party leaders in the LDP figured (incorrectly as it turned out) that factions and *kōenkai* would continue to shape the outcome of these primaries. Thus, most predicted—incorrectly—that former Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro would win the position of party president, and thus, become the next prime minister of Japan. Despite having weak backing within the party—especially from the most powerful factions—Koizumi was able to use his well-known image as a political and economic reformer to appeal to the prefectural chapters. Once it became clear that Koizumi would win a great deal of support from these chapters, it became difficult for LDP Diet members to vote against Koizumi (Lin, 2009; Mikuriya, 2006).

Koizumi’s campaign for LDP president displayed the very unorthodoxy that had defined his political career up to that point. Koizumi had run on the strength of his own personal brand and the slogan: “If I can not change the LDP, I will break the LDP.” Thus, from the very beginning Koizumi had a very different power base from many of the prime ministers who came before or after. Instead of strong factional support, Koizumi had a popular base that reached beyond his party. His campaign had also served notice to party insiders that he planned to play by a different set of rules. Thus Koizumi’s persona was an important resource, but one that needed to be constantly renewed through dramatic acts that kept the public engaged and interested.

From the very beginning, the relationship with the US played an essential role in Koizumi’s approach to foreign policy and defense. He chose not only to embrace US policies wholeheartedly, but also to personalize the relationship between himself and the US president in unprecedented ways. The personal relationship between Koizumi and Presi-

dent George W. Bush would come to surpass even the “Ron-Yasu” relationship of Ronald Reagan and Nakasone Yasuhiro. Koizumi would be a frequent visitor at Bush’s Crawford Ranch in Texas, the beneficiary of several poolside chats, and would even have the honor of listening in on one of the President’s Daily Briefs by the CIA (Tawara, 2006, p. 135-136; Iijima, 2007). The two frequently bonded over their shared love of Elvis and their fondness for Gary Cooper’s western classic *High Noon*. In his final trip to the US, Koizumi was not only rewarded with a summit putting a final stamp on the alliance’s transformation, but was also treated to a presidential tour of Elvis Presley’s home, Graceland, in Memphis, Tennessee (Faiola, 2006, June 27; Iijima, 2007, p. 277-279; Yoshida, 2006, June 29). Despite President Bush’s unpopularity in Japan, the personalization of the bilateral relationship nevertheless proved a great political success for Koizumi. The close relationship gave the prime minister another stage on which to demonstrate his charisma and flamboyance, and provided him with numerous opportunities to exploit his media savvy.

The substance of his contributions to the US-Japan alliance and his skill in manipulating the policy process were no less significant. One of the most studied aspects of the Koizumi administration is his acumen with the resources of the *kantei* (the prime minister’s office and its resources). Koizumi would use these resources to help overcome bureaucratic and political obstruction in formulating policy on contributions to the alliance in both Afghanistan and Iraq (Shinoda, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007a; Kliman, 2006). In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, many Japanese politicians and bureaucrats remembered painfully the “failure” of the first Gulf War, where Japan had been criticized for not providing a human contribution to the war, only a large financial one. The shock and embarrassment of this incident reverberated deeply in Japanese elite circles and provided permissive conditions for a bolder approach to alliance management should another crisis occur. Though elite attitudes were predisposed to a more active contribution, few would predict the boldness and speed of Koizumi’s policy responses in the wake of the September 11th attacks. Koizumi was able to use early public statements pledging concrete support to the US to outpace the bureaucracies, his party, and the Diet. This approach contrasted drastically with the traditional practice of intensive consultation (*nemawashi*) before announcing a policy course. As Kliman (2006, p. 83) argues, by setting high expectations with the US, Koizumi was using the threat of future American *gaiatsu* to overcome complacency and intransigence within his own party and the bureaucracy. Other attributes of Ko-

zumi’s policy process were equally conspicuous in their effectiveness: Koizumi assembled the most skilled bureaucrats and experts from the relevant ministries under policy teams in the *kantei* in ways that allowed him to form policy options quickly under his own leadership; he used early negotiations with the LDP’s coalition partner the Komeito to help pressure his own party to take action; and Koizumi also framed his contributions in both Afghanistan and Iraq as contributions to international security rather than defining the contributions in collective self-defense terms (Shinoda, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007; Kliman, 2006; Samuels, 2007).

Dispatches of the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq would stretch the limits of constitutional pacifism without entirely alienating the Japanese public or breaking the coalition with the more pacifist Komeito. Though both the Anti-Terror Legislation of 2001 and the Iraq Dispatch Legislation of 2003 broke with tradition by dispatching the JSDF for de facto collective self-defense, they nevertheless adhered to Japan’s anti-militarist identity in ways that allowed Japan to maintain the façade of constitutional pacifism. Japanese SDF personnel were for the most part kept out of danger, and in the details of SDF dispatches pains were taken to limit contributions to tasks that were largely humanitarian in nature. Both these pieces of legislation also served the proximate goal of demonstrating to the public Koizumi’s skill at using the *kantei* to overcome the centrifugal forces of the government. In doing so, he helped avoid the trauma associated with the first Gulf War and strengthened the sense of trust with the US.

Just as Prime Minister Nakasone had done in the mid-1980s, Koizumi was using the contours of the US-Japan alliance framework to whittle away at the edges of Japan’s anti-militarist institutions (Envall, 2008; Samuels, 2007). Within this new alliance framework, old inhibitions against collective self-defense would fall by the wayside. Japan would acquire the necessary equipment for an operational ballistic missile defense shield. Building on a formal decision in 1998 to support joint missile defense research, a cabinet decision would be made in December 2003 to proceed with a two-layer system consisting of Standard-3 missile interceptors deployed on AEGIS-equipped destroyers and ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles (Glosserman, 2004, p. 4; Uriu, 2004, p. 177). The decision by the Tokyo government to deploy a limited missile defense system would require Japan and the US to integrate planning, development, and systems design in unprecedented ways. The missile defense systems would allow Japan access to US early warning intelligence and technology. These arrangements, in turn, would

bring up thorny issues of legality. Not only would cooperation require modifications of the ban on arms exports, but it would also require maneuvering around constitutional issues of collective self-defense. During the Koizumi administration, alliance managers on both sides would continue to reshape the alliance in ways that strengthened Japanese capabilities and immersed Japan further in US technology and US global defense priorities. Indeed, McCormack (2007) would call the 2006 agreement leading to the fusion of command and intelligence functions of US and Japanese forces the most dramatic turn in the alliance since the signing of the security treaty. Joint force modernization plans would include enhanced intelligence capabilities, a coordinated network of satellites, missile interceptors, and radar, as well as increased joint training, and the establishment of the first joint command center (Samuels, 2007, p. 178-179; McCormack, 2007).

Though Koizumi's close relationship with the US was the centerpiece of his approach to security and defense, other dramatic acts in the realm of security were equally important for supporting his image as a maverick politician. On 17 September 2002, Koizumi would make his dramatic trip to Pyongyang to meet with the reclusive North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. Despite predominantly being associated with a Gaullist/nationalist tradition with regard to defense, Koizumi was nonetheless willing to apologize for the "tremendous damage inflicted by Japanese colonialism" (Cha, 2002; *Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-Bu*, 2006; Iijima, 2007; Uriu, 2003). In return, Kim Jong-Il apologized for the abduction of thirteen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s. The two parties then signed the Pyongyang Declaration, which pledged both parties to work toward the normalization of diplomatic ties. As a result of Koizumi's visit to North Korea, five of the original abductees were returned. Though negotiations over normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and North Korea would slowly unravel during Koizumi's administration, one can still see the North Korea trip as a success. Once again, Koizumi had demonstrated his ability to take risks, overcome obstacles, and find proximate successes that demonstrated his abilities to the public. As accounts of his administration suggest (*Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-Bu*, 2006; Iijima, 2007), visits to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il were less about normalization of ties with North Korea and more about the return of the abductees to Japan.<sup>3</sup>

Koizumi's most contentious acts in the realm of defense politics were his visits to Yasukuni Shrine every year during his prime ministership. Koizumi's determination to visit Yasukuni was probably

based on his assumption—an assumption that had regularly proven correct—that his reputation as a reformer was tightly bound with his ability to meet the letter of his campaign pledges, and that any retreat from these pledges would be exploited by his political opponents. Before becoming prime minister, Koizumi had promised the powerful Japan Association of Bereaved Families, which boasts close to a million voters, that he would make a formal annual visit to the shrine (McCormack, 2007, p. 50). The shrine had become a subject of controversy, especially after thirteen Class A war criminals were secretly enshrined there in the late 1970s. These visits put Koizumi at odds not only with China and South Korea, but also with left wing politicians, pro-China business elites, and even, during the last year of his administration, the US Congress. Despite lingering questions over the legitimacy of the shrine and its symbolism, Koizumi would frequently characterize his visits as a domestic issue and "a matter of the heart." Prior prime ministers who had shared Koizumi's political affiliation with the Japan Association of Bereaved Families, such as Nakasone Yasuhiro and Hashimoto Ryutaro, had visited Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister only to give up their visits in the face of official and popular protests in China and South Korea. With Koizumi, there would be no backing down. Polling data from several newspapers during this time, including the *Asahi*, *Yomiuri*, and *Mainichi Shimbun*, shows that by the end of his prime ministership Koizumi had turned an otherwise unpopular symbolic act of state into a quasi-popular one (Stockwin, 2008; McCormack, 2007; Mong, 2010). The reversal in popular opinion may have reflected the growing insecurity of the Japanese public against the backdrop of rising Chinese power and the noxious North Korea abductee issue, but probably also demonstrated the public enthrallement with Koizumi's ability to overcome political obstacles. In short, his Yasukuni visits became one more symbol of a prime minister who could stare down opposition.

Finally, Koizumi's record on postal reform bears noting because of its relevance to theorizing future leadership on defense policy and politics. Prior to coming to office, Koizumi had campaigned on a reformist agenda. He had promised the electorate that if he could not change the LDP, he would smash the LDP. A priority for Koizumi was reforming Japan's government-run postal system. Koizumi knew that privatizing the postal system would be a difficult task because of the formidable influence of the postmasters within the LDP. Indeed, their influence had significantly weakened prior attempts at privatization during the Hashimoto administration. When Koizumi's postal reform bill

passed the Lower House with only a slim margin, and faced even stiffer opposition in the Upper House, Koizumi threatened to call Lower House elections if the bill did not pass the Upper House (Gaunder, 2007:129-130). In September 2005, despite flagging support for the party and his cabinet (his own support rating was still a robust 53 per cent), Koizumi made good on his campaign pledge to dissolve the Lower House of the Diet and called for snap elections based around the issue of postal reform, making the election a direct referendum on his postal reform project. In addition, he refused to grant party endorsement to Lower House LDP members who had voted against the bill. As for those who resisted his reform efforts, he had them kicked out of his party and sent “assassins” (hand-picked contenders) to compete with these Diet members in their districts. The election gave Koizumi an unprecedented 296 out of 480 seats—a resounding victory for his reform agenda (Gaunder 2007; Maclachlan, 2010, 2011). With a two-thirds majority in the Lower house, he now had the ability to override resistance in the Upper house if necessary.

Koizumi’s use of his power as party president and prime minister to attack dissenting members of his own party is an important example for the area of defense policy and politics because of its potential use in areas where entrenched interests currently prevent progress on key issues. These issues include revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, revisions to the US-Japan Security Treaty, and/or bolder moves on the Futenma Airbase issue. In each of these areas, short of dramatic tactics that appeal to popular opinion to fight policy dissenters in the coalition, ruling party, and minority party, little is likely to change.

### ***Hatoyama (2009-2010): Romantic Politics of Yuai Diplomacy***

The relatively short prime ministership of Hatoyama Yukio (16 September 2009 – 4 June 2010) is an important case study in Japanese defense politics because it is the first time in recent history that a prime minister has challenged—however subtle that challenge may have been—the primacy of the US-Japan defense alliance. In contrast to both Hashimoto Ryutaro and Koizumi Junichiro, who had believed in the importance of the alliance and helped deepen the alliance through their charisma and personal involvement, Hatoyama had throughout his political career stood against the deepening of the US-Japan alliance. In a sense, this distaste for the US military presence in Japan was generational. As the grandson of

Hatoyama Ichiro, the prime minister in the tumultuous political climate of the 1950s who had espoused an end to the US base presence, Hatoyama Yukio was the heir to a trend of political thought that saw the US base presence in Okinawa as unnatural and an affront to Japan’s sovereignty. Hatoyama was also different in another crucial respect from Hashimoto and Koizumi. Whereas both Hashimoto and Koizumi had used the expertise of bureaucrats to help manage the alliance, Hatoyama’s politics were ideologically set against the continuation of bureaucratic control of policy in all areas. From his early political career, Hatoyama and the fellow founders of the early DPJ party had campaigned tirelessly against the continuation of strong bureaucratic rule in Japan. In the historic campaign of 2009, the party had campaigned on the theme of: *shifting power from collusion between bureaucrats and politicians to cooperation between politicians and citizens*. Given that the US-Japan alliance had benefited from the close ties and the accumulated personal networks of key bureaucrats, Hatoyama’s challenge to bureaucratic power was significant. Moreover, in his political rhetoric Hatoyama demonstrated a desire to strengthen the spirit of Japanese anti-militarism by becoming more active in civilian internationalist activities that the Japanese felt more comfortable with: nuclear disarmament, climate change diplomacy, and regional order building. Indeed, some of his actions early in his administration demonstrated that he hoped to displace the military aspects of the US-Japan alliance through contributions in these areas.

Yet, despite coming to power with overwhelming public support and new ideas about the direction of defense policy, Hatoyama would have to resign within a short period after embroilment in a money scandal and mismanagement of the issue of the relocation of Futenma Airbase. This was the first time in the post Cold War period that a Japanese prime minister’s resignation was directly due to the mishandling of a defense issue. By the end of his approximately eight months in office, Hatoyama’s popularity figures had plummeted from their postelection high of 71 per cent to a mere 17 per cent (Economist, 2010, 2 June). During the historic DPJ campaign, Hatoyama had promised the people of the Okinawa that he would move Futenma Base “outside of Japan, or at least outside the prefecture.” However, during the short tenure of his administration, Hatoyama would fail to make good on this promise, at some points suggesting he might backtrack on his campaign pledge and at other times suggesting he would press on to find a solution to the problem.

Hatoyama’s personal failings as a leader were often underscored by his critics in dramatic terms.

Critics described him as “hapless” and “aloof”. One critic said he had a “diplomacy without a strategy” (Yamauchi and Inoue, 2010:99) and another said he had a “blindfolded diplomacy” (Nakanishi, 2010:113). Certainly, personal failings played a large part in his administration’s failure. Foremost among his failings was Hatoyama’s striking inability to choose. In his relations with his own cabinet, with the minority party, and with his US counterparts, Hatoyama was the consummate “peace lover” (see Hayao, 1993; Shinoda, 2000) hoping to appease all parties with nuanced and delicate compromises. Despite the limitations of this approach, there was nevertheless a basic logic to it. The DPJ had come to power mainly on the strength of its platform on economy and social issues, not on security and foreign policy. Moreover, the DPJ suffered from a fractured view on security more severe than anything the LDP had faced since the early years of its inception. The party ranks included the more conservative views of Hatoyama and Ozawa Ichiro, who endorsed constitutional revision and an independent military force, pro-US alliance conservatives like Maehara Seiji, as well as moderates such as Kan Naoto. In addition, important party members, such as former Socialist Yokomichi Takahiro, held extremely pacifist views (Easley et al, 2010:5; Konishi, 2009:2-3; Sneider, 2009:7-8; Koellner, 2011). Moreover, the DPJ had come to power at a time when the current US president was a celebrity in Japan. As one commentator noted at the time, President Obama’s approval ratings in Japan regularly trumped those of the prime minister (Green, 2011).

Hatoyama’s situation within his own administration was also surprisingly unsettled, despite trends that would suggest otherwise. The DPJ had come to power on a platform that promised a shift of power and responsibility from bureaucrats to politicians. The DPJ had taken concrete steps to pursue this course through the use of a greater number of political appointees, the abolition of coordinating meetings of the Vice Ministers (a key policy coordinating mechanism for bureaucrats), the creation of a National Strategy Unit, and deliberate steps to exercise power without the bureaucrats. Moreover, under the Hatoyama cabinet, the DPJ’s Policy Research Council had been abolished, significantly weakening the power of DPJ back-benchers to object to policies, and thus, centralizing policy making in the cabinet. Despite all of these changes in favor of policy making from the cabinet, Hatoyama’s position was nevertheless a comparatively weak one. Whereas other prime ministers had been both prime minister and head of the party, in this instance de facto power had been split with powerful party insider Ozawa Ichiro. Compounding

the situation was the composition of his cabinet. The cabinet had been filled with powerful faction leaders and heads of the coalition party, many of whom had little hesitation in presenting their own (often different) views on issues directly to the public. The difficulty of Hatoyama’s situation became embarrassingly apparent during the Futenma crisis, where different cabinet ministers publicly voiced different views on their preferred option to resolve the issue.

Despite these limitations on Hatoyama’s power, in the immediate aftermath of the DPJ’s historic victory, Hatoyama’s administration showed signs that its shift in foreign policy might have a chance at success. An important pillar of Hatoyama’s approach would be the use of civilian internationalist issues such as nuclear nonproliferation and climate change as platforms for international leadership and as common ground for a close relationship with the US. In a sense, this approach substituted softer “international” agendas for regional ones that addressed the growing security dilemma in the region. Hatoyama’s early speech at the United Nations in September of 2009 would emphasize his government’s pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 25 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 and his desire for Japan to act as a bridge between the developed and developing world (Hatoyama 2009, 22 September). He would also frequently state his desire to work with the Obama administration toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Early meetings between Hatoyama and President Obama also demonstrated the prime minister’s desire to reformulate the US-Japan bilateral relationship around these common civilian issues of nuclear nonproliferation and climate change. In a sense, these early meetings had been well planned by advisors on both sides who had counseled the leaders to avoid contentious issues such as Futenma Airbase and Hatoyama’s stated desire to review the Host Nation Support (HSN) and Status of Force Agreements (SOFA). For the Hatoyama administration, another unstated purpose of this greater emphasis on nonproliferation and climate was to capture two of the most popular themes of Obama’s historic campaign—which had been widely followed in Japan—and to use them as a way of putting distance between Japan and the military aspects of US global security strategy.

Prior to the November 2009 summit meeting with the US, Hatoyama’s government would announce that his government would not extend refueling assistance to allied forces in the Indian Ocean after January. As the opposition party, the DPJ had regularly pointed out the problematic nature of fuel assistance, given the constitutional ban on collective self-defense. As they had argued frequently in

their battles with the LDP in the Diet, there was no way of knowing whether the fuel would be used for combat or non-combat missions. Since at least some of the fuel would plausibly be used in support of combat missions, fuel assistance could be seen as a violation of the constitutional ban on collective self-defense. Rather than directly repudiating the law, however, the administration would simply let the current legislation expire. As a replacement for this fuel assistance, Hatoyama's government would support job training and agricultural assistance in Afghanistan with five billion dollars of aid over five years (Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-bu, 2010).

Though these early policy moves were largely successful, it soon became clear that the DPJ would face stiff resistance from the US when it came to renegotiating military base issues. From public statements and high level bilateral contacts down to working level meetings, the Obama administration sent clear messages early in the new DPJ administration that it would not renegotiate the 2006 agreement that would transfer the functions of Futenma Airbase within Okinawa prefecture. When the issue was brought up during their summit meeting in November 2009, Hatoyama uttered the words "trust me" to Obama on the issue of Futenma, leading the president to believe that his administration would implement the original agreement. Instead, Hatoyama and his administration would undertake a lengthy reevaluation process that would drag on for several months. Ironically, Hatoyama's failure to support the 2006 plan from the outset would eventually erode his ability to remain relevant in one of the civilian internationalist issues he cared about most. After months of mixed statements and contradictory proposals from the Hatoyama cabinet on Futenma Airbase, the Obama administration would deny Hatoyama a full meeting at the Washington Nuclear Summit in April 2010 (Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-bu, 2010). Hatoyama would instead have to settle for a ten-minute sidebar. The brevity of this meeting would contrast sharply with the 90-minute meeting secured by his Chinese counterparts. This inability to secure a meeting with the US would turn out to be a significant political failure and would signal a steep decline in the prime minister's support rating.

Over the course of Hatoyama's reevaluation of the Futenma plan, there would be plenty of material for the media to harp on. Reports would leak out that members of the Obama administration had found Hatoyama to be increasingly "loopy." Other reports would suggest Obama officials were nervous about Hatoyama's pledge for a comprehensive review of the alliance (Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-bu, 2010). To make matters worse, visible signs of the security dilemma would appear in ways that would

provide the media with fuel to point out Hatoyama's neglect of the alliance. If Hatoyama had hoped to emphasize "*Yuai*" diplomacy—creating relationships of trust and friendship—with countries in the region, North Korean belligerency would provide a poor backdrop for his approach. On 26 March, a North Korean torpedo sank the South Korean naval ship *Cheonan*, heightening tensions in the region. As Hatoyama would later state in an interview, the sinking of the *Cheonan* was on his mind during the negotiations for Futenma and would help shift momentum back to the original 2006 plan (Norimatsu 2011, 28 February). Small incidents with China in the East China Sea would also crop up late in Hatoyama's administration, upsetting hopes of closer ties with China as a way of decreasing Japan's "dependence" on the US. In April, a Chinese surveillance helicopter would come within 90 meters of a Japanese Marine Self Defense Force destroyer during a People's Liberation Army naval exercise near Japanese territorial waters. Also, in early May a Japanese research ship operating within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) would be pursued by a Chinese ship and ordered to cease its activities (Przystup, 2010).<sup>4</sup> Each of these incidents served as a reminder of the sensitive security environment in the region and the importance of the US military presence as a stabilizing force.

As has been demonstrated thus far, Hatoyama's broad strategic approach to defense corresponded poorly to his operational environment. Not only did he misjudge the degree to which he could substitute civilian internationalist policies for maintenance of the military aspects of the alliance with the US, but he also misjudged the degree to which overtures towards China would be rewarded with an alleviation of the security dilemma. Compounding the weaknesses of Hatoyama's strategy, however, was poor execution and policy management. Failures at this level would include a callous approach to speaking about the US-Japan alliance, lax management of his cabinet, and shutting out valuable expertise in the Japanese bureaucracy.

By the end of May 2010, his popularity figures having plummeted to the high teens, Hatoyama would announce that he would endorse the original 2006 plan to relocate Futenma within the prefecture. In essence, he had capitulated to pressure from the US and had backtracked on his campaign pledge. Shortly afterward, he would have to dismiss Social Democratic Party (SDP) head Fukushima Mizuho from the cabinet for failing to approve the cabinet order that approved in principle the original 2006 plan to relocate Futenma's functions within the prefecture. In his subsequent speeches, Hatoyama would apologize to the people of Okinawa for the damage caused by the US military presence and assure them that the Japanese government would take steps to mitigate the effects of the US military presence.

nawa and to Japan, characterizing the failure to move the base out of Okinawa as a personal one, not a failure of his party. In his resignation speech Hatoyama would say that he was disappointed that he could not get the people of Japan to approve his ideas with regards to the Futenma Airbase and security more generally. In addition, he would state that his ideas were not necessarily meant to refer to the present, but rather to a Japan five, ten, or twenty years from now, and that he one day hoped to see a Japan without permanent US bases (Hatoyama 2010, 2 June).

### **Discussion: The Importance of the Prime Minister in Japanese Defense Politics**

How have the different political strategies and policy entrepreneurship of the prime minister mattered in post Cold War Japanese defense politics? As the case studies have demonstrated, adeptness in defense policy has been an important element of Japan's defense trajectory. For the most part, the policy skill of Hashimoto and Koizumi helped to entrench Japan in US technology, regional strategy, and to an extent, global strategy. However, Hatoyama—through both a combination of harsh contextual circumstance and his own inability to overcome these circumstances—was unable to significantly overturn any major aspects of these changes. In the case of Hatoyama, it was not a lack of motivation that prevented him from achieving his objective, but rather, a failure to take risks or to use unorthodox policy mechanisms (as Koizumi had done on postal reform) that prevented him from mounting an effective challenge.

If Hashimoto's administration can be called a success, then one has to admit that it was a success made up of both perseverance and mundane political resources. Lacking Koizumi's penchant for confrontation and dramatic acts to challenge opponents (as well as the enhanced resources of the new *kantei* he himself would create), Hashimoto was still able to achieve some remarkable successes. Both the Joint Declaration and the Joint Guidelines were prepared through exhaustive consultation among alliance managers at the bureaucratic level. Hashimoto's own leadership came later at a time when the success of these initiatives was all but ensured. Negotiations on Futenma Airbase, on the other hand, were kept within a tight circle of confidants. This allowed Hashimoto to avoid intraparty and coalition wrangling that could have turned the negotiations into a spectacle. These tactics would stand in contrast to the methods of Hatoyama. Caught in a similar situation on the issue of Futenma Airbase, not only did he bypass

the expertise of experienced bureaucrats with knowledge of past negotiations, and disregard the clear political signals of top US officials, but he also allowed negotiations on the issues to get bogged down in intraparty and coalition squabbling by allowing his cabinet to float their own individual proposals. Having let the policy process spin out of control, he eventually endorsed most of the original 2006 agreement established under Koizumi's administration and then assumed personal responsibility for failure to live up to his promise.

The comparison between Hatoyama and Hashimoto is especially relevant for another important reason: Hashimoto's level of success was well within Hatoyama's grasp. Hatoyama always had the option of allowing negotiations to linger in working committees until such a time as they were ready for his personal involvement. Hatoyama even had the option of allowing the Futenma decision to remain in committees until the Upper House elections in 2010, after which he might have had a firmer political base on which to negotiate.

However, if Hatoyama had wished for a more revolutionary change in bilateral defense relations between the US and Japan, then the only option would have been to borrow the approaches pioneered by Koizumi. Koizumi appointed a cabinet and set up institutions and expertise specifically targeted toward uprooting the influence of the postmasters from Japanese politics. Indeed, much as the postmasters had made up an important constituency in Japan, with significant ties within the LDP, the US-Japan Security Treaty and the various permanent players involved in implementing it had also set down firm roots in Japan's defense establishment. These interconnections were not only solidified with technological cooperation and joint training, but also benefited from extensive personal contacts between officials. In the key positions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense, Hatoyama appointed independent-minded policy makers with a vision on Futenma Airbase significantly different from his own (and significantly different from each other!). If changing the relationship between the US and Japan was indeed Hatoyama's top priority, then a cabinet with a shared sense of purpose would have been essential. Equally essential would have been some kind of "Koizumi magic" in the form of political theater and confrontational policies that openly stated the challenge and sought public approval for a dramatic shift. However, even with the full weight of these resources focused on reforming the US-Japan alliance relationship, significant changes would have been anything but guaranteed.

Koizumi, for his part, made good use of the US-Japan alliance as a political resource. Like Hash-

imoto, his high profile successes in alliance management would become the precursor to a major reform. However, the content of Koizumi's alliance contributions were much bolder than anything Hashimoto had attempted and indeed seemed self-consciously aimed at promoting his personal brand as a maverick. Despite President Bush's own unpopularity in Japan, the personalization of the relationship between the two leaders helped Koizumi maintain a high profile. Other measures, such as his dramatic trip to North Korea and his trips to Yasukuni Shrine, seemed to work in a similar way to demonstrate his maverick credentials and to solidify his image as a prime minister who was not afraid to take risks. In an age when most voters are not aligned with either party and are chronically uninterested in politics altogether, defense politics became yet another forum in which Koizumi could present himself as dynamic and interesting. Despite Koizumi's popular performances, changes in defense policy and politics were more limited than they would appear. Japan would integrate deeper into US technology as well as its regional and global defense objectives, and it would continue to whittle away at the edges of prohibitions against collective security cooperation—but deeper transformations, such as overcoming the one per cent limit on defense spending and revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, would have to wait.

As this essay has sought to demonstrate, prime ministers matter in the realm of Japanese defense policy and politics. They matter in the way they endorse bottom-up initiatives, through top-down initiatives, through agenda setting, and through symbolic acts of state. Moreover, differences in the quality of leadership have also mattered significantly in the post Cold War world. Indeed, successful policies in defense have usually presaged important domestic reforms like Hashimoto's administrative reform initiative and Koizumi's postal reforms.

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Failures in defense have also presaged policy muddle and lack of energy in domestic reform and policy.

### Conclusion: Challenges for Japan's Future Leaders

The future leaders of Japan are sure to face challenges both unique and similar to the ones faced by the three prime ministers examined above. In the recent past, Japan has experienced one very extreme event—the triple disasters of 11 March, 2011—and has weathered smaller incidents, for example, the collision of a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard ship that was caught on film. These events have taken place in a landscape of evolving contexts that will shape Japan's future. Leaders also face the deepening crises of economic malaise, growing sovereign debt, demographic decline, and widespread public disgust with politics. Against this backdrop, China will continue to rise as a significant regional power with growing military, political, and economic influence that challenge Japan's interests and the regional status quo.

All of these contexts suggest the potential relevance of political leadership without specifying its content. As has been seen in the years following Koizumi's resignation, leadership is as conspicuous by its absence as it is by its presence.

Will leaders embrace the US more closely, hoping to maintain US extended deterrence at a reasonable cost? Will leaders energize nonaligned voters through dramatic political acts? Will politicians—as many have in recent years—neglect the challenge of leadership, instead opting for backroom deals, party realignments, and muddle through? Or, are nonparty forms of political entrepreneurship in the making that will radically transform the Japanese state? The answers to these questions will help define Japan's defense trajectory in the years to come.

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## Notes

[1] Despite contributing 13 billion dollars to coalition forces, Japan would not be recognized in the thank you letter published by the Kuwait government in the *New York Times*. This article thanked all the participants of the coalition, but failed to mention Japan. This came as a great shock to the Japanese government and proved to be a hot topic in the Japanese media. The lesson learned was simple: it was not enough to provide money; Japan would need to also provide a “human contribution” in order to be recognized for its contributions to global security (Akiyama, 2002, p. 10-11; Funabashi, 1999; Soeya, 2005).

[2] Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero (2009, p. 122), for example, point out that strong prime ministers have often been supported by an extensive brain trust, usually consisting of scholars, think tank officials, and intelligent members of the business community. Prime Minister Nakasone was an exemplar in this respect. Another way to bolster one’s power as a prime minister—a method used especially by prime ministers Tanaka Kakuei and Takeshita Noboru—is to build extensive connections within the bureaucracies. By establishing their own connections within bureaucracies, both Tanaka and Takeshita were able to have privileged access to unvarnished information (Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero, 2009; Shinoda, 2000).

[3] It is also not an insignificant detail that the dramatic trip to Pyongyang in late 2002 helped to boost his popularity ratings after they had taken a hit following the firing of his popular Minister of Foreign Affairs Tanaka Makiko.

[4] These incidents would be a harbinger of the much more serious incident in September during the Kan Naoto administration when a diplomatic row would ensue after a Chinese trawler clashed with a Japanese Coast Guard vessel.

## About the Author

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## Space, Punishment and the Disruption of Social Continuity in the World Bank

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### Abstract:

How can political science and international relations theories elucidate the ambiguity and complexity of Japan's security identity? This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Japan's vague security identity through the lens of analytical eclecticism as suggested by Peter Katzenstein in 2008. The reason this research employs analytical eclecticism is because it re-confirms that existing theories of orthodox international politics (classical/neo-liberalism and classical/neo-realism) and existing alternative approaches (constructivism) are incomplete in themselves, but are mutually supplemental within an eclectic research method. In an attempt to prove the applicability of analytical eclecticism and to investigate Japan's changing security identity, this paper proposes four theoretical models of Japan's security identity (a pacifist state, a UN peacekeeper, a normal state, and a US ally). By substantiating the validity of analytical eclecticism and visualising Japan's elusive security identity, this paper attempts to make a contribution to the study of Japanese politics and to the application of international relations theory.

**Keywords:** analytical eclecticism, Article 9, Japan's security identity, SDF.

### Introduction

Japan's security identity has been constantly changing and elusive. Indeed, to the casual observer, it may seem to have exhibited schizophrenic tendencies (Dupont 2005; MacCormack 2007: 191-204). In spite of its infamous status as an ultra-nationalistic militarist state during the Pacific War, Japan became a pacifist state following its defeat in the Second World War and thorough disarmament during the occupation period. Based on the ideals of the so-called Peace Constitution, the Japanese government was determined to preserve its security by 'trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world' (NDL, *The Constitution of Japan*). However, Japan started rebuilding

its self-defence capabilities in response to requests from the United States after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Although it was a part of the US-led alliance system during the Cold War, Japan refrained from making a military contribution to either the Korean or Vietnam Wars. Despite the unstable international security environment during the Cold War, Japan did not complete its military normalisation and never dispatched its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) overseas even for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO).

Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis forced the Japanese government to reconsider its conventional security policy, especially its policy on overseas

dispatch of the SDF. The United States, in particular, exerted pressure on Japan to deploy the SDF in the Persian Gulf, but the Japanese government failed to pass the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill through the Diet. Japan's inability to make a human contribution to the UN-authorised military action led to international criticism. This spurred the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (MOFA) to create a new legal framework to allow the SDF to participate in UNPKOs, which ultimately resulted in the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law, or the International Peacekeeping Operations Law (the so-called PKO Law). In 1992 Japanese peacekeepers were dispatched to Cambodia, and subsequent Japanese governments have continued to make contributions to UN-sponsored PKOs. As a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and the US-led War on Terror, Japan dispatched the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Emergency Legislation, moreover, was created in 2002 and 2004 in case of armed attack from outside of Japan. Furthermore, in 2007 the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) was upgraded to the Ministry of Defence Japan (MOD), and the Japanese government passed legislation that specified the processes that must be undertaken for a national constitutional referendum. The latter was a necessary step for constitutional revision, and thus potentially Japan's military normalisation.

These developments highlight the fact that Japan is not only maintaining its security identity as a pacifist state, based on the Peace Constitution, but is also becoming a normal state with a normal military capability commensurate with its economic power. In fact, Japan's annual military expenditure is one of the highest in the world (ISS 2009: 447-452). Notwithstanding the progress of military normalisation, it is unlikely that Japan will become an aggressive military power or a nuclear state. Significantly, in spite of its military alliance with the United States and membership of the United Nations, its ability to exercise the right of collective self-defence and participate in the collective security system has been strictly prohibited by Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution. Thus, Japan possesses a complicated, and seemingly paradoxical, security identity. Here, two questions immediately arise. First, how does research on Japanese security policy deal with the complexity of Japan's security identity? Second, do theories of international relations provide a satisfactory explanation for this changing, and seemingly contradictory, security identity?

A problem in applying international relations theories to an analysis of Japan's security policy is that none of them alone is sufficient for providing a comprehensive and systematic perspective. As

dominant theories of international relations, classical realism and neo-realism (Morgenthau 2006; Waltz 1979, 1993, 2001) provide detailed explanations of why Japan began normalising its military capability and supporting a military alliance with the United States. Realist theories, however, do not elucidate why Japan has been hesitant to complete its military normalisation and to develop nuclear weapons. In contrast to these realist schools, analyses based on classical liberalism (idealism) and constructivism expound on how and why Japan's complete rearmament has been prohibited by the influence of anti-war pacifism and a post-war culture of anti-militarism (Berger 1993, 1998; Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Katzenstein 1996). These normative perspectives, however, do not account for Japan's at least partial military normalisation process and the continued embrace of the military alliance with the United States. Moreover, the normative constraints on Japan's security policy themselves have been weakened by a domestic desire for rearmament in a changing international environment.

Meanwhile, the premise of another orthodox theory, neo-liberalism, explains why Japan's pacifism has shifted in order to make an international contribution (Krasner 1983; Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1984; Berger 2007). Whereas extreme anti-war and anti-militarist pacifism, consistent with classical liberalism, negates the existence of the SDF and its overseas dispatch for any purpose, Japan's PKO policy is compatible with neo-liberalism with its focus on multilateral cooperation for international peace and security, and affirms the utilisation of Japanese military power for post-conflict peace operations. Yet, like other theories, neo-liberalism is not perfect; it cannot explain why Japan could not participate in UNPKOs until 1992 and why it supported the US-led wars on Afghanistan and Iraq.

Thus, each theory of international relations is incomplete, and each provides only a partial explanation of Japan's security identity. The problem for the theoretical analysis of Japanese security policy and security identity, therefore, lies in the lack of an eclectic and comprehensive approach in the existing scholarship. Although earlier research provided thorough analyses of a few or particular theoretical perspectives on Japan's security identity (Funabashi 2004; Hughes 2004; Weeks 2004; Inoguchi 2008; Middlebrooks 2008; Oros 2008; Llewelyn, Walton and Kikkawa 2009; Soeya 2011), these analyses have been theoretically limited. Accordingly, this paper aims to contribute to closing this research gap in the study of Japan's security policy and international relations theory by demonstrating the applicability of a theoretically

eclectic approach. To this end, the methodological utility of analytical eclecticism will be examined in relation to multiple forms of Japanese security identity in the past, present and the future.

### **Methodological Applicability of Analytical Eclecticism**

The concept of analytical eclecticism for the scrutinising of Japanese security policy was first articulated by Peter Katzenstein. Due to ‘broadening of the theoretical spectrum’, research on Japan’s security policy has differed from analyst to analyst (realist, liberalist and constructivist) and tends to have ‘sidestepped metatheoretical debates’ (Katzenstein 2008: 3). As an alternative research method, Katzenstein proposed the application of analytical eclecticism as follows:

Some writings on Japanese security may, in the future, be able to take a more eclectic turn, by incorporating elements drawn from three different styles of analysis – the testing of alternative explanations, the rendering of synthetic accounts, and historically informed narratives (ibid).

In fact, the necessity of analytical eclecticism can be found in international relations theories and approaches. First, the significance of an eclectic approach can be identified in the analysis of E. H. Carr, one of the founders of classical realism and international politics. Although his main work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, is regarded as one of the major texts of classical realism, previously ‘simplistic reading of Carr has begun to be re-evaluated as a number of scholars have pointed to areas of common concern of both ‘idealists’ and ‘realists’ (Rich 2000: 198). Indeed, Carr’s ‘motives in writing the book were both realist and utopian’ (Dunne 2000: 221). In spite of his stance as a critic of utopianism, Carr dedicated the book to ‘the makers of the coming peace’, that is, to the creators of utopia (ibid). Moreover, Carr’s other well-known work, *The Conditions of Peace* (1942), includes the tenets of idealism, in other words, the conditions for utopia (Wilson 2000: 185). Furthermore, whereas Carr’s main argument focused on a criticism of the extremely idealistic nature of international relations theory developed after the First World War, he also pointed out the limitations of realism itself (Carr 1949: 89). Carr likewise asserted the importance of balanced analysis with both realist and utopian perspectives. He unequivocally emphasised the importance of the combination of both idealism and realism, and repetitively underlined this point thus:

Immature thought is predominantly purposive and utopian. Thought which rejects purpose altogether is the thought of old age. Mature thought combines purpose with observation and analysis. Utopia and reality are thus the two factors of politi-

cal science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place (ibid: 10).

Political science must be based on a recognition of the interdependence of theory and practice, which can be attained only through a combination of utopia and reality (ibid: 13).

Significantly, Carr reached the ‘conclusion that any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality’ (ibid: 93). His insistence on the need for a combined method of analysis in the study of political science and international relations provides strong support for the methodological validity of analytical eclecticism.

Likewise, writings of other major realists indicate an eclectic underpinning of their realist logic. The arguments of Thomas Hobbes, a renowned realist, also contain liberal elements. Hobbes considered human beings to be egoistic in their natural state, where they engaged in a ‘war of all against all’ (Hobbes 1962: 24, 143). At the same time however, he also argued that human beings would be able to work together to establish an artificial state, a Leviathan, by means of cooperative social contracts, in opposition to their egoistic individualism (ibid). As Tomoko Okagaki (2000: 67, 81) pointed out, this perspective is similar to that of neo-liberalist viewpoints, which insist that international cooperation is possible even though states egotistically pursue maximisation of power and interest. Similarly, the analyses of Thucydides offer both idealist and liberalist perspectives. For instance, Bruce Russett noted that the observations of Thucydides on the nature of democracy are ‘more familiar in contemporary liberal-institutionalist and idealist paradigms that compete with realism’ (Russett 1993: 62; Tsuchiyama 2000: 59). Notably, even Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neo-realism (structural realism), acknowledged the theoretical unassailability of the idealist logic that advocates for establishing a world government as a means of abolishing international wars, although he considered this unattainable in reality (Waltz 2001: 228).

In addition to classical and structural realism, neo-liberalism, the English School and constructivism also underline the efficacy of eclectic approaches. First, neo-liberalism acknowledges some neo-realist conditions, such as the significance of national interest as a state goal, and the existence of anarchy in the global system (Kegley and Wittkopf 2006: 44), although neo-liberals are positive that sustainable international cooperation is possible even under anarchy (Keohane 1984). In this regard, neo-liberalism is theoretically eclectic in comparison to the realist schools. Second, the so-called English School also demonstrated the possibility for analytical eclecticism. For instance, Hedley

Bull's analysis shows that, although anarchy is the nature of the international system as neo-realists argue, international order exists in an anarchical society (2002: 22-50). Bull divided traditional political philosophy into three types: the Hobbesian (realist tradition), the Kantian (universalist tradition), and the Grotian (internationalist tradition) (*ibid*: 25). He maintained that it is important to balance the perspectives of realism (the Hobbesian tradition) and liberalism (the Kantian tradition) with an emphasis on the importance of internationalism in influencing international relations. Third, constructivism, a 'liberal-realist theoretical approach' (Kegley and Wittkopf 2006: 52), also indicates the utility of eclectic analysis. On the one hand, constructivism accepts the conditions suggested by realism and neo-realism, such as the significance of states as key actors in international politics, and the self-centredness of states in pursuit of their national interests (*ibid*). On the other hand, constructivism theoretically stems from idealism and liberalism (Wendt 1999: 1) and underscores the significance of the 'institutional transformation of identities and interests' (Wendt 1992: 391-425, 394). Indeed, the culture of anti-militarism as an analytical framework (Berger 1993, 1998) is composed of both classical liberalist and constructivist perspectives. Constructivism, therefore, employs an eclectic approach in an attempt to 'bridge the gap between neo-liberal and neo-realist theories' (Kegley and Wittkopf 2006: 53). In this sense, the constructivist approach is even more eclectic than the realist and liberalist perspectives. As examined above, each theory of, and approach to international politics, demonstrates the methodological applicability of analytical eclecticism. Hence, analytical eclecticism can be applied to a comprehensive analysis of Japan's security identity.

# **Japan's Security Identity in Terms of Analytical Eclecticism**

As shown so far, a theoretically eclectic approach can be methodologically applicable and effective. Indeed, some earlier research has employed an eclectic approach in the analysis of Japan's security policy. For example, William Heinrich Jr. (1997) applied a 'multilevel analysis' combining 'domestic and structural factors' to examine Japan's security policy. Yoshihide Soeya (1998) in his analysis showed that Japanese security policy has been influenced by both normative constraints and structural imperatives. Soeya referred to the significance of a combined analysis of Japan's 'dual identity', arguing that 'both realism and constructivism (social norms of pacifism and the political culture of anti-militarism) are relevant in explaining Japan's security thinking and behaviour' (*ibid*: 231). Also, Jennifer Lind (200zmbxbvvv 4:

92-121) utilised an eclectic approach and argued that Japan's pacifism, or culture of anti-militarism, is a constructivist norm and that Japan's buck-passing policy was a realist strategy. Similarly, Amy Catalinac (2007) employed eclectic explanations of Japan's security policy by offering analyses from the perspectives of neo-liberalism and neo-realism. Catalinac pointed out limitations in both theories and advocated 'identity theory' as an alternative constructivist approach. Likewise, Richard Samuels (2007: 128) provided an eclectic analysis and proposed four stances regarding Japanese security policy (neo-autonomists, normal nationalists, pacifists, and middle-power internationalists). Yet these are not perspectives on Japan's national security identity but on Japanese attitudes towards security policy. Moreover, both neo-autonomist and normal-nationalist perspectives can be conceptualised as part of the classical realist perspective which focuses on Japan's security attitude as a normal state. Although these analyses above support the utility of analytical eclecticism, they did not examine Japan's security identity specifically from this perspective.

The phrase ‘security identity’ as a term in political science is defined as ‘a set of collectively held principals that have attracted broad political support regarding the appropriate role of state action in the security arena and are institutionalised into the policy-making process’ (Oros 2008: 9). In essence, the very analysis of identity can be considered as following a constructivist approach (Catalinac 2007), and analysts tend to examine Japan’s security identity from a few or particular theoretical perspectives, describing it as a pacifist state, a normal country, a normal military power, a global civilian power, or a global ordinary power (Funabashi 2004; Hughes 2004; Samuels 2007; Inoguchi 2008; Middlebrooks 2008; Oros 2008; Llewelyn, Walton and Kikkawa 2009; Soeya 2011). As already mentioned however, much of the early research focused on analysing a few or particular theoretical perspectives and was unable to offer a comprehensive perspective on Japan’s changing security identity in a holistic manner.

In short, eclectic analyses in the existing literature are limited to a couple of theoretical dimensions (realism, liberalism and constructivism) and have not offered theoretically systematic perspectives on Japan's multiple security identity. Unlike previous scholarship, this paper integrates all these theoretical perspectives (classical/neo-liberalism and classical/neo-realism) and proposes four models of Japanese security identity (constructivism) as shown in Table 1: Japan as a pacifist state (classical liberalism), as a UN peacekeeper (neo-liberalism),

as a normal state (classical realism), and as a US ally (neo-realism). As a set of eclectic methods, these four perspectives will help to clarify and analyse Japan's changing security identity.

*Note: This table rules out latent security identity, such as Japan becoming an unarmed neutral state, a militarist state, or a nuclear-armed state, as these potential outcomes are unattainable at this point. However, such potential can form part of Japan's security identity as a pacifist state and a normal state.*

### a. Classical Liberalism: Japan as a Pacifist State

Classical liberalism (idealism) explains why Japan has been reluctant to become a major military power and has instead remained a pacifist state. It also provides an explanation for why Japan has been reactive with regard to foreign and security policies (Calder 1988). Japanese pacifism, inscribed in Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, stipulates the renunciation of war and the non-possession of armed forces. Japan's constitutional pacifism can be seen as classical liberalism, since both concepts stem from anti-war idealism. The significance of the Peace Constitution as a basis for non-violent pacifism has been espoused by academics acting as constitutional protectors. This argument is the antithesis of the normal state debate (Kimijima 2003: 17). This paper, however, regards Japan as a relative pacifist state rather than an absolute pacifist state. Before the Peace Constitution was promulgated, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida stated that its peace clause renounced even the right of self-defence. Nevertheless, Yoshida changed his stance and eventually recognised Japan's possession of the right of self-defence (NDL, *Proceedings of the 90th Imperial Parliament Session*). Although it is possible to justify Japan's absolute pacifism from the perspective of constitutional law, the Japanese government has consistently adopted a relative pacifism as Japan's security policy. Therefore, Japan as a pacifist nation now means it adopts a relative pacifism which recognises the right of self-defence.

Theoretically, idealism and (classical) liberalism can be used interchangeably because the advocates of liberalism were inspired by idealism after the First World War. Basically, idealism as classical liberalism is based on the belief that human beings inherently possess a good nature, and this is the reason for peace and cooperation (Kegley and Wittkopf 2006: 30). In relation to anti-war idealism in Japan, Thomas Berger (1993, 1998) observed that the 'culture of anti-militarism' has been deeply rooted and prevalent in Japanese society to an extent which constrains the excessive increase of Japan's military capability. Likewise, Jitsuo

Tsuchiyama (2007) argued that the renunciation of war described in Article 9 has had a normative influence on Japan's security policy. Without doubt, Japan's post-war pacifism (anti-war, anti-militarist and anti-nuclear pacifism) has been a core norm in post-war Japanese politics which has constructed Japan's security identity as a pacifist state.

Furthermore, Japan's anti-militarist pacifism is similar to Kantian idealism. In his essay, *Perpetual Peace*, Immanuel Kant (1939: 4, 6) proposed preliminary articles for perpetual peace, such as: 'no state shall by force interfere with either constitution or government of another state' (Article 3 of Chapter 1) and 'standing armies shall in time be totally abolished' (Article 5 of Chapter 1). A resemblance can be identified between Kantian pacifism and Japan's anti-war pacifism based on Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution. First, both Article 3 of Chapter 1 in Kant's *Perpetual Peace* and Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution express the 'illegalisation of war or use of force'. Second, the purpose of Article 5 of Chapter 1 in *Perpetual Peace* and Paragraph 2 in Article 9 of the Constitution is disarmament. In this sense, Kant's classical liberalism and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution share a fundamentally similar anti-war and anti-militarist philosophy.

The renunciation of war stipulated in Article 9 is in line with international moves towards the illegalisation of war, such as, the Covenant of the League of Nations (1920), the Paris Non-War Pact (1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact), and the Charter of the United Nations (1945) (Nasu 2004). But in comparison with these international anti-war arrangements, Article 9 is not only anti-war but also anti-nuclear, due to Japan's experience of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Abe, Ukai and Morisu 2006: 71-72). Japan's anti-war pacifism, reflected in Article 9, was viewed in theory as the type of unarmed neutrality advocated by opposition parties and pacifist intellectuals (Miyata 2004). As well, those who adhere to Japanese constitutional pacifism tend to seek to protect Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and moreover, try to internationalise it (Ohta and Nakazawa 2006). Indeed, on the basis of anti-war pacifism, some Japanese politicians, academics and peace activists have attempted to abolish nuclear weapons by internationalising the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Hiraoka 1996).

Anti-war pacifism and the culture of anti-militarism forbade any overseas dispatch of the SDF, symbolised by the Upper House resolution of 1954 (NDL, *Proceedings of the 19th Diet Session*). On the basis of anti-militarist pacifism, the Japanese government banned Japan's arms exports, adopted three non-nuclear principles, and placed a

ceiling on the defence budget of 1% of GNP. This clearly indicates that the anti-militarist pacifism of Article 9 has functioned as Japan's 'defence constraint' (Keddell 1993). On the basis of Article 9, Japanese citizens took legal actions on various occasions claiming that the existence of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty was unconstitutional. For instance, the Suzuki Case (1952) on the National Police Reserve, the Sunakawa Case (1959) on a US base, the Eniwa Case (1962) on the SDF, the Naganuma Nike Case (1969) on an Air SDF (ASDF) base, and the Hyakuri Case (1977) on an ASDF base were all rooted in anti-war pacifism. The Japanese courts, however, sidestepped a clear judgement on the constitutionality of the SDF and the Security Treaty, arguing that these issues were highly political and subject to governmental action (*tōchi kōi*) (Beyer 1993). Moreover, anti-militarist pacifists argue that Japan's participation in UNPKOs should have no connection with the SDF (Ōta 1992: 108-109).

Japan's anti-war pacifism and culture of anti-militarism have acted to prohibit the SDF from participating in international peace operations. Notably, the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill, which aimed at sending the SDF to the Persian Gulf, was scrapped due to strong opposition in the Diet based on anti-war/anti-militarist pacifism (Dobson 2003). Significantly, even after the Japanese government created legal frameworks to dispatch the SDF to UNPKOs, the Indian Ocean and Iraq, exercise of the right of collective self-defence has been restricted (Hardacre 2005). These factors indicate that anti-militarist pacifism as a defence constraint has been, and will remain, influential until Article 9 is revised or deleted by constitutional amendment. Although there have been shifts towards international pacifism and Japan has normalised its military capability, anti-militarist pacifism remains an influential normative restraint in forming Japan's security identity as a pacifist state.

### **b. Neo-Liberalism: Japan as a UN Peacekeeper**

From a neo-liberal perspective, Japan's security identity can be described as that of a UN peacekeeper. Japan's contributions to UNPKOs and UN-authorised peace operations after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq can be interpreted as foreign and security policies based on neo-liberalism. As Gō Itō (2007) argued, the term 'international contribution' (*kokusai kōken*) was a key phrase in legalising the dispatch of the SDF to UNPKOs. Theoretically speaking, the term 'international contribution' is compatible with the neo-liberal argument that international cooperation is possible even within an anarchic international system (Kegley and Wittkopf 2006: 40-42). Japan's security policy, which con-

tributes to international cooperation on the basis of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, is therefore congruous with neo-liberalism and liberal internationalism (O'Hanlon 2007). Likewise, Thomas Berger (2007) argued that the motivation behind Japan's international contribution is fundamentally based on the liberal philosophy of international relations theory. Berger described Japan's policy towards international peacekeeping as 'Japanese liberalism' or 'pragmatic liberalism' (ibid: 260-261). Whereas Japan's classical liberalism as anti-militarist pacifism prohibited the SDF from participating in international peacekeeping operations, Japan's neo-liberalism and international pacifism based on the Preamble of the Constitution has facilitated Japan's participation in post-conflict peace operations.

The Preamble of the UN Charter and its counterpart in the Japanese Constitution share similar norms that construct international pacifism. The former reaffirms 'fundamental human rights', the 'dignity of the human person' and 'better standards of life in larger freedom' (United Nations, *The Charter of the United Nations*). The latter reconfirms 'the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression, and intolerance' and 'the right to live in peace, free from fear and want' (NDL, *The Constitution of Japan*). Both Preambles seek the attainment of international peace based on human rights and the right to live in peace. Japan's participation in UNPKOs is, therefore, consistent with international pacifism as represented in the two Preambles. From a neo-liberalist perspective, Japan contributes to post-conflict peace operations not only out of national interest, but also out of international interest. As a supportive argument to this view, Michael Pugh (2004) claims that PKO policy is not necessarily dependent upon national interest but more on 'altruism' based on international interest (Ishizuka 2008: vii). Similarly, Roland Paris (2004) applied 'liberal institutionalist theory' to peace-building operations (Ishizuka 2008: vii). In this way, UN peace operations, such as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace-building as defined in *An Agenda for Peace* by Boutros Ghali (1992), are compatible with neo-liberalist perspectives.

Furthermore, peacekeeping and peace-building operations based on the premise of international pacifism are consonant with the concept of 'human security', which is consistent with the neo-liberal paradigm. In fact, there is a similarity between the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution and the concept of human security. The Preamble states, 'we recognise that all people of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want', while the purpose of human security is to attain 'freedom from want, freedom from fear' (Commis-

sion on Human Security 2003). In other words, both the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution and the concept of human security are consistent with neo-liberal international pacifism and therefore justify Japan's contributions to UN peace operations. In fact, the Japanese government dispatched the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq by referring to the Preamble as a legal basis as well as to UN resolutions. Thus, Japan's participation in UN-authorised peace operations is based on the international pacifism of the Preamble, congruent with a neo-liberal international cooperation, which indicates Japan's security identity as a UN peacekeeper.

### **c. Classical Realism: Japan as a Normal State**

Classical realism, or human nature realism, provides explanations for why Japan has pursued a security policy aimed at becoming a normal state that possesses normal, or stronger, military power. Classical realism insists that each state egoistically pursues its own national interests such as economic and military power (Morgenthau 2006). From such a realist perspective, Japan has sought to maximise not only its economic power but also its military power. For instance, Herman Kahn (1970) predicted that Japan would become a superstate by normalising and strengthening its military power. The argument that Japan desires to become a normal state has been a central issue in Japan's security policy debate. Indeed, conservative Japanese politicians have insisted on the necessity of Japan's military normalisation (Ishihara 1989; Ozawa 1994; Koizumi 2003; and Abe 2006). Similarly, analysts of Japanese politics have focused on the same issue (Green 1995; Hook 1996; Dupont 2004; Hughes 2004, 2009; Pyle 2007; Samuels 1994, 2007; Oros 2008; Middlebrooks 2008; and Soeya 2011).

Certainly, classical realism supports the fact that the LDP government pursued not only a maximisation of economic power but also the normalisation of military power. Retrospectively, the original purpose of establishing the LDP was to revise the Peace Constitution so as to normalise Japan's military power. The Hatoyama-led Democratic Party and the Yoshida-led Liberal Party ostensibly merged to establish the LDP because they needed a two-thirds majority of seats in the Diet to revise the Constitution (Abe 2006: 27-29). On 15 November 1955, the LDP announced that the party aimed to revise the 1947 Constitution and expand Japan's military capability (LDP 2009).

According to classical realism, even leftist political parties tend to pursue national military power. E. H. Carr (1949: 20) contended that once a leftist political party comes to power, the party abandons theoretical utopianism and becomes more

realistic. Indeed, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), notable for its absolute pacifist policy of unarmed neutrality, which opposed the Japan-US Security Treaty and the SDF, changed its policy once Tomiichi Murayama of the JSP became prime minister in coalition with the LDP in 1994. Murayama overturned JSP policy and recognised the existence of the SDF and the Security Treaty (NDL, *Proceedings of the 130th Diet Session*). Thus, the arguments of classical realism are supported not only by the LDP's security policy but also by the example of the policy shift of the JSP.

From the perspective of Japan as a normal state, Japan's remilitarisation through the establishment of the National Police Reserve (1950), the Police Preservation Corps (1952) and the Self Defence Forces (1954) can be interpreted as the first stages of military normalisation. The second stage of military normalisation can be recognised as developing after the end of the Cold War. The disappearance of military threat from the Soviet Union provided an opportunity for the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) to normalise Japan's military power. In particular, the dispatch of the SDF overseas since 1992 can be interpreted as part of the process of becoming a normal state. In this respect, Japan's participation in UNPKOs has been based on realistic motives which desire the maximisation or normalisation of military power, and this is only but a first step. With regard to this point, Katsumi Ishizuka (2008: 48-50) observed that Japan's participation in UNPKOs contributes to Japan's national interest as well. It is also possible to conceive that the Japanese government has intended to gain international prestige, specifically a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) by making contributions to UNPKOs. Since being a permanent UNSC member would contribute to enhancing Japan's political influence in international politics, Japan's participation in UNPKOs is based on a realistic motivation, namely the pursuit of national interest (Drifte 2000), rather than altruism.

The third stage of the normalisation process became evident after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the subsequent US-led War on Terror. Whereas Japan's relative national power has been declining (Dupont 2001: 6), Prime Minister Jun'ichiō Koizumi attempted to maximise Japan's military power in a Gaullist manner (Envall 2008). The Koizumi government swiftly enacted the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation and in the same year dispatched the Maritime SDF (MSDF) to the Indian Ocean. Likewise, the Iraq Special Measures Legislation was created in 2003, and in the following year, the Ground SDF (GSDF) was deployed in a non-combat zone in Iraq (Shinoda 2007a). In 2007, the JDA was upgraded into the Ministry of Defence

(MOD), and the National Referendum Law was enacted as a step towards constitutional revision. This series of moves towards Japan's military normalisation exemplifies the arguments of classical realism. Moreover, recent political events such as the Senkaku islands issue and the missile launch of North Korea all the more stimulated Japanese right-wing conservative politicians who have pushed for a resurgence of nationalism. This trend has also facilitated Japan's military normalisation as well as maximisation of national interest (*East Asia Forum*, 17 September 2012). In short, from a realist perspective, it can be claimed that Japan has been moving away from its pacifism, based on the Peace Constitution, towards becoming a normal state, based on classical realism and a domestic desire to maximise national interest.

#### **d. Neo-Realism: Japan as a US Ally**

Classical realism supports the argument for Japan as a normal state and for Japan's militarisation from a domestic perspective. On the other hand, neo-realism, or structural realism, supports Japan's military normalisation, as well as its security identity, in terms of being a US ally. Indeed, neo-realism stresses the significance of a balance of power and thus justifies the Japan-US alliance. It also argues that an international structure of anarchy (Waltz 1979, 2001) and the presence of the United States as a hegemonic state (Gilpin 1981) determine the behaviours of other countries. From a structural realist perspective, it is possible to argue that Japan's security policies have been shaped by this international structure. Kenneth Pyle (2007: 18-21), for instance, has analysed how Japan's foreign and security policies have been determined in response to changes in the international structure. The anarchic self-help system and the Cold War structure forced Japan to conclude the Japan-US security treaty and remilitarise. Japan's pacifist intellectuals argued that the security treaty should be comprehensive rather than partial (Kersten 1996). Still, the fact that Japan chose a partial peace treaty indicates that the international structure and the presence of the United States as a hegemon determined the direction of Japan's post-war security policy. Although Japan has not armed itself with nuclear weapons, Japan has depended on the US 'nuclear umbrella' through the Japan-US military alliance. Thus, structural anarchy influences Japan's security policies, namely remilitarisation with the SDF and a military dependence on the United States. As structural realism supports the hegemonic stability theory, US hegemony made it possible for Japan to focus on its economic development through the Yoshida Doctrine.

Even in a post-hegemonic world, external pressure, mainly from the United States, and changes in

the international environment have determined Japan's foreign and security policies (Akaha 1993). For neo-realists, the Cold War structure facilitated Japan's policy on official development assistance (ODA) for countries in the Western camp. Because of its structural military dependence on the United States in (Johnson 2004), Japan's security policy, in spite of its Peace Constitution, has been influenced by external pressure, especially from the United States. Japan's responsive security policy and incremental militarisation are thus attributed to its military dependence on the United States. In order to reduce criticism of being a 'free rider' in an anarchic world, Japan was forced to share strategic burdens with the United States. Furthermore, structural transformations such as the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War caused Japan to reconsider its security policy (Inoguchi 1991, Waltz 1993) and eventually enabled the SDF to participate in UNPKOs. Thus, Japan's participation in UNPKOs was determined by external pressure (*gaiatsu*), particularly from the United States (George 1993). Indeed, Prime Minister Murayama (NDL, *Proceedings of the 130th Diet Session*) stated that the reason why the JSP changed its security policy and recognised the constitutionality of the SDF and the Japan-US alliance was because of the collapse of the Cold War structure.

As significant as the end of the Cold War structure, the 2001 terrorist attacks and the outbreak of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq also brought about incremental shifts in Japan's security policies. For instance, the unusually speedy passage of two legal frameworks, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Legislation, indicates how international structure and external pressures determine and influence Japan's security policy (Shinoda 2007a). As Tomohito Shinoda (Shinoda 2007b) has shown, Japanese security policy and public opinion in the post-Cold War period became more realistic due to the changing international environment. Likewise, Paul Midford (2011) has demonstrated that Japanese public opinion has evidently shifted from anti-militarism to an 'attitudinal defensive realism' since 9/11. Thus, a structural realist perspective indicates that Japan's UN peacekeeping policy has been not only based on the egotistic or altruistic nature of the state but also on the structural nature of the international system. The international system and the United States in particular have placed considerable external pressure on Japan. As a US ally, Japan has responded to these international pressures in its security policy-making processes.

In essence, the applicability of all four theoretical models of Japan's security identity: Japan as a pacifist state, a UN peacekeeper, a normal state,

and a US ally, is evident. These four perspectives on Japan's security identity, based respectively on classical liberalism, neo-liberalism, classical realism, and neo-realism, will assist in providing comprehensive theoretical explanations for the analysis of Japan's changing security identity.

### **Implications for the Future of Japan's Security Identity**

Although it is difficult to crystal-gaze into Japan's security identity in the future, it is theoretically feasible to identify and analyse possible scenarios in terms of analytical eclecticism. The possible scenarios are: Japan as a non-violent state, as a UN centrist state, as a completely normal state, and an equal US ally. From the perspective of classical liberalism, it can be argued that Japan should revise the current Peace Constitution in order to make the SDF and the Japan-US military alliance explicitly unconstitutional (Inoue 2006). In this scenario, Japan would become a non-violent state in a condition of unarmed neutrality, without any military alliance with the United States. This scenario, however, is unlikely to happen, considering the weakened political influence of the Japanese Socialist and Communist parties. As a pre-condition, this might require the establishment of an international security organisation in Asia or of a functional world government that could provide sufficient security for non-violent states. Although it remains theoretically possible, like the theory of world government this scenario seems unattainable in practice at least in the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, from the perspective of neo-liberalism, it is fair to argue that Japan could become a UN centrist state, able to participate in all UN peace operations, after a constitutional revision. For instance, Ichirō Ozawa (2006) suggested that Japan should establish a UN stand-by force to contribute to the UN collective security system. Although re-organisation of the SDF into a UN stand-by force is technically feasible, this scenario would require Japan to participate in UN-authorised military operations, and therefore Japan might need to normalise its military capability. Thus, if it wishes to become a UN centrist state that can make a full military contribution to all UN peace operations, including military sanctions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, Japan might need to become a normal state. In this scenario, Japan might abrogate its military alliance with the United States to become a completely UN centrist state.

As has been suggested already, if conservative politicians revise Article 9, Japan will not fail to become a normal state with ordinary military power commensurate with its technology and economic power. This paper argues that Japan has been becoming a normal state, but that constitutional

amendment will be required to complete this process. As a completely normal state, Japan would be able to contribute to both UN-authorised and US-led military operations. Still, as Yukio Hatoyama (1999, 2009) has suggested, a normal state would limit its military commitment based on national interest. Takashi Inoguchi (2008) has analysed how Japan has become, and will remain, a global ordinary power. He has also predicted that a future Japanese government will revise the current Constitution by 2020. If Japan normalises its military capability as a normal state or as a global ordinary power, it may also desire to maximise its military power (Mearsheimer 2001). In this scenario, it is conceivable that Japan might even seek to possess nuclear weapons (Waltz 1993).

By revising or deleting Article 9, Japan would become an equal US ally that could make a full military commitment to a US-led war in the future. The United States has pressured Japan into normalising its military capability so that Japan can contribute to the bilateral military alliance. Therefore, the United States would welcome a scenario whereby Japan becomes an equal US ally (INSS 2000). Still, it is possible that Japan might seek to become a militarily independent state while remaining a US military partner. Even so, in this scenario, Japan as a US military partner would remain loyal to decisions made by Washington. From the structural realist and geopolitical viewpoint, a military alliance with the United States would remain a critical part of security policy even after constitutional revision. Again, in order to become an equal US ally, Japan would need to become a completely normal state by revising Article 9. In all of these scenarios, the theoretical implications of analytical eclecticism are profound and meaningful here in investigating the past, present and the future of Japan's security identity.

### **Conclusion**

This work has investigated the applicability of analytical eclecticism, as proposed by Peter Katzenstein, to the study of Japan's security identity. The paper started with an overview of Japan's composite security identity and its elusiveness. It was stressed that Japan's security identity has been changing and has sometimes been contradictory. As was pointed out, at the end of the Pacific War, Japan was transformed from an aggressive militarist state into an idealistic pacifist state. In the process of deliberation over the current Constitution, Japan chose to become a relative pacifist state rather than an absolute pacifist state. In the face of the Cold War structure, Japan as a pacifist state decided to become a US ally and began normalising its military capability towards becoming a normal state. In the post-Cold War world, Japan then de-

cided to make a contribution to UNPKOs as a UN peacekeeper. With these transitions in mind, the main research question raised in the introduction was how political science and international relations theories might provide a systematic understanding of the complexity of Japan's changing security identity.

In an attempt to seek a solution, this research critically examined orthodox theories of international relations and pointed out their limitations. One theoretical problem that was clarified is that each theory remains incomplete and provides a limited perspective. Nonetheless, this paper demonstrated that each theory and approach can be mutually supplemental and that a theoretically eclectic approach is possible and applicable to the study of Japan's security identity. Significantly, four theoretical models of Japan's security identity (constructivism) – as a pacifist state (classical liberalism), a UN peacekeeper (neo-liberalism), a normal state (classical realism), and a US ally (neo-liberalism) – were then proposed in order to provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis. The applicability of the eclectic approach was tested by examining these four theoretical models, and these

perspectives were found helpful for a more systematic understanding of Japan's security identity.

In addition, the paper presented possible scenarios of Japanese security identity after constitutional revision. It is not absolutely possible to predict future scenarios, but the eclectic analytical method assisted in visualising each of four theoretical possibilities: Japan as a non-violent state, a UN centrist state, a completely normal state, an equal US ally. The four theoretical models proposed in the paper will remain valid until a future Japanese government revises Article 9. Moreover, analytical eclecticism will remain effective in the analysis of Japan's security identity into the future. The originality of this study, therefore, lies in the fact that this research has germinated four theoretical models of Japan's security identity, has demonstrated the utility of analytical eclecticism, and has used this method to provide a more systematic and comprehensive explanation of Japan's security identity than has been offered thus far. In this way, this work contributes to the application of international relations theory to the study of Japanese security identity.

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

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


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